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"FREE TO BE ARBITRARY AND...
CAPRICIOUS": WEIGHT-BASED
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LOGIC OF
AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
Elizabeth E. Therant
We have demonized subordinating practices of the past to such a
degree that condemning such practices may instead function to exonerate
practices contested in the present, none of which looks so unremittingly
"evil" by contrast. That which we retrospectively judge evil was once
justified as reasonable.'
Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises not from malice or
hostile animus alone. It may result as well from insensitivity caused by
simple want of careful, rational reflection or from some instinctive mech-
anism to guard against people who appear to be different in some re-
spects from ourselves. 2
In this article, I seek to offer an approach to antidiscrimination law
that resists placating itself with the "demonization of subordinating prac-
tices of the past" by requiring a stronger attunement to the subordinating
practices of the present. In particular, my focus here is on a specific
failing of American antidiscrimination law: its reliance on inaccurate and
deeply misleading premises about how human bias, stereotyping, and
prejudice function, and its concomitant stance that only those forms of
discrimination that are reflective of these inaccurate premises merit legal
remediation. This failing results in two major areas of underinclusivity:
Antidiscrimination law in this country fails to cover both those types of
t Law clerk, Honorable Nancy Gertner; J.D., Yale Law School, 2001. I owe a profound
debt of gratitude to several mentors and scholars: On the legal end, I thank Professor Drew S.
Days III, whose careful supervision and deep knowledge of antidiscrimination law pushed me
to pursue points both large and small to their logical conclusions. My sincerest thanks also go
to Professor Kelly Brownell and Dr. Marlene Schwartz of the Yale Department of Psychology,
whose enthusiastic support and expertise in the fields of psychology and obesity stigma were
invaluable to me in executing this highly interdisciplinary project. Dr. Eunice Chen and Re-
becca Puhl, also of the Yale Psychology Department, were unfailingly helpful and supportive
as well. Finally, I would like to thank the Rudd Foundation and the Rudd Institute Scholars,
particularly Dr. Steven N. Blair and Dr. James Early, for their comments, insight, and support.
Of course, it goes without saying-although I'll say it anyway-that any remaining mistakes,
inadequacies, or omissions are entirely mine.
I Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Sta-
rus-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111, 1113 (1997).
2 Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (con-
curring in decision striking down Title I of the A.D.A. as against the states).
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discrimination that do not comport with a perpetrator-blame model, and
those types that disadvantage groups not deemed to have suffered suffi-
ciently in the past at the hands of such blameworthy perpetrators. As I
will discuss below, the example of weight-based discrimination serves as
an important illustration of how this underinclusivity fails many Ameri-
cans and leaves them without recourse for arbitrary, irrational, and unfair
treatment.
Civil rights law in America is inordinately resistant to extending
protection to the victims of "new" forms of discrimination-"new," at
least, in the sense that they are not already enshrined in our legal code,
even if they have been occurring for centuries. By this point in our his-
tory, we are relatively comfortable with the notions of race-, religion-,
and ethnicity-based intentional, animus-driven discrimination as morally
problematic; we are slightly less comfortable with that characterization
of gender-based discrimination, somewhat less comfortable with it as ap-
plied to disability and age discrimination, and very much less comforta-
ble with extending it to sexual orientation discrimination. The further we
move away from the racial end of this spectrum, the less protection we
are willing to afford. Anything beyond sexual orientation discrimination
does not exist on the legal spectrum at all; these are simply "social pref-
erences" into which the legal system does not inquire.
There is a similar resistance to moving onto a different spectrum
entirely: that of non-intentional forms of discrimination that may occur
outside of the individual's awareness. No matter what the effects of
these other types of discrimination-no matter how regularly they result
in denial of jobs, wrongful termination, exclusion from public accommo-
dations, or other harms-they are still not deemed to warrant legal
remediation, both because they are insufficiently "concrete," and because
those who perpetrate them are thus not worthy of "blame." This is the
kind of reasoning employed by Justice Powell in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, where he argued, in the context of race-based af-
firmative action: "Societal discrimination, without more, is too amor-
phous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. . . . No one
doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination in this country.
But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work
against innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and over-
expansive. ' 3
This conception of antidiscrimination law, I argue, has it backwards.
Antidiscrimination law does not, and should not, exist principally to pun-
ish those who do "blameworthy" things; it is not perpetrator-focused in
the same sense as the criminal law. Rather, the purpose of American
3 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986).
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antidiscrimination law (and the doctrine of equal protection) has been,
from the start, to provide a recourse and a remedy for those denied their
civil rights, whether by the government or, slightly later, by private ac-
tors. Whether the people engaging in these forms of discrimination are
somehow "bad" or "blameworthy" is entirely beside the point. If the
discriminatory acts of one group deprive another group of civil or human
rights, intentionally or otherwise, then the law should be able to provide
a remedy-regardless of whether the deprived group is a previously ac-
knowledged (in the law) target of discrimination.
I maintain that American antidiscrimination law, completely con-
sistently with its purpose, can extend broader protections to "new"
groups and targets of forms of discrimination for which there may be no
particular person, group, or period in our history to "blame." In so doing,
I use the problem of weight-based discrimination to illustrate how a
"non-traditional" and often non-explicit form of discrimination can have
a profound negative impact on members of the target group. Weight
discrimination is also an area in which plaintiffs, defendants, advocates,
and courts have struggled to fit the claims that arise into the existing
statutory schemes, both federal and state, with little consistent success.
The principal reason behind this lack of success is the narrow specificity
of many antidiscrimination statutes, intended to address only certain
"subjects" of discrimination, such as race, sex, or disability. The present
statutory scheme, I argue, draws an essentially arbitrary distinction be-
tween these types of discrimination and others, when, in reality, most
types of discrimination are functionally the same, and the kinds of harms
they perpetrate vary only with respect to the target population. Thus, in
creating a body of antidiscrimination law, we should not seek to con-
strain the availability of remediation based solely on the identity of the
target population or on the intent of the actor. Rather, we should adopt a
more flexible approach, which would essentially allow Title VII-type
federal antidiscrimination statutes to be applied to any group for which
there is substantial proof of systematic discrimination. This approach
also suggests a much closer relationship between the law (especially leg-
islators) and the social sciences, since, in many cases, what the law con-
siders a "new" or as yet untouched problem has actually been the subject
of research for many years. Obesity discrimination, as we shall see be-
low, is certainly one such example. Moreover, while there are definite
difficulties and challenges with this approach that need to be addressed,
any criticism that merely echoes Justice Powell in complaining that such
a remedy would punish the "innocent" fundamentally misunderstands
both the nature of the problem and the critical need for a solution.
This article will proceed as follows. Part I will address the basic
questions of what bias, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are
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and how they function, both implicitly and explicitly. In so doing, it will
cover terrain that, at least to my knowledge, has never been addressed
rigorously and thoroughly within legal scholarship and with particular
reference to legal issues; although several legal scholars have incorpo-
rated one or another particular psychological or sociological theory of
prejudice and discrimination into their work, my goal here is to answer
the question of what, taken together, all of the past and current social
science research has to tell us about how, when, and why we stereotype
and discriminate. Part II will then move into a close analysis of obesity
discrimination as an illustration of how American antidiscrimination law,
in its current form, fails to afford any consistent protection against a very
real, extensively documented, and much-suffered form of discrimination.
In Part III, I will turn to the remediation issue, where I will argue that
remedies for obesity discrimination and other similar types of discrimi-
nation must be made available at the federal level. Specifically, I will
argue that antidiscrimination statutes such as Title VII, or at least the
fundamental logic behind them, should not remain "subject-matter re-
stricted," but should be able to accommodate any form of harmful dis-
crimination-whether "intentional" or automatic-that deprives a target
group of protected civil rights.
I. ETIOLOGY OF PREJUDICE AND BIAS
As Susan Fiske explains, the psychological study of stereotyping,
prejudice, and discrimination began in the second quarter of the twenti-
eth century, so that there was already an extensive literature review on
the subject by 1954. 4 Before going into the details of how our under-
standing of bias has evolved since then, however, it will be useful to
present a few basic definitions of already familiar words that are also
psychological "terms of art," which will help to clarify the subsequent
discussion.
A. DEFINITIONS
The terms "stereotyping," "prejudice," and "discrimination," as
used in psychology, refer to diffeient aspects of category-based reactions
to people from groups perceived to differ significantly from one's own.5
4 Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 357-58 (4th ed. 1998).
5 As Fiske notes, id. at 357, there is some semantic and conceptual disagreement on this
point, but regardless of the labels or framework chosen there seems to be consensus as to the
existence of distinctions between these three phenomena. For another discussion, see Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimina-
tion and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1176 (1995). For the pur-
poses of this article, and specifically because the choice of semantic labels doesn't matter
much for these purposes, I have chosen to adopt Fiske's definitional and semantic framework,
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Stereotyping is generally understood as the cognitive component of these
category-based reactions: the part arising from and relating to the thought
process, by which we process information and assign meaning to experi-
ence. Prejudice is a term with a fairly broad range of meanings; as used
in the social-psychological literature, it can refer either to a subject's
immediate emotional response to a target group (e.g., pity, anger, fear),
or to the attitudes or beliefs that result from this response (e.g., contempt,
inferiority). I use it here to refer to the affective, or emotional, compo-
nent of these reactions: how one feels about a member of a different
group, or about that group generally. In order to distinguish between the
two potential meanings, I will refer to the attitudes and beliefs that result
from affective prejudice as "bias"; I am using this term in order to distin-
guish it not only from prejudice, but also from discrimination, which is a
behavioral phenomenon. Discrimination refers to how people implement
their stereotypic thoughts and prejudicial feelings in dealing with mem-
bers of different groups: refusing to hire them, marry them, speak to
them, etc. As we will see later, stereotyping, prejudice, and bias, as well
as many combinations thereof, can lead to discriminatory behavior.
B. STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE
1. Historical overview
Prior to 1920 or so, group-based stereotyping and prejudice were
not subjects of study because they were not really seen as a problem;
"the existence of real differences between the races was widely, if not
universally, accepted."'6 Beginning in 1920, however, psychologists be-
gan to look for the sources of prejudice, and by 1940, as Beschle ex-
plains, they were looking for the sources of "irrational prejudice."'7
Since the 1940s, several different theories have gained currency as
psychological explanations for stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimina-
tion. While their respective primacies have waxed and waned, these the-
ories have all influenced the current understanding of how these
phenomena work. Perhaps the most important point to stress is that ster-
eotyping, prejudice, and discrimination seem to be multiply deter-
mined-there is no single factor or influence that accounts for why
stereotypes or prejudices form, and, consequently, how discrimination
then occurs. Thus, in reviewing the history of this area of study, it will
although I have added the term "bias" in order to clear up some of the confusion between the
different meanings of "prejudice."
6 Donald L. Beschle, "You've Got to Be Carefully Taught": Justifying Affirmative Ac-
tion After Croson and Adarand, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1141, 1163 (1996).
7 Id. (quoting Franz Samuelson, From 'Race Psychology' to 'Studies in Prejudice':
Some Observations on The Thematic Reversal in Social Psychology, 14 J. HIST. BEHAVIORAL
Sci. 265, 265 (1978)).
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be useful to keep the different theories in mind as illuminating different
aspects of the etiology question, rather than viewing it as a scientific
trial-and-error progression from "wrong" account to "wrong" account
until we finally arrive at the "right" one.
Social psychology has offered two different broad groups of theo-
ries to explain the occurrence of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimina-
tion: one centered on the individual, and another centered on social and
social-structural factors. The earliest work in this area, beginning in the
late 1940s, was mostly individual-focused, "hing[ing] on the individual's
conscious or unconscious conflict between the personal (desires, beliefs,
or feelings) and the social (appropriate or learned responses)[.]" '8 In the
late 1940s and 1950s, researchers responding to the horror of the Holo-
caust focused on "authoritarian personality theory," which sought to de-
lineate the personality traits that would most predispose someone to
outgroup-hatred: "blind submission to authority, strict adherence to mid-
dle-class conventions, aggression against those who do not live conven-
tionally, and the tendency to think in rigid categories."' 0
In the 1960s and 1970s, some researchers began to question
whether, notwithstanding the existence of some "virulent" outgroup-hat-
ers, the dominant affect of prejudice in general was not actually hatred,
which would in turn lead to aggression, but rather "ambivalence and dis-
comfort, leading to avoidance."' This insight led to the development of
several theories known collectively as "subtle racism," all building on
the notion that whites' attitudes toward blacks might best be character-
ized as generally ambivalent and conflicted rather than hostile. For ex-
ample, one such theory, symbolic racism, held that "because whites were
no longer comfortable expressing racism directly (perhaps as the result of
a change in norms), they would express it instead by advocating tradi-
tional values and policy preferences that all happened to disadvantage
black people."' 12 Another, aversive racism, held that:
Modern norms against overt racism make their own ra-
cism aversive to whites, so they cannot admit it to them-
selves. Because aversive racists are concerned with their
8 Fiske, supra note 4, at 360.
9 Id. at 358.
10 Id. at 358.
11 Id. at 359.
12 Id. at 359. See also Lawrence D. Bobo, Prejudice as Group Position: Microfounda-
tions of a Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations, 55 J. Soc. ISSUEs 445, 465
(1999) (arguing that "laissez-faire racism," which "legitimates persistent Black disadvantage
in the United States ... [and] condones as much Black disadvantage and segregation as the
legacy of historic discrimination along with modem-day free-market forces and informal so-
cial mechanisms can reproduce or exacerbate," has replaced much of Jim Crow racism in
modern America).
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own egalitarian self-images, they avoid acting in overtly
discriminatory ways. But when their behavior can be
explained away by other factors (i.e., when they have a
nonracial excuse), or when situational norms are weak,
ambiguous, or confusing (i.e., when right and wrong are
less clear), then aversive racists are most likely to dis-
criminate overtly because they can express their racist
attitudes without damage to their nonracist self-
concept. 13
In the 1990s, the "dissociation" model built on and extended the
insights of subtle racism theory, emphasizing a distinction between peo-
ple's conscious beliefs about others and their early internalization of cul-
tural stereotypes. This model holds that people learn cultural stereotypes
about others at an extremely young age, when they are not yet able to
evaluate such stereotypes critically, and these stereotypes become acti-
vated automatically on encounters with members of the stereotyped
groups. 14 However, "people's personal beliefs-which may complement
or contradict their knowledge of cultural stereotypes-develop later than
their cultural knowledge, are less practiced, and thus are less
automatic." 15
At the same time, beginning in the mid-1950s, another strain of psy-
chological research began to examine the social and contextual aspects of
stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. The resulting line of schol-
arship on "social cognition theory" focused mostly on categorization: the
ways in which ordinary human cognitive processes drive people to pro-
cess the world in categorical terms-including, with regard to the social
world, the us-them distinction between "ingroups" and "outgroups."' 16
As Fiske points out, the real forerunner in this line of scholarship was
Gordon Allport, whose 1954 book, The Nature of Prejudice, was among
the very first to emphasize "the role of social categorization and its ame-
lioration by constructive interethnic contact."' 17 Although Allport still
made extensive reference to distinctions between "prejudiced" and "tol-
erant" types of people, 18 he nonetheless argued that categorization was a
normal and inevitable aspect of how human beings process the world
13 Fiske, supra note 4, at 360 (citing S.L. Gaertner & J.F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of
Racism, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61 (J.F. Dovidio & S.L. Gaertner eds.,
1986)). See also Charles R. Lawrence II, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 335 (1987) (from a particularly Freudian
perspective, arguing that racism, including aversive racism, originates in the unconscious).
t4 Fiske, supra note 4, at 360.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 361.
17 Id.
18 E.g., GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 174-75 (1954).
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around them, including each other. As applied to "other" groups of
which the perceiver is not a member, however, categorization could often
result in negative stereotypes and prejudice. He summarized his argu-
ment as follows:
Impressions that are similar, .... especially if a label is
attached, . . . tend to cohere into categories (generaliza-
tions, concepts). All categories engender meaning upon
the world .... [T]he principle of least effort inclines us
to hold to coarse and early-formed generalizations as
long as they can possibly be made to serve our pur-
poses .... A rational category is built around the essen-
tial or defining attributes of the object[; aln ethnic
prejudice is a category concerning a group of people, not
based on defining attributes primarily, but including va-
rious "noisy" [i.e., nonessential and possibly false] at-
tributes, and leading to disparagement of the group as a
whole. 19
Allport felt that intergroup contact could be extremely important in
mitigating these categorization effects with regard to interethnic
prejudice, but not just any contact would do; in fact, the wrong kind of
contact could easily exacerbate the problem, especially in the short
term.20 He promoted "equal status contact.., in the pursuit of common
goals[,] ... sanctioned by institutional supports... lead[ing] to the per-
ception of common interests and common humanity .... ,,21
During the next two decades in the U.S. and Europe, and especially
in the 1970s, social psychologists built on and greatly extended Allport's
cognitive theory of prejudice into what came to be known as social cog-
nition theory. Experiments established repeatedly that ingroup-favorit-
ism and outgroup-bias could be evoked in people even on the basis of
arbitrary or socially meaningless group assignations.22 For example,
Tajfel and Wilkes found that, in asking subjects to estimate the relative
lengths of eight lines on a page, the results differed depending on
whether the lines were presented as belonging to either "Group A" or
"Group B," or whether they were simply presented as eight individual,
ungrouped lines.23 "[Qince they introduced the concept of 'groupness'
19 Id. at 175-76.
20 See generally id. at 261-82 (chapter 16 titled "The Effect of Contact").
21 Id. at 281.
22 See Fiske, supra note 4, at 361 ("The minimal group paradigm, in which research
participants are divided into arbitrary groups by explicitly trivial or random means, reliably
demonstrates ingroup favoritism in the distribution of rewards .... ); see also Beschle, supra
note 6, at 1166-67.
23 Krieger, supra note 5, at 1186 (discussing Henri Tajfel & A.L. Wilkes, Classification
and Quantitative Judgement, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101 (1963)).
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into the situation, subjects perceived objects in different groups as more
different from each other, and objects in the same group as more similar
to each other, than was in fact the case."' 24 A better known (or at least
better publicized) example of this kind of work was the series of "brown-
eyes/blue-eyes" simulations begun by elementary school teacher Jane El-
liott after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968, which
illustrated how quickly ingroup-outgroup prejudices could form on the
basis of a normally socially insignificant trait, and how quickly the ef-
fects of such prejudices became substantial and detrimental to the target
group. 25 These and many other similar experiments established fairly
conclusively that "[t]he mere perception of belonging to different groups
triggers ingroup favoritism and relative outgroup discrimination." 26
Social cognition theories begin with the premise that "people are
cognitive misers, overwhelmed by the complexity of the social environ-
ment and forced to conserve scarce mental resources. '27 Viewed in this
light, categorization serves an important cognitive function in terms of
efficiency, but at the same time leads to fundamental errors, as Taylor
proposed:
[C]ategorization (1) tags information by physical and so-
cial distinctions such as race and gender, (2) minimizes
within-group differences and exaggerates between-group
differences, and (3) causes group members' behavior to
be interpreted stereotypically. As a result of catego-
rizing a set of people into two or more groups, small
groups (i.e., solos, pairs, or minorities within a larger
group in any given setting) elicit (4) more distinctions
among themselves and (5) more stereotyped perceptions.
Increasing familiarity, however, (6) allows more distinc-
tions and (7) creates subtypes. 28
As Fiske explains, these kinds of "cognitive-shortcut" theories "[re-
main] a dominant theme in current understandings of stereotyping,
prejudice, and discrimination .... ,"29 However, in the 1990s, researchers
24 Id.
25 For details of Elliott's work, see WILLIAM PETERS, A CLASS DIVIDED (1971); WILLIAM
PETERS, A CLASS DIVIDED: THEN AND Now (1987). Elliott's experimental framework spawned
a research literature of its own; e.g., Deborah A. Byrnes & Gary Kiger, Prejudice-Reduction
Simulations: Ethics, Evaluations, and Theory into Practice, 23 SIMULATION & GAMING 457
(1992); Angie Williams & Howard Giles, Prejudice-Reduction Simulations: Social Cognition,
Intergroup Theory, and Ethics, 23 SIMULATION & GAMING 472 (1992).
26 Fiske, supra note 4, at 361.
27 Id. at 362.
28 Id. (discussing S.E. Taylor, A Categorization Approach to Stereotyping, in COGNITIVE
PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 83 (D.L. Hamilton ed., 1981)).
29 Id. at 363.
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came to place less emphasis on the notion of the "cognitive miser" con-
strained to make these kinds of categorization shortcuts, and instead
came to view the shortcuts as only one cognitive option among many that
people could pursue, depending on context and on predilection. These
more recent theories, based on what Fiske terms the "motivated tacti-
cian" metaphor,
assume that people normally engage in cognitive short-
cuts, unless motivated to go beyond them. The term
"tactician" suggests that people strategically choose
which interactions merit additional effort and which do
not, motivated by their current goals. Goal-based
choices could be made strategically (that is, planned
before a specific encounter), but more likely they are




The current understanding of stereotyping and prejudice, as alluded
to above, does not adhere exclusively to any one of these earlier theories;
nor does it reject any of them outright. Rather, prejudice and stereotyp-
ing are understood to result from a host of different factors, both inside
and outside of the individual's awareness. For example, on the cognitive
end, the process of categorization itself seems to occur largely "automati-
cally," without intentional intervention by the perceiver, 3' as does a bias
toward ingroup favoritism. 32 Moreover, stereotypic judgment can be-
come essentially automatic through repeated exposure and "practice,"
which then serves to enhance further the processing speed advantage ob-
tained by using stereotypes to begin with.33
Cognitive schemas, when they occur, also seem to occur automati-
cally. As Krieger explains, cognitive schema theory holds that, in creat-
ing categories, we create mental images of "typical" or "ideal" category
members, for example, the "typical letter a," "typical chair," "typical law
school professor," or "typical urban gang member."' 34 Then, in determin-
30 Id.
31 Id. at 364 ("What is startling about categorization is, first, how rapid and apparently
automatic it can be; and second, whether automatic or not, how many potentially automatic
ramifications it has.").
32 Id. at 365. Interestingly enough, as Fiske notes, the finding of automatic ingroup fa-
voritism is far more robust than that of outgroup derogation, although there is some evidence
for the latter as well.
33 Id. at 366.
34 Krieger, supra note 5, at 1189-90.
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ing whether a new letter, object, or person fits into any of these catego-
ries, we do so by comparing it to the category prototype and making
some assessment of the distance between the two. These cognitive
schemas function as theories about the nature of events or situations we
face, and, "[o]nce activated, the schema influences the interpretation, en-
coding, and organizing of incoming information and mediates the draw-
ing of inferences or the making of predictions about the schematized
object or event."35 However, as with any other cognitive shortcuts, there
is a price to the cognitive economy of schemas: As Krieger puts it, "cate-
gorical structures ...bias what we see, how we interpret it, how we
encode and store it in memory, and what we remember about it later. ' 36
Thus, in intergroup relations, cognitive schemas can result in
discrimination.
Another demonstrable, automatic aspect of stereotyping results from
attribution errors. In particular, what is commonly referred to as the "ul-
timate attribution error" refers to "the tendency to accept the good for the
ingroup and the bad for the outgroup as personal and dispositional, but
more important, to explain away the bad for the ingroup and the good for
the outgroup with situational attributions. ' 37 In other words, if I succeed
and you fail, I am more likely to say that that is because I am smarter or
more capable than you; but if I fail and you succeed, I am more likely to
say that you had more time to work on the project than I did, or that you
tried harder, or that you had better access to resources. The ultimate
attribution error thus serves to reinforce the separate tendency to favor
stereotype-confirming information by making such information "disposi-
tional"-not only is the perceiver more likely to register stereotype-con-
firming information about others, but s/he is also more likely to view
such information as reflective of others' inherent dispositions rather than
of external, social factors. 38 Thus, to take a linguistic example,
People apparently encode and communicate positive in-
group and negative outgroup behavior more ab-
stractly . . . than counter-stereotypic behavior. The
effect is subtle but telling: An ingroup member may
have punched someone, but an outgroup member was
aggressive. This linguistic intergroup bias apparently
stems from stereotype congruency, rather than from in-
group protection[.] . . . [P]eople use such remembered
35 Id. at 1190.
36 Id.
37 Fiske, supra note 4, at 369 (citing Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution
Error: Extending Allport's Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PsYcHoL.
BULL. 461 (1979)); see also Krieger, supra note 5, at 1204-07.
38 Fiske, supra note 4, at 369.
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abstract summaries ("aggressive") as the basis for future
interactions, rather than returning to the data on which
the summaries were based, and such abstract summaries
resist disconfirmation for the same reason-because
they are not easily unpacked and scrutinized. Such lin-
guistic attributional bias subtly perpetuates stereo-
types .... 39
Memory also sustains stereotypes in a number of ways, both creat-
ing an ingroup advantage with regard to memory (e.g., remembering
same-race targets more easily than different-race targets) and an advan-
tage in recall of stereotype-congruent information as compared to stereo-
type-disconfirming information. 40 Thus, "once a target individual has
been perceived as a member of a particular category, people are more
likely to remember the target as exhibiting attributes and behaviors com-
monly associated with that category," including stereotype-consistent be-
haviors that never actually occurred. 41 Moreover, there is even evidence
for a "categorization disadvantage," such that people tend to "confuse
other people they have lumped into the same category. '42 Thus, for ex-
ample, people tend to "tag comments by race and gender: [e.g.,] 'I know
a woman said it, but I can't recall which woman."' 43
At the same time, there are certain aspects of stereotyping that seem
to be less automatic and more driven by utility and social pragmatism-
in other words, at least in certain situations they "can help people interact
more easily." 44 Categories that are physically manifest, socially signifi-
cant, and salient to immediate interaction goals will tend to persist; the
level at which they persist (e.g., "woman" versus "petite woman" or
"blonde") will also depend on social and cognitive utility.45 A primary
and widespread example of this kind of persistence of stereotypes is
"proxyism," where the perceiver uses one stereotyped trait in order to
make predictions about the disposition of the target who possesses that
trait. In a culture such as ours, which has been moving away from close-
knittedness and localized interactions for the last century or more, the
increasing likelihood that we will encounter unknown people in contexts
(e.g., employment) where evaluation is important creates a strong need,
or at least a desire, to make rapid inferences about people we do not
know well. Thus, as Fiske explains, "to the extent that dispositional in-
39 Id. at 370 (citations omitted).
40 Id. at 371; see also Krieger, supra note 5, at 1208-09.
41 Krieger, supra note 5, at 1208.
42 Fiske, supra note 4, at 371.
43 Id. at 372.
44 Id. at 375.
45 Id. at 376-77.
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ferences allow perceivers the sense that they can predict the course of
future encounters, traits will be central in stereotypes-and so they
are[.]" ' 4 6 Moreover, stereotypes become even more "useful" to the extent
that either (1) they are actually accurate,47 or (2) stereotype-confirming
behavior occurs,48 even if such behavior is actually a self-fulfilling
prophecy resulting from the stereotype itself, or if the stereotype happens
to be consonant with social roles that shape behavior in other ways.
Thus, while some aspects of the stereotyping process are at least
semi-deliberate and serve utilitarian purposes, social cognition theory in-
dicates that much of stereotyping occurs outside the realm of deliberation
or consciousness. People categorize other people just as they categorize
everything else; unfortunately, when it comes to other people, the mis-
takes can be socially costly.
b. Prejudice
Just as with stereotyping, there are both automatic and nonautomatic
aspects of prejudice, some of which are individual, and others systemic
or social-structural. Fiske highlights three main causes of prejudice de-
scribed in the current social-psychological literature-group threat, the
wrong kind of direct contact, and individual hostility-all of which
"share an underlying dimension of perceived threat to the core of the
prejudiced person. '49 The notion of group threat grows out of the core
insight of social identity and self-categorization theory: that people's
sense of self extends to the ingroup as a whole. Thus, in situations where
one perceives a threat to one's group, particularly in terms of a focus on
the group's relative gains, jobs, or welfare, prejudice against the threat-
ening groups is likely to result.50 Evidence indicates that direct contact,
on the other hand, can create problems even when the outgroup member
presents no particular threat to the perceiver, because, as Fiske puts it,
"[flamiliarity smooths people's transactions; difference disrupts[, and
s]uch disruptions cause anxiety, discomfort, and irritation."'5' And, fi-
nally, as the early authoritarian personality theorists pointed out in the
1940s and 1950s, there is a personality type that is particularly inclined
to prejudice: the "right-wing authoritarian":
[R]ight-wing authoritarians [are] submissive to author-
ity, aggressive in an authoritarian way (i.e., down a sanc-
46 Id. at 376.
47 See id. at 381.
48 Id. at 382-83.
49 Id. at 374.
50 Id. at 373; see also Bobo, supra note 12, at 448 (discussing Herbert Blumer's group
position model of racial prejudice).
51 Fiske, supra note 4, at 373 (citations omitted); see also ALLPORT, supra note 18, at
261-62.
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tioned hierarchy), and conventional. People high on this
scale are more prejudiced than mere stereotypes would
explain; the evaluative implications of stereotypes (e.g.,
incompetent, lazy) do not explain the hostility of people
high on this scale. The attitudes of high right-wing
authoritarians seem to be based not on stereotypes, but
on perceived value differences, and such people are
more likely to act on their hostility. Conventional values
and authoritarianism also predict rejection of the
stigmatized.5 2
Another factor that seems to affect the evocation and degree of
prejudice against stigmatized groups is that of perceived controllability.
Bernard Weiner, for example, has done extensive work on the role of
perceived stigma controllability in evoking negative affective re-
sponses.5 3 He has demonstrated repeatedly and convincingly that peo-
ple's affective responses to members of stigmatized groups vary
considerably depending on the nature of the stigma and the extent to
which the stigmatized trait is perceived to be within the control of the
person who possesses it. As he explains,
[J]ust as is the evaluation of an achievement outcome,
reactions to stigmatized persons are in part based on
moral principles. Persons with controllable stigmas are
construed as responsible for their conditions and are con-
sidered moral failures. This judgment gives rise to
moral-based negative affects [e.g., dislike and anger] and
corresponding behavioral intentions. On the other hand,
stigmatized individuals with uncontrollable "marks" are
not held responsible for their stigmata and are consid-
ered "innocent victims." This construal elicits altruism-
generating affects [e.g., pity] and positive behavior.54
Moreover, Weiner found that "[t]he degree of moral condemna-
tion.., directed toward stigmatized persons can be altered by communi-
cating specific causal information." 55 Thus, for example, given two
physical conditions-heart disease, the onset of which people tended to
52 Fiske, supra note 4, at 373 (citations omitted).
53 E.g., Ralf Schwarzer & Bernard Weiner, Stigma Controllability and Coping as
Predictors of Emotions and Social Support, 8 J. Soc. & PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 133 (1991);
BERNARD WEINER, JUDGMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1995); Bernard Weiner, On Sin Versus
Sickness: A Theory of Perceived Responsibility and Social Motivation, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
957 (1993); Bernard Weiner et al., An Attributional Analysis of Reactions to Stigmas, 55 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 738 (1988).
54 Weiner, supra note 53, at 960.
55 Id.
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assume was not within the patient's control, and AIDS, for the contrac-
tion of which people did tend to blame the patient-Weiner found that
respondents' affective responses to the patient changed markedly when
they were told that the heart disease was caused by smoking, or that the
patient had contracted AIDS through a blood transfusion.56
Lawrence, in arguing that all of racial prejudice originates in the
unconscious, offers, inter alia, a Freudian-psychoanalytic perspective on
the origin of prejudice. As he explains, the irrational nature of prejudices
indicates "poor reality-testing" on the part of the perceiver, which, ac-
cording to psychoanalytic theory, must fulfill some sort of psychological
function, "usually the preservation of an attitude basic to the individual's
makeup. ' 57 Thus, he argues, the stereotypes of outgroups like blacks as
"dirty, lazy, oversexed, and without control of their instincts" imply that
their Ids dominate their Egos, while those of Jews as "pushy, ambitious,
conniving, and in control of business, money, and industry" imply that
their Egos dominate their Ids. 58 The resulting prejudices "correspond to
two of the most common types of neurotic conflict: that which arises
when an individual cannot master his instinctive drives in a way that fits
into rational and socially approved patterns of behavior, and that which
arises when an individual cannot live up to the aspirations and standards
of his own conscience. '59 In a sense, then, Lawrence's Freudian account
seems to maintain that stereotypes can actually grow out of prejudice-
or, more specifically, out of neurotic conflicts within the perceiver that
drive him or her to label others stereotypically.
Prejudice, then, like stereotyping, is a somewhat complex and multi-
ply determined phenomenon-or perhaps it would be more accurate to
think of it as a set of phenomena-that is only partially within one's own
awareness. 6° Without question, the kind of prejudice that would lead one
to become a member of the Ku Klux Klan is intentional, and, moreover,
evidence suggests that a predilection for this kind of prejudice resides
within a certain personality type. (Note, however, that even a KKK
56 Id.; Weiner et al., supra note 53, at 745-47.
57 Lawrence, supra note 13, at 332.
58 Id. at 333-34. Cf Fiske, supra note 4, at 385 (pointing out that "[v]arious stereotypes
seem to create two pragmatic types of people, those who are liked but disrespected, and those
who are respected but disliked; the pragmatics lie in maintaining the status quo of the one and
staving off the threat of the other.").
59 Id. at 333-34.
60 E.g., Markus Brauer et al., Implicit and Explicit Components of Prejudice, 4 REv.
GEN. PSvCHOL. 79, 96 (2000) (arguing that "prejudice should be conceived as a multidimen-
sional construct that involves the automatic activation of prejudice upon perception of a mem-
ber of the target group, application of these ideas in judgments about a member of a target
group, and conscious beliefs and action tendencies toward members of the target group. Al-
though these aspects are likely to be related for some individuals, it may nevertheless be the
case that someone who is highly prejudiced in one sense is somewhat less prejudiced in an-
other sense.").
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member could have been exposed to hate messages at a very young age,
and thus not have made a deliberate choice to adopt his/her particular
stereotypes and prejudices.) Likewise, the kind of "explicit" prejudice
described by Weiner, which is based on moral judgments of responsibil-
ity, requires at least a phase of deliberate evaluation, even though the
perceiver's impression of whether a given stigma is controllable or not
may come from implicit stereotypes or from mistaken understandings.
On the other hand, the role of group threat suggests that prejudice may
arise as an almost-automatic response to social-structural triggers that
affect the perceiver on a level outside of his/her awareness.
C. BIAS AND DISCRIMINATION
As mentioned above, "bias" refers to beliefs and feelings about
others that result from affective prejudice; discrimination is the behav-
ioral implementation of bias. Whereas, up to this point, we have been
talking about thoughts, thought processes, and feelings that occur only
within the perceiver, the notion of discrimination takes these mental phe-
nomena outside of the individual and applies them to other people.
Interestingly, several studies have shown that prejudice is a better
predictor of bias, discrimination, and social distance than is stereotyping;
or, put another way, that personal, affective beliefs about social groups
are more closely related to discriminatory behavior than are culturally
shared stereotypes. 61 However, notwithstanding these findings, Stangor
et al. point out that "[a]lthough the measures of consensual social stere-
otyping that we collected in this study accounted for little variance in
attitude, there was a significant relationship between the endorsement of
negative social stereotypes and attitudes toward disliked social
groups. ' 62 Thus, they appear to suggest that, while stereotyping does
play a role in creating prejudicial behavior, it may be more informative,
for the purposes of understanding discrimination, to focus on the affec-
tive component of "endorsing" such stereotypes rather than the cognitive
processes that create or sustain stereotypes in the first place.
Fiske argues that there are two "types" of discrimination, "hot" and
"cold." 63 "Hot" discrimination grows out of strong, affect-laden biases
of the kind that would induce someone to belong to a hate group, while
"cold" discrimination is based on stereotypes of an outgroup's interests,
knowledge, and motivations. 64 Even though "cold" discrimination ap-
pears to be more cognitive in origin, and "hot" more affective, it should
61 See, e.g., Fiske, supra note 4, at 372; Charles Stangor et al., Affective and Cognitive
Determinants of Prejudice, 9 Soc. COGNITION 359, 376-77 (1991).
62 Stangor et al., supra note 61, at 377.
63 Fiske, supra note 4, at 374-75.
64 Id.
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be noted that this does not necessarily imply a distinction in deliberate-
ness; for example, Fiske's examples of "cold" discrimination include
"[u]sed-car dealers [] exploit[ing] groups they consider gullible, and
teachers [ ] scold[ing] groups they consider thick-skinned. '65 Thus, the
"temperature" of the discrimination really speaks to affective content,
rather than to the degree of active participation of the perceiver.
There do appear to be certain contexts in which discrimination is
more likely to result, even given continuity of cognitive functioning, ste-
reotypes, and affective prejudice. Several of these contexts have already
appeared in our discussion of prejudice: For example, not only are people
likely to feel more prejudice against targets whose stigmas are perceived
to be "their fault," but they are also more likely to act on those
prejudices. 66 The "proxy" theory also predicts that discrimination is
greatly exacerbated by lack of contact with or personal knowledge of the
individual being assessed; where the perceiver has no actual knowledge
to go on, and where, as Fiske points out, "people are pushed to be deci-
sive and in control," 67 as in interviewing job candidates or loan appli-
cants, the pressure (whether or not the individual is aware of it) to
discriminate is greater. Also, where stereotypic information is perceived
to be particularly diagnostic, even where it may not actually be so, it has
a greater tendency to be relied upon. Thus, as Fiske explains, negative
information is perceived to be more diagnostic, and therefore is more
often relied upon than positive information, because (a) it is relatively
rare and unexpected in our culture generally, and (b) negative informa-
tion tends to carry an inferential asymmetry, such that "[a] dishonest per-
son can do honest things, but an honest person cannot do dishonest
things without being reclassified. '68
Another context that seems to evoke discriminatory assessment is
where the candidates being assessed are marginally, rather than well,
qualified. A study of bank lending habits, which assessed the treatment
of mortgage applicants of different races with similar credit histories,
revealed that "Black and Hispanic applicants with clearly good credit
histories were accepted about as often as comparable white applicants.
65 Id. at 375.
66 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text; but see Beschle, supra note 6, at 1168-
69 (discussing study where, even when difficulty with task completion was represented as not
the target's fault, subjects were still substantially less likely to provide assistance to black
targets (33%) than to white targets (73%)).
67 Fiske, supra note 4, at 388.
68 Id. at 386 (citation omitted). However, with regard to other dimensions, such as abili-
ties, Fiske points out that positive information can be the more diagnostic: "a genius can do
stupid things sometimes, but a stupid person cannot be a genius sometimes." Id.
2001]
130 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 11:113
However, among applicants with 'marginal' credit histories, twice as
many minorities were rejected as were whites. '69
As one might-perhaps-expect, the social pressure brought to bear
by the presence of a third party had the opposite effect on discriminatory
conduct. In one study where subjects were asked to help black and white
targets complete a task, there were substantial initial discrepancies in
subjects' willingness to assist the target based on the target's race.70
However, when a third party intervened to request the subject's help on
behalf of the target, the initial discrepancy vanished, and, in fact, subjects
were even slightly more likely to assist the black targets than the white
targets. Thus, as Beschle explains, "in the absence of social reinforce-
ment of the appropriateness of helping blacks who were in the same ob-
jective circumstances as whites, white subjects were much more likely to
overlook a white worker's own fault for his predicament than a black
worker's. This effect was eliminated when helping blacks was endorsed
by a third party." 7' It is unclear whether the subjects' increased willing-
ness to help owed more to the third party's establishment of a norm in
favor of "race-blind" assistance or to individual subjects' unwillingness
to manifest their own prejudices in the third party's presence, but
whether for reasons of belonging or accountability, the result was
significant.
Looking at the evidence as a whole, it is clear that stereotyping,
prejudice, and context all play major roles in the manifestation of bias
and discrimination. Discrimination results from not one, but many con-
junctions of all these factors-some of which are intentional, but many
more of which operate automatically and outside of the perceiver's
awareness.
D. CONTROLLABILITY OF STEREOTYPES, PREJUDICE, AND
DISCRIMINATION
Despite the fact that so much of stereotyping, prejudice, and dis-
crimination often occurs unbeknownst to the individual, studies have in-
dicated that all three are susceptible to varying degrees of control-if not
by the individual directly, then by altering the social context. One way,
as discussed above, is by including third parties, whether to "model" tol-
69 Beschle, supra note 6, at 1169-70 (citing William C. Hunter & Mary Beth Walker,
The Cultural Affinity Hypothesis and Mortgage Lending Decisions, Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, Working Paper 95-8 (July 1995)).
70 Id. at 1168-69 (discussing David L. Frey & Samuel L. Gaertner, Helping and the
Avoidance of Inappropriate Interracial Behavior: A Strategy that Perpetuates a Nonpreju-
diced Self-Image, 50 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1083 (1986)).
71 Id. at 1169. Cf. Fiske, supra note 4, at 388 ("hearing someone condemn or condone
racism (implying the local norm) leads people to express more or less antiracist attitudes (cita-
tion omitted)").
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erant norms or to promote accountability. Another way, as Gordon All-
port pointed out in the 1950s, continues to be meaningful, safe intergroup
contact within mixed neighborhoods or among friends. 72 A third mode
of control is education; as the literature on perceived controllability indi-
cates, even where people actively believe that someone is to blame for a
given trait or experience, providing them with information as to the real
etiology of that trait or experience tends to reduce both prejudice and
discrimination. 73
Thus, as Fiske explains, "[t]he context-driven nature of most of this
work implies that most people, given the wrong context, are prone to
stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. However, most people, given
the right context, can avoid stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. ' 74
Now, this is not to say that a good-faith effort is all that is required to
overcome impulses to discriminate; forcible attempts to suppress or over-
ride stereotypic categories or memories, even made with the best of in-
tentions, can often result in "rebound" effects and even more pejorative
assessments than the same person made before. 75 What is clear is that
good-faith efforts do help to mitigate, while bad faith abets, stereotyping,
prejudice, and discrimination; ultimately, though, most of what is occur-
ring lies beneath the surface, and more than deliberate good intentions
are thus required to change it.
E. CURRENT LAW AND THE BLAME PARADIGM: How TIGHT IS THE
FIT?
Given this survey of what we know of how stereotyping, prejudice,
and discrimination function, how well does American antidiscrimination
law reflect our understanding? In short, the fit is poor at best. Insofar as
our laws attempt to draw a distinction between "intentional" and
"nonintentional" discrimination, to separate "blameworthy" discrimina-
tion from "innocent" or non-blameworthy discrimination, or aspire to a
society that is truly difference-blind, they are responding to a notion of
discrimination that does not comport with reality.
72 Fiske, supra note 4, at 375; ALLPORT, supra note 18, at 261-82.
73 See, e.g., Weiner et al., supra note 53, at 745 ("Perceptions of the controllability of the
onset of many stigmas can be altered, given pertinent information .... This change in attribu-
tions tends to produce modifications of affective reactions and behavioral judgments .... What
in part appears to be needed are procedures and methods of education that point out the array
of determinants of the onsets of stigmas such as obesity and drug addiction that lessen the
perceived responsibility of the stigmatized person.").
74 Fiske, supra note 4, at 375.
75 Id. at 390.
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As other commentators have noted,76 the "intent" requirement for
Title VII disparate-treatment cases stands as an obvious offender against
the reality of how prejudice and discrimination function. Although Title
VII says nothing about intent on its face, since Teamsters v. United
States77 the courts have consistently required "proof of discriminatory
motive" in order for a disparate-treatment plaintiff to prevail. In addition
to requiring that the discrimination be both within the individual's aware-
ness and deliberate, this paradigm seems to contemplate plaintiffs com-
ing forward with "smoking-gun" evidence of employers saying, "I am
firing you because you are a woman," or "I hate blacks and I don't want
to work with them"; the further away from this model the evidence
moves, the harder it becomes for the plaintiff to prove his or her case.
Even without any knowledge of social psychology, common sense makes
it pretty easy to understand why this kind of evidence is rare; in this day
and age, an employer would have to be extremely ignorant both of the
law and of prevailing social mores to make explicit statements like these.
(This is not to say, unfortunately, that such employers no longer exist-
simply that they are increasingly rare.) Psychology, though, offers an-
other, deeper account of why we should not expect to see much direct
evidence of this sort in disparate-treatment cases: Even if these kinds of
prejudices do affect the employer's decision, there is a strong chance that
the employer him- or herself may not be consciously aware of that fact.
Whether the particular employer's bias is grounded more in stereotyping
or in prejudice, evidence for both phenomena suggests strongly that these
processes occur outside of the awareness of the perceiver. Cultural ste-
reotypes are internalized early and run deep, and a decision based on
these kinds of stereotypic judgments is likely to seem rational and sensi-
ble to the decisionmaker, even as if it were based on "experience" with
these groups of people. With regard to prejudice, theories like aversive
racism and cognitive dissonance suggest other reasons for the automatic
operation of bias: Especially in a climate where biases like racism and
sexism are generally viewed as unacceptable, someone who has these
biases will probably feel at least somewhat conflicted, or at least chal-
lenged, by the widespread public opinion that condemns them. Thus,
automatic decision-making processes operating at a level that is outside
of the individual's awareness can provide ways for unresolved prejudices
to continue.
Title VII's disparate-treatment jurisprudence does make some al-
lowance for the lack of smoking-gun evidence through "pretext" analy-
76 E.g., Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 953, 960 (1993); Krieger, supra
note 5, at 1164; Lawrence, supra note 13.
77 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
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sis, where the plaintiff seeks to prove that some seemingly-neutral
employment decision was actually just a pretext for discrimination.
However, even in pretext cases, plaintiffs are still required to prove that
both the discrimination and the application of the pretext were, in effect,
purposeful.78 As one commentator pointed out, as this requirement
works in practice, this is often tantamount to having to prove that the
employer was lying.79 In any case, while this mode of analysis may be at
least somewhat responsive to the "common-sense" concern that even the
most deliberate of discriminators won't be stupid enough to admit out-
right what s/he is doing, the psychological critique persists. In order for
a reason to be "pretextual," the implication is that there has to be some
other, "real," intentional decision that the employer is trying to hide.
While this may be true in some circumstances, the psychological litera-
ture reviewed above indicates that this isn't the way discrimination usu-
ally functions, at least not in the current climate.
Title VII, however, is only one part of a larger picture of American
constitutional and statutory antidiscrimination law that has been, and
continues to be, mostly premised on a notion of blame. Justice Powell's
argument in Wygant, mentioned at the beginning of this article, is by no
means idiosyncratic; it reflects quite accurately the stance of American
law toward prejudice and discrimination. Some discrimination is really
bad, because it is our fault; where the government endorsed and perpe-
trated it (e.g., slavery, women's disenfranchisement), we are clearly to
blame, and a cause of action and remedy are thus required. Other kinds
of prejudice and discrimination are less bad, but still bad enough to be
remedied-provided that remedy doesn't go "too far" (sexual orienta-
tion, age). All other forms of discrimination (e.g., appearance) may ar-
guably be bad, but not bad enough to warrant legal recourse, and thus
those who act on these prejudices are not to be required to stop. Moreo-
ver, as Justice Powell explained in Wygant, even the really bad kind of
discrimination still isn't bad enough to require a remedy that punishes
"innocents" by affecting the current distribution of resources to their
disadvantage.
78 See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (holding that because
ultimate burden of persuasion rested with Title VII plaintiff, trier of fact's determination that
defendant's reasons were pretextual did not entitle plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law);
Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Wa-
ters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The requirements for an equal protection claimant proceeding under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 or 1983 mirror the Title VII requirements. Krieger, supra note 5, at 1168
n.16.
79 Krieger, supra note 5, at 1163 n.8 ("Existing disparate treatment jurisprudence in
many ways equates a finding of pretext in plaintiffs favor with a finding that the employer has
lied about the reasons for its decision.").
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Psychology makes it clear just how senseless this hierarchy is.
Some groups clearly do experience more and different discrimination
than others, but this doesn't make more common forms of discrimination
''worse," or someone whose biases are more commonly held more to
blame for them. What psychology tells us is that, because of the way we
process the world around us, we are all prone to stereotyping and
prejudice to varying degrees, and cultural stereotypes and prejudices
enter our minds early and remain there long after we cease to be aware of
them. When these cognitive and affective processes lead to unfair dis-
crimination against others, the problem is not what may be going on
inside our heads, but that others are being deprived of civil rights as a
result. Regardless of when the original stereotype entered the cultural
canon, or what government actions kept it there, all of these forms of
discrimination perpetrate the same harms on target groups, and, there-
fore, should all be susceptible to legal remediation where appropriate.
Part of what may be underlying the "gradation" of discrimination-
and this is an objection commonly voiced by those opposing new civil
rights legislationS°0 -is an intuition that under certain circumstances, a
categorical exclusion of a group from a certain position may be legiti-
mate. Thus, while today race is almost never a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ), sex can be (albeit rarely-e.g., for the proverbial
wet-nurse position, 8 or for "genuineness" or "authenticity" purposes for
an actor or actress playing a role82), and something like appearance or
other physical qualities more often is (e.g, athletic ability or build for
sports, thinness for high fashion models, or, more controversially, the
ability to wear the clothes sold in a store where one works). However,
the fact that legitimate, rational job requirements may sometimes include
certain physical traits simply is not an argument for allowing irrational or
invidious discrimination based on those same traits to continue, and it
does not make this kind of discrimination any less morally problematic
or harmful.
There are two further points to take away from this discussion of
blame and remedies. First, as should be obvious, the status quo is not
bias-free. Especially in the affirmative-action context, there is a ten-
dency in the public discourse to speak about "introducing" bias, or "re-
verse-discrimination," into a neutral baseline-but the baseline clearly
isn't neutral. Second, as Professor Beschle points out, even "if we could
successfully eliminate social norms favoring prejudice, we would be left
80 See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidis-
crimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (responses to Santa Cruz "anti-lookism" ordi-
nance); see also infra notes 379-382 and accompanying text.
81 Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971).
82 Jd.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (2001).
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not with a starting point of nondiscrimination, but still with an individual
tendency to perceive differences between people and to display a bias
against those perceived as different and in favor of those seen as similar
to the self."8 3 Thus, providing a legal remedy for discriminatory in-
fringement of one's civil rights should not be about deciding who to
blame for what we did wrong in the past, or even for what we are doing
wrong now. Rather, the only meaningful purpose of such a remedy is to
monitor and attempt to prevent the infliction of irrational biases on their
targets.
In a recent article, Professor Post focuses on what he views as an-
other gap in the logic of American antidiscrimination law: its aspiration
to attain social "blindness" to appearance-related characteristics. 84 Inso-
far as this is, in fact, a goal of our antidiscrimination law, it is certainly
unrealistic. The evidence from psychology indicates that, even if we
make the best of good-faith efforts to blind ourselves to stereotypes, not
only will we probably fail, but we may end up even more prejudiced than
we started.85 Also, as just discussed above, there are certain areas in
which race, sex, and appearance are perfectly legitimate grounds for
decisionmaking, ranging from "exceptions" to otherwise-protected areas
like employment to the "private" arenas of friendship, dating, and mar-
riage. Antidiscrimination law, no matter how realistic or attuned to the
psychological realities of stereotyping and prejudice, will never succeed
in "blinding" us in this manner-as well it should not. We are not all the
same, as Post stresses, and it is not the job of the law to make us so.
However, while antidiscrimination law cannot and should not blind
us to one another's appearances, it should require us to think very care-
fully about what criteria actually matter before making decisions that dis-
criminate against others, and recognize that we are the "least cost-
avoiders" when our irrational discrimination deprives someone else of
his or her civil rights. I do not see this mandate as equivalent to "system-
atically effacing the social world," as Post does.86 Certainly, antidis-
crimination law does have great potential to "transform" existing social
practices of gender, race, and appearance-but I would argue that what is
perhaps its greatest potential lies in enabling and promoting the kinds of
meaningful and useful contact that Allport and others have stressed since
the 1950s as ways of overcoming prejudice. If people are allowed to
hide behind rationales like "blame" or "intent" in order to isolate them-
selves from the groups they stereotype and judge, then the ability of the
law to effectuate that transformation will be greatly hampered.
83 Beschle, supra note 6, at 1168.
84 Post, supra note 80.
85 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
86 Post, supra note 80, at 40.
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This, then, is the ultimate harm of the poor fit between American
antidiscrimination law and the behavior it seeks to regulate. Not only
does it fail to extend protection in areas where it is needed, and to people
who are suffering unjust discrimination, but in so doing it misses an im-
portant chance to strike at the heart of prejudice and discrimination. In
speaking of "societal discrimination," people often despair, lamenting
that the law can do little "if society doesn't change." But in areas where
society has already begun to change, at least enough to recognize that
certain types of stereotyping and prejudice are irrational, the law can
move the tide of change forward. In the twentieth century, we already
saw this occur with respect to race, gender, age, and disability. Now, as I
will proceed to argue, we could and should see it again in the twenty-first
century with other forms of discrimination.
II. WEIGHT DISCRIMINATION: A CASE STUDY
The poor fit between American antidiscrimination law and the ways
in which discrimination actually works is not just an abstract theoretical
point. It has profound consequences for the lives of many people in this
country, who are told by the laws and by the courts that irrational dis-
crimination against them is legally permissible because it doesn't match
one of the categories we have arbitrarily chosen to regulate. The purpose
of this Part is to look at one such form of discrimination in detail:
weight-based discrimination. Weight-based discrimination has the po-
tential to affect every single American, fat, average-weight, or thin, be-
cause, as we shall see below, there is no "minimum weight requirement"
for discrimination-"too fat" is squarely in the eye of the beholder.
Nonetheless, current medical estimates are that at least 70 million Ameri-
cans-more than one third of all adults and one in five children-meet
the medical standard for obesity. 87 Fifty-five percent of adult Ameri-
cans-97 million-are categorized as either overweight or obese, and
the numbers have only been growing since 1960.88 For these people-
that is to say, for the majority of adults in this country-the risk of en-
countering weight-based discrimination is unquestionably heightened.
Yet, as we shall see below, even though overweight adults may be in the
87 American Obesity Ass'n, What Is Obesity?, at http://www.obesity.org/what.htm (last
visited Feb. 18, 2001). Obesity is "officially" defined with reference to Body Mass Index, or
BMI, which is calculated by dividing a person's body weight by the square of their height. A
BMI of 30 or greater is considered obese; a BMI between 25 and 29.9 is considered over-
weight. BMI aside, as a general rule of thumb, individuals who weigh 20% or more over their
ideal body weight are considered obese; those who weigh either 100% more, or are 100 lbs.
over ideal weight, are termed "morbidly" obese.
88 Id. However, these figures are not uncontroversial. For a critique of the AOA statistics
on obesity, see LAURA FRASER, LOSING IT: FALSE HOPES AND FAT PROFITS IN THE DIET INDUS-
TRY 174-80 (paperback ed. 1998).
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numerical majority, overweight people are at high risk for discrimination
due to disempowerment because of their weight, or, more specifically,
because of their weight combined with race, gender, and socioeconomic
factors, which operate synergistically to disadvantage them further.
Weight discrimination acts to ensure that these people do not attain posi-
tions where they could alter or resist the perpetuation of that
discrimination.
This Part will proceed as follows. First, I will provide a brief over-
view of the cultural history of the American preoccupation with weight.
Then, I will turn to a detailed analysis of the state of fat prejudice in
America now: how it operates and is perpetuated, and our current scien-
tific understanding of why and how people gain, maintain, and lose
weight. Finally, I will focus on how American antidiscrimination law
has dealt with weight discrimination, and how the existing legal remedies
have failed to provide any meaningful protection, or even a coherent le-
gal framework in which to address the problem. In Part III, I will turn
back to the more general problem of how and why the law should rem-
edy these kinds of omissions.
A. CULTURAL HISTORY OF WEIGHT AND WEIGHT DISCRIMINATION IN
AMERICA
Although the first signs of American preoccupation with food and
weight showed up with the advent of Grahamism in the Jacksonian pe-
riod, the present obsession has its roots in the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, between 1890 and 1910-20.89 This was the point at which the
medical profession, an incipient commercial diet industry, and the popu-
lar culture began to link gluttony, which had previously been associated
with thinness and other medical problems such as dyspepsia and neuras-
thenia, with fatness and general notions of imbalance. 90 From that point
onward, "[n]ever previously an item of systematic public concern, diet-
ing or guilt about not dieting became an increasing staple of private life,
along with a surprisingly strong current of disgust directed against people
labeled obese." 9' As people became more self-conscious about their
weight, and society more critical, the language itself came to reflect these
trends:
[E]mbarassment blushed from language itself, as euphe-
misms for obesity ran thin. "Stout," once a fine word for
89 HILLEL SCHWARTZ, NEVER SATISFIED: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF DIETS, FANTASIES,
AND FAT 81 (1986); PETER N. STEARNS, FAT HISTORY: BODIES AND BEAUTY IN THE MODERN
WEST 3 (1997).
90 SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 68-73, 81; STEARNS, supra note 89, at 27 (doctors' con-
cern with weight as health factor).
91 STEARNS, supra note 89, at 3.
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all ages, had become ambiguous if not uncomplimen-
tary. "Fat" had become an "ugly word," wrote a middle-
aged woman . . .in 1907, . . ."Stout? Obnoxious adjec-
tive, barely tolerable as a noun." "Chubbiness" per-
tained to healthy children, "chunkiness" to runaway
slaves and then to street toughs. Around mid-century,
"dumpy," "pudgy" and "tubby" had emerged, none of
them quite as pejorative as "porky" (1860s), "sod-
packer" (1880s), "jumbo" (1880s, from the Gullah for
elephant), or "butterball" (1890s). A man might have a
potbelly or, after 1879, a bay window, but Thomas B.
Reed, portly Speaker of the House, proclaimed: "No
gentleman ever weighs more than 200 pounds." Fatty
Arbuckle as Sheriff "Slim" Hoover summed up the situ-
ation just before the final curtain of The Round-Up in
1907: "Nobody loves a fat man."'92
In the first decade of the twentieth century, the medical profession
remained somewhat skeptical of the benefits of promoting dieting and
weight loss to patients.93 Where mainstream doctors did not step in,
however, diet faddists like Horace Fletcher and John Harvey Kellogg
quickly did, promoting weight-loss plans based on extremely slow chew-
ing of food or low-protein diets. By 1910, doctors had begun to reassert
control over this territory, but only after the general public had become
convinced of the importance of weight loss and its connections to re-
strained eating.94
With the advent of World War I, the American anti-fat campaign
intensified. Along with wartime rationing came a campaign against food
waste-particularly fats and sugars, which were needed in the war effort.
In this climate, "[n]utrition took on a military cast .... [and] reducing
weight became civil defense. '95 Commentators at the time noted that
"[t]here are probably a good many million people in the United States
whose most patriotic act would be to get thin gradually and gracefully
and then to stay thin,"96 and that "it may become a serious question as to
whether a patriot should be permitted in times of stress to carry excess
body-weight, for the expense of carrying it around calls for calories that
other people need."'97 Thus, a strong connection was drawn between
overweight and treason and, inversely, slimness/weight loss and patriot-
92 SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 89.
93 STEARNS, supra note 89, at 30-32.
94 Id. at 37.
95 SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 141.
96 Id. at 141-42 (quoting Gordon Lusk).
97 Id. at 142 (quoting Francis Benedict).
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ism.98 There was also a growing connection to xenophobia, since,
"[d]uring the prewar era, for the first time, fatness had been specifically
associated with immigrant groups, especially with Jews and Italians ....
Americanization began to imply an actual physical change toward uni-
form American (Yankee) features." 99
At the same time, doctors were by now championing slenderness
and, where the patient was not slender to begin with, weight loss. More-
over, whereas the medical focus in the previous decades had been more
on hereditary and glandular causes of obesity, doctors had come to rec-
ognize that "[i]n the great majority of cases, the cause is chiefly overeat-
ing"; regular, moderate exercise was also found to be essential. 10 0
Patients with weight problems or with a family history of obesity were
advised to cut caloric intake "from the normal 3000 per day to 2200." 101
However, Steams cautions against reading these early trends as a true
"medicalization" of obesity-that is to say, "by which doctors seized on
new information and used it to browbeat an innocent public into novel
anxieties the treatment of which, not surprisingly, extended physicians'
power and profit."10 2 Rather, he stresses that the initial impetus to fore-
ground weight and dieting came, not from doctors, but from patient pres-
sure spurred by middle-class fashion. 10 3 Slenderness, particularly in
women, had come into vogue by 1900 or so, and along with it had come
new trends in clothing and mainstream imagery of women. 10 4 By the
beginning of World War I, high fashion had already essentially aban-
doned the wearing of corsets in favor of a more natural shape,10 5 and, as
the clothing itself lost weight and layers, it became more revealing of the
figure underneath, which then fueled the public concern with body
weight and shape. 10 6 Moreover, the success of ready-made fashions for
men (in the last quarter of the nineteenth century) and women (beginning
around 1910) created another source of concern: Instead of having cloth-
98 Id. at 140-45; STEARNS, supra note 89, at 21-24.
99 SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 143.
1OO STEARNS, supra note 89, at 40.
101 Id. Note the contrast to most modem diet programs, where caloric intake is limited to,
at most, 1200 per day; see, e.g., FRASER, supra note 88, at 147.
102 STEARNS, supra note 89, at 43.
103 Id. at 45.
104 Id. at 12.
105 Id. at 13; SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 161. But see SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 143
(pointing out that working women during World War I were still encouraged to wear corsets);
id. at 177-78 (noting transmutation of old-fashioned corsets into "elasticized, lightened, and
softened" foundation garments between 1913 and 1930).
106 Schwartz also makes the very interesting point that eyesight was improving in the
general public at this time as well, due to advances in treatment of disease, vision-correction
technology, and eye safety in the industrial sector. Thus, he notes, appearance-conscious wo-
men "could no longer count on an accommodating blur in the public eye." SCHWARTZ, supra
note 89, at 163-64.
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ing made to fit the person, there was now increasing pressure for the
person to fit into the clothing. 10 7 In the print media, the "Gibson Girl"
sketches that appeared in magazines between 1895 and 1914 depicted "a
distinctly thinner figure overall than any widely publicized female image
in the United States since the 1830s, and the durable popularity of the
sketch series literally knew no prior precedent."' 108 Tall, slender, and
athletic in appearance, the Gibson Girl was a reflection of the newly
fashionable active lifestyle for women, as well as the new emphasis on
relative thinness-the personification of "the new 'natural woman' who
came into vogue at the turn of the century."' 0 9 The Gibson Girl ideal-
"so popular that any woman who could afford to was practically
dutybound to buy a product that would make her look like her"'I 10-"cut
across class lines, creating a single national ideal of womanhood.""'
These were some of the principal concerns that sent Americans at
the turn of the century-particularly women-into their doctors' offices
asking, or begging, for weight-loss advice. It did not take long for doc-
tors to "absorb" the public's concern with weight-and to develop a
"link between the growing cultural hostility to fat and physicians' often-
expressed moral disdain for their obese patients."' 12
Some medical summaries shifted terminology, calling
the overweight that resulted "simply" from excessive
eating and inadequate exercise "indolence obesity." Pa-
tients suffering from this should shape up, and if they
could not, a character deficiency was clearly indicated.
"Since overweight is essentially an index of wrong liv-
ing," thought physicians, a plump businessman was not
an index of financial prosperity but rather a "sign of
physical bankruptcy." Of course, in many obese individ-
uals "the malady" was "a character defect, an evidence
of lack of self-control." . . . Fat patients and their con-
cerns, including their fashion concerns, could not be
avoided. They might be helped. They were not, unless
they quickly reformed, well liked."13
By the 1920s the medical profession had fully joined the anti-fat
campaign, as had the insurance industry. Between World War I and
World War II, insurance companies began to adjust their height-weight-
107 Id. at 160-61.
108 STEARNS, supra note 89, at 12-13.
109 FRASER, supra note 88, at 28.
Mo Id. at 32.
112 STEARNS, supra note 89, at 46.
'13 Id. at 46-47.
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age tables downward; these tables, previously based on "average"
weights, now reflected lower, "ideal" weights, and allowed for less varia-
tion in weight that could still be termed "healthy."'1 14 They also began to
subtract, rather than add, pounds from the "acceptable" weights of older
people, reflecting a belief that aging people should be losing, not gaining,
weight.' 15 In accordance with this trend toward monitoring weight, sales
of private bathroom scales, which had first begun to appear just after the
turn of the century, took off in the 1920s, as did sales of kitchen scales
for weighing food.' 16 Calorie-counting, first popularized in a best-sell-
ing book by Dr. Lulu Hunt Peters in 1917,117 came to be a staple of
dieting, 118 and surgery to remove fat from the abdomens of obese pa-
tients, which had begun in the last decade of the nineteenth century, was
an accepted, if not common, practice.1 19
The 1920s also witnessed the development of a gendered approach
to weight and weight loss that would continue throughout the twentieth
century. The gender distinction began at childhood: From the 1920s into
the 1970s, articles on childhood obesity, from Good Housekeeping to
Pediatrics, generally featured girls, whereas articles on underweight chil-
dren focused on boys. 120 Adult women were targeted as well, with the
new fashion for slim female bodies closely tied to popular notions of
women's newfound "freedoms" as sexual beings-and as consumers.
The slender "flapper" ideal-standing in direct contrast to her prim and
proper Victorian mother, physically voluptuous, sedentary and passive-
was lively, active, young, and rebellious, and "naturally" boyishly slim
(or dieted and bound her breasts to make herself more so).' 2 1 She was
also "free" to be a consumer, "keeping up with fashion and buying the
latest in beauty products."' 122 Thus, despite the rhetoric of freedom that
surrounded the flapper ideal, this particular "freedom" brought with it
what Fraser terms a kind of narcissistic masochism:123 an obsession with
the correction of one's own physical flaws. And it did not take long for
advertisers to figure out how to tap into this market:
It was during the 1920s that advertisers hit on a problem
that was visible enough for women to be embarrassed
about, difficult enough to require buying lots of prod-
114 SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 157.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 168-71 (bathroom scales), 171-73 (kitchen scales).
117 FRASER, supra note 88, at 55.
118 SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 177.
119 Id. at 178-79.
120 STEARNS, supra note 89, at 75-77; SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 282-84.
121 FRASER, supra note 88, at 33-34.
122 Id. at 37.
123 Id. at 38.
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ucts, and best of all, would never go away: fat. Adver-
tisers made women feel humiliated that they weren't as
slim as the beautiful women in their illustrations
... Every advertisement chided women for being over-
weight. . . With all these pressures . . . , women began
to do anything to be slim. They starved themselves and
chewed gum laced with laxatives to lose weight. Told to
"Reach for a Lucky instead of a sweet," they took up
smoking to lose weight; it was, as the ad said, "the mod-
em way to diet." They followed a number of wild fad
diets recommended by physicians and pseudophysicians,
many of which involved fasting, purgatives, and odd
combinations of foods. 124
Thus, by the late 1920s, much of what we now know as anti-fat
attitudes and the obsession with dieting was firmly in place in American
culture. Despite some variation in the details of fashion and dieting over
the course of the twentieth century (e.g., the "sweater girls" of the 1950s
versus the "Twiggy" look of the 1960s, and the prevailing demonization
of carbohydrates in the 1970s (and now) versus the prevailing demoniza-
tion of fat in the 1980s and 1990s), the fundamental American cultural
view of food and weight has not changed much in the last eighty years or
so. With the possible exception of the 1950s, when "America had a new
romance with peaceful suburban domesticity after World War II" that
included Marilyn Monroe as a cultural icon (and the prototype for the
"dumb blonde" stereotype), 125 the message for most Americans, and par-
ticularly for women, remained the same: The thinner you can be, the
better.
As Professor Steams points out, "[t]he most important development
in the campaign against fat from the 1920s onward involved its sheer
intensification."'' 26 This intensification phenomenon was, and continues
to be, particularly strong in three main areas. The first is the "gendering"
of dieting and weight-by which I do not mean that food and body con-
cerns came to be the exclusive province of either sex, but, rather, that
they were presented differently, and thus manifested themselves differ-
ently, in men and women. For both sexes, "[w]ith dieting established as
a moral category, available to compensate for real or imagined indul-
gence in other facets of American society, it could be ratcheted up to
attach additional moral issues posed by particular segments of the popu-
124 Id. at 38-39.
125 Id. at 41. As Fraser notes, this is in no way a commentary on Monroe's actual intelli-
gence, but a reference to the types of roles she played: "maternal-bodied and ooz[ing] sexual-
ity .... [but] childlike, innocent, and a little dim." Id.
126 STEARNS, supra note 89, at 98.
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lation."127 However, given the profound and socially unsettling changes
in women's social roles that occurred in the twentieth century, it was
perhaps inevitable that the most virulent aspects of the pressure to diet
and be thin would fall on them. For example, Steams notes that between
the 1920s and the 1960s, despite the fact that all the insurance data from
1910 onward indicated that overweight was a health problem for both
sexes, dieting advice and exhortations were targeted disproportionately at
women. 128 These discussions of dieting for women "almost invariably
emphasized aesthetic factors" rather than health, such as men's lack of
sexual interest in obese wives, or ability to fit into swimsuits or other
fashions.129 The level of scorn and disdain for fat women that infused
popular reading matter from the 1940s onward is truly astonishing:
Disgust had been suggested in the first decades of the
dieting craze, before 1920, but it had rarely been gender-
specific. Now, as the level of revulsion accumulated in
the literature aimed at the very groups being insulted,
women were the clear targets. Thus fat women were
"lazy and undisciplined. They prefer[red] lying in bed a
bit longer to actually planning, preparing and consuming
a [sensible] breakfast meal." The fat woman would be-
come evasive: "She accuses her husband of being super-
critical, which makes her too nervous to plan menus or
shop properly (she would be a lot more nervous if she
knew her husband is running around with his slim secre-
tary because his wife is so fat and unattractive)." "Psy-
chiatrists have exposed the fat person for what she really
is: miserable, self-indulgent and lacking in self control."
And bluntly .... "[b]eing fat is a sickness; a fat woman's
body (with fat men implicitly exempt?) was "a physical
nonentity," an object of ridicule, a sign of self-hate and
social failure, a woman's "resignation from society."
"Are you aware that fatness has destroyed your sex ap-
peal and made you look older, somewhat like a buffoon
whom people are inclined not to take seriously in any
area or on any level?"130
This differential condemnation of women's weight was occurring at
exactly the time when other distinctions between the sexes, both essen-
tialist (e.g., feminine passivity, emotionality, and irrationality) and more
explicitly gender-role related (e.g., staying at home), were beginning to
127 Id. at 71-72.
128 Id. at 80, 82.
129 Id. at 82.
130 Id. at 83.
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be eroded or debunked. Steams argues that this may have been, in large
part, a response to cultural anxiety produced by women's growing rejec-
tion of maternalism as their ideal role: "Rigorous discipline of women's
bodies helped men and women alike gain some confidence that declining
maternal functions did not leave women free for every form of indul-
gence." 131 Weight was already present as a device for moral condemna-
tion and control; it was invoked here-by both men and women, it
should be noted-in an attempt to maintain the existing social fabric.
Controlling women's weight as a way of controlling women per-
sisted throughout the ascendancy of the feminist movement. With more
women moving into the white-collar workplace in the 1970s and 1980s,
"the androgynous, dress-for-success look became popular, along with a
physique that didn't look too overtly female in the workplace"; women
found it easier to attain power and fit into a male-dominated world if
they were thin.' 32 The "in" look for women from the later 1980s through
the present has been a stronger and more muscular one (particularly with
the new emphasis on mainstream women's athleticism from the mid-
1990s onward), but the emphasis, as we shall see below, is still very
much on thinness and weight loss. Now, the socially acceptable woman
in control of herself does not just have to be thin: She has to be "buff' as
well. Although some feminists have characterized this trend as empow-
ering for women 133-which it doubtless is in some respects-viewed in
the context of the twentieth-century preoccupation with controlling wo-
men through weight it could just as easily be viewed as another form of
"backlash" against deeper and more economically threatening forms of
women's empowerment.1 34
The "intensification" phenomenon affected men as well, but differ-
ently. From the beginning, medical concerns such as heart disease, cho-
lesterol, and high blood pressure made up a relatively higher percentage
of the discourse surrounding men's weight compared to that about wo-
men's weight-due at least in part to the fact that it became clear early
on that these were greater health risks for men.135 Aesthetic concerns for
men in the twentieth century have always been of a different order than
those for women; whereas looks have long been considered an integral
part of a woman's social value, and crucial to her ability to get a mate,
there has been a wider range of acceptable weights for men, whose social
value stereotypically resides in their earning power or economic worth
131 Id. at 87.
132 FRASER, supra note 88, at 43.
133 Id. at 44-45.
134 See generally SuSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERI-
CAN WOMEN (1991).
135 STEARNS, supra note 89, at 100-01; SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 213.
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rather than their looks. 136 Nonetheless, the pressure on men to lose
weight grew, particularly from the 1950s onward, as a genre of diet
books for men stressed weight loss as a way to "score points on [your]
buddies" and gain more attention from women.' 37 Dieting also allowed
men to "display male character and independent initiative" and renew
power in their marriages. 138 By the 1990s, the ability to keep one's
weight under control had become as important an indicator of character
and self-discipline for men as it was for women, and dieting articles for
men had begun to appear regularly in a new crop of men's health and
fashion magazines. 139
One final note on the twentieth-century "gendering" of weight and
weight loss: The extremely simplified historical account I have presented
so far makes no mention of ethnic and cultural differences, which un-
questionably exist. In particular, the construct of weight was somewhat
different in the African-American community, especially for African-
American women: The stigmatization of overweight in the mainstream
white, middle-class culture never really caught on. As Steams notes, un-
til the 1980s, Ebony magazine, in marked contrast to middle-class white
magazines, seldom discussed weight or dieting, even though it had a
great deal to say about other beauty and fashion issues. 140 Ebony also
featured female models of a much wider range of sizes and shapes than
appeared in mainstream white magazines, and was very quick to embrace
articles that "counterattacked" the national slimness trends, even as early
as the 1970s. t41 To this day, social science research indicates that weight
is substantially less linked to attractiveness, and less stigmatized, among
African-Americans.142 Steams suggests that this may be related to the
different configuration of gender roles in African-American culture, in
that black women have, for a long time, occupied a more powerful posi-
tion in their families and family economies. 143 The white middle- and
upper-class norm of women not working outside the home, particularly
after marriage, had never existed in African-American culture, and thus,
in a sense, there was no apple cart to upset (and therefore to offset with
weight obsession) in this regard. Another feature of mainstream white
cultural history-the reduced cultural prestige of motherhood-was also
not present in the African-American community; black birth rates re-
136 STEARNS, supra note 89, at 100.
137 Id. at 101.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 103-04.
140 Id. at 89.
141 Id. at 90-91.
142 Id. at 91; but see FRASER, supra note 88, at 144 (noting that weight concerns are more
closely correlated with class than with race, and professional African-American and Latina
women tend to be thinner and have higher rates of eating disorders than poorer women).
143 Id. at 92-93.
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mained higher, and thus "there was less reason to apologize for a decline
of maternity through body restraint."'"1
The second feature of America's weight and diet obsession that has
undergone extreme intensification in the last eighty or so years is the
commercialization and medicalization of weight and dieting. This is a
truly vast subject, and I cannot possibly aspire to do it justice in this
context; fortunately, others have already done so.145 For the present pur-
poses, suffice it to say that the American market for diet programs, diet
foods and food replacements, diet pills, health clubs, and medical treat-
ment for weight loss has truly exploded in the course of the twentieth
century, becoming a multibillion-dollar industry. In light of this undis-
puted observation, it is particularly striking that the third major area of
intensification has been in weight gain, which has risen steadily in the
American population as a whole since 1920146-oddly enough, the more
the weight-loss industry has failed, the more it has succeeded. Professor
Stearns, after looking at medical, insurance, and other data, concluded:
Putting these data together suggests a weight gain of
about two pounds per decade from the 1940s to the
1980s (but a bit less for women), after a prior two-pound
increase from 1920 to 1940. Then the late 1980s and
early 1990s broke the scales with an unprecedented
surge. The average American adult gained eight pounds
between 1985 and 1995.147
Several factors are understood to have contributed to this trend. The
first has been increasingly greater pressure on Americans to eat more,
mutually reinforced by the booms in the snack-food and fast-food indus-
tries, and by extensive food-related advertising promoting over-con-
sumption. 48 The advent of "lite" or lo-cal foods has, at a minimum, had
no effect on this trend, and more likely has exacerbated it, for two main
reasons. First, people often incorporate these foods into their diets with-
out changing anything else about their eating patterns. 149 Second, the
"diet" label very often induces people to consume more than they would
have otherwise-either of the "diet" food itself or of other foods as a
reward for eating the diet foods-and, in the case of low-fat desserts, the
fat tends to be replaced with substantial amounts of sugar in order to
144 Id. at 93.
145 The three principal sources in this section, particularly Schwartz's Never Satisfied and
Fraser's Losing It, are excellent and exhaustive books on the subject; for more details on the
development of the weight-loss industry in America, I refer the reader there.
146 STEARNS, supra note 89, at 129; FRASER, supra note 88, at 120-21.
147 STEARNS, supra note 89, at 133.
148 Id. at 134-36; FRASER, supra note 88, at 122.
149 STEARNS, supra note 89, at 135.
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make the products palatable. 150 Also, as anyone who has spent time in
other countries knows, the distinctly American emphasis on "value" for
money has resulted in restaurants providing very large portions of food
relative to what people actually need; with repeated exposure, these over-
size portions have come to seem normal and expected.' 51
The second major influence on American weight gain in the twenti-
eth century has been the increasingly sedentary nature of our lifestyles.
As Stearns points out, "[t]he decades since 1920 have seen a steady trend
away from agricultural and manufacturing jobs toward the service sector
and, in all segments of the labor force, rural as well as urban, increased
mechanization." 152 These trends in the workforce have been mirrored
and reinforced in private life: The twentieth century witnessed the inven-
tion and explosion of reliance on the automobile, at first instead of walk-
ing, and now because we have structured our communities in such a way
that the distances we need to travel on a daily basis (e.g., between resi-
dential and shopping areas, or between home and work) are simply too
far to walk. Domestic chores have also become greatly mechanized, and
the extreme popularity of television has had a profound influence on how
Americans spend their recreational and leisure time. 153 Thus, as we have
sought to spend less and less time and effort on routine physical tasks
both at work and at home, whatever leisure time we manage to eke out
thereafter has increasingly been spent sitting in our cars or in front of the
TV, video games, or computers. As we have been steadily consuming
more calories, we have also been moving less.
Finally, Stearns points to a third factor: the encouragement of child-
hood eating.154 Despite all of the attention paid in the last decade or so
to overweight children, "[c]oncern for underweight children vastly sur-
passed attention to childhood obesity problems until the late twentieth
century."' 155 For much of the twentieth century, the "bouncing baby"
was the ideal, at least in part because, for newborns and very young chil-
dren, the health risks of underweight were significantly greater than
those associated with mild overweight. 156 Well-fed children were re-
150 FRASER, supra note 88, at 126-29.
151 See, e.g., Sylvia Rector, Burden or Bargain? Heaping Restaurant Servings Weigh
Down an Already Overfed Population, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 16, 2001, § 7, at 3 (discussing
American Institute for Cancer Research study).
152 STEARNS, supra note 89, at 134.
153 See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 221-46 (discussing trends in television watch-
ing in the second half of the twentieth century). But see, e.g., D.A. Crawford et al., Television
Viewing, Physical Inactivity and Obesity, 23 INT'L J. OBESITY 437 (1999) (concluding that,
while there is a link between television viewing and obesity, that link is not as straightforward
as it was once thought to be, especially in adults).
154 Id. at 137-46.
155 Id. at 142.
156 Id. at 142-43.
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garded as mirroring the degree of their parents' love and concern for
them, and, as Stearns notes, articles in family magazines from the 1930s
through the 1960s or so were filled with advice about how to get recalci-
trant children to eat.' 57 By the time this began to change around the
1970s, other factors like the abundance of snack foods and the rise of
television had reached levels that made children's eating patterns diffi-
cult to change. Since overweight and obesity in childhood do make it
more difficult to maintain a healthy weight later in life, a58 these genera-
tions of children have grown up both heavier and struggling harder to
lose weight.
B. WEIGHT AND FAT PREJUDICE IN AMERICA Now
1. Weight and Obesity: The Medical Evidence
According to a study published last October in the Journal of the
American Medical Association, obesity is still on the rise. Across all
sociodemographic groups and regions of the United States, "[t]he preva-
lence of obesity increased significantly from 17.9% in 1998 to 18.9% in
1999, an increase of 5.6% in 1 year and of 57% from 1991."' 59 Obesity
remains substantially more prevalent among blacks (27.3%) and Hispan-
ics (21.5%) than among whites (17.7%); the rates of obesity are also
highest among those who did not graduate high school (25.3%), and low-
est among those with a college degree or more (14.3%).1 60
Despite all of the time, money, and energy devoted to weight loss in
this country, there remains a fair amount we still do not understand about
how weight and obesity work. The basic outlines are deceptively simple,
and not too controversial: If a person takes more calories in than s/he
expends, the excess calories are stored as fat and weight gain will result.
However, once one begins to parse this equation-especially the caloric
expenditure part-on an individual level, things get quite complicated.
We all know people who seem to eat whatever they want, in prodigious
amounts, never go to the gym, and still stay naturally thin, and others
who eat much less (and/or much healthier foods), work out regularly or
157 Id. at 142.
158 See, e.g., S. R6ssner, Childhood Obesity and Adulthood Consequences, 87 ACTA
PeDIATRICA 1 (1998) (advocating aggressive treatment of childhood obesity due to, inter alia,
the tendency of obese children to grow into obese adults).
159 Ali H. Mokdad et al., The Continuing Epidemic of Obesity in the United States, 284 J.
AM. MED. Ass'N 1650 (2000) (based on data from the 1999 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveil-
lance System, a cross-sectional telephone survey).
160 Id. at 1651. Interestingly, though, at least one study has suggested that family income
is not correlated with overweight in children of any race aged two through seven, or in chil-
dren of any race other than non-Hispanic whites aged eight through sixteen. Suzanne Rostler,
Food Supply May Not Explain Obesity in Poorer Kids, REUTERS HEALTH (Oct. 15, 2001),
available at http://www.ahealthyme.com/article/reuters/101355564 (discussing results of study
published in the October 2001 issue of Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine).
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live active lifestyles, and still weigh more. Still others become ex-
tremely, morbidly 161 obese at a very young age, and remain so all their
lives. This is part of the mystery that medical researchers are currently
trying to understand.
One thing is clear, however: It is more appropriate to refer to
"obesities" in the plural than to "obesity" in the singular, because obesity
is heterogeneous and excess fat deposition is multifactorial. 162 In other
words, even individuals of the same weight can weigh what they do for
totally different reasons. These reasons range from normal genetic fac-
tors and rare genetic disorders to neuroendocrine conditions, weight
gains associated with certain medications (such as gluticocorticoids,
widely used in treating chronic immunologic disease, some antidepres-
sants, and progestins163), and lifestyle-related factors of the types dis-
cussed above. 164
With regard to genetics, there are a number of rare, abnormal ge-
netic conditions that result in obesity, among other symptoms. Perhaps
the best-known is Prader-Willi syndrome, in which obesity first
manifests itself in very young children between one and three years old;
these children develop a constant, ravenous appetite and often become
extremely obese, "frequently . . . in excess of 200% of their ideal body
weight." 165 Other genetic conditions that result in early-onset obesity,
sometimes accompanied by mild mental retardation, are Bardet-Biedl,
Ahlstrom, Cohen, and Carpenter syndromes.
However, when people speak in general of weight being "genetic,"
the more common reference is to non-abnormal genetics. Here, too,
there is evidence for strong genetic ties. Studies of adopted children
have demonstrated that while biological parents' body mass indices, or
BMIs, 166 are directly correlated with those of their children, there is little
or no relationship between the BMIs of adopted children and their adop-
tive parents, suggesting that the role of environmental factors in deter-
mining these children's weight is limited. 167 The evidence from studies
of identical and fraternal twins shows a marked difference between the
correlation of body weights for identical twins, who share identical ge-
netic material, and fraternal twins, who do not-the correlation is much
161 See supra note 87 for discussion of what constitutes morbid obesity.
162 George A. Bray, An Approach to the Classification and Evaluation of Obesity, in PER
BJORNTORP & BERNARD N. BRODOFF, OBESITY 294, 294 (1992) [hereinafter OBESITY]; see
also Claude Bouchard, Genetic Aspects of Human Obesity, in OBESITY 343, 343-44.
163 Bray, supra note 162, at 300-01.
164 See supra notes 148-157 and accompanying text.
165 William H. Dietz, Genetic Syndromes, in OBESITY, supra note 162, at 589, 589-90.
166 See supra note 87.
167 Bray, supra note 162, at 297.
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closer for identical twins.168 Thus, "[t]he best estimates suggest that ge-
netic and environmental factors may be of equal importance in the over-
all determination of body fat and that genetic factors may be more
important than environmental factors in determining fat distribution."1 69
There are a number of abnormal neuroendocrine conditions that are
also associated with obesity. For example, traumatic injuries or diseases
(e.g., cancer or inflammatory disease) of the ventromedial region of the
hypothalamus, which is responsible for integrating information about en-
ergy stores, result in uncontrolled eating and obesity in patients. 170 Ova-
rian diseases in women, such as Stein-Leventhal or polycystic ovary
syndrome (PCOS), are also correlated with weight gain and obesity. Al-
though the directionality of the correlation between PCOS and obesity is
not well understood, the correlation itself is clear; "[PCOS] is probably
the most common endocrine disorder of reproductive-age women, affect-
ing 1.5%-6% of this population .... [O]bese women with PCOS form
one of the most prevalent subgroups of obesity."'171
However, as with genetics, recent research has suggested that nor-
mal neuroendocrine functioning may also be tied significantly to body
weight. An article published in the New York Times in October 2000
reported on a new wave of research focusing on the molecular causes of
appetite and satiety: various molecules that occur normally in the body
and are thought to either control appetite or react to signals from the
body that it is not fat enough, which in turn triggers an urge to consume
high-calorie foods. 172 These researchers suggest that, while everyone's
eating is controlled by these and other molecules that send signals be-
tween the brain and the body, obese people are more likely to have a
different balance of them or to be less responsive to them:
There is very strong biological evidence that the brain
receives signals from the body and the brain talks back,"
Dr. Leibel said. And this, not conscious decisions about
how many calories to take in over days or weeks, is what
regulates body weight to keep it in a narrow range, he
added. While acknowledging that this notion of weight
168 Id.
169 Id. at 297-98.
170 Id. at 298-99; see also Gina Kolata, How the Body Knows When to Gain or Lose, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2000, at Fl, F8 (discussing early evidence indicating that "when [the hypothal-
amus] was destroyed, animals, and people, ate ceaselessly and grew massively obese.").
171 Andrea Dunaif, Polycystic Ovary Syndrome and Obesity, in OBESITY, supra note 162,
at 594, 594.
172 Kolata, supra note 170, at F8. See also Merritt McKinney, "Obesity Hormone" Gene
Mutation Found in Some Obese, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 31, 2001) available at http://
dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/2001103 1/hi/obesity_ I10.html (reporting that researchers in the UK
have discovered that certain obese people have a genetic mutation that leads to low levels of
leptin, a hormone released by fat cells and other tissues that can tell the brain to curb appetite).
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runs counter to beliefs about willpower and even free
will, Dr. Leibel and others said it does not surprise them
because the brain signals other sorts of behavior, like
drinking and excreting the right amounts of water to
maintain a precise balance in the body, and even making
sure that people eat to maintain their blood sugar, when
necessary. "If you had an abnormally low blood sugar
level, would you be surprised if you got hungry and agi-
tated?" Dr. Leibel said. Yet, he added, few would ques-
tion that such behavior is driven by the brain,
independently of willpower or free will. 173
The results of the recent research are also consistent with the notion
of set-point theory, which holds that individuals are biochemically
"programmed" to weigh within a certain range, and that when their
weights go either above or below that range, the body automatically ad-
justs its metabolism to maintain the set-point weight, resulting in a con-
comitant increase or decrease in hunger and interest in food. Ultimately,
"[t]he weight range studies lead to an inevitable conclusion, obesity ex-
perts say: if researchers want to enable fat people to lose weight perma-
nently, they have to enable them to change their natural weight range[,
which] means identifying the biochemical signals between the brain and
the body that control weight." 174
Finally, it is of course well known that lifestyle factors such as eat-
ing habits and exercise level-particularly the latter-play an important
role in determining an individual's weight. However, there is increasing
evidence that an individual's fitness level-i.e., in terms of cardiovascu-
lar health, strength, and endurance-is not much related to his/her
weight, and that many of the health risks often touted as associated with
obesity may in fact stem from inactivity, regardless of weight. 175 Moreo-
ver, other evidence suggests that some of the health risks usually thought
to be associated with obesity, such as hypertension and decreased lon-
gevity, may actually be caused by weight cycling, more commonly
known as yo-yo dieting.' 76 Thus, not only are the effects of diet and
173 Kolata, supra note 170 (quoting Dr. Rudolph Leibel, obesity researcher at Columbia
Presbyterian Medical Center).
174 Id.
175 FRASER, supra note 88, at 252-55; Steven N. Blair & Suzanne Brodney, Effects of
Physical Inactivity and Obesity on Morbidity and Mortality: Current Evidence and Research
Issues, 31 MED. & Sci. SPORTS & EXERCISE S646 (1999); see, e.g., Jane E. Brody, Fat But Fit:
A Myth About Obesity is Slowly Being Debunked, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 2000, at F7.
176 See, e.g., SONDRA SOLOVAY, TIPPING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FIGHTING WEIGHT-
BASED DISCRIMINATION 204-07 (2000); Paul Emsberger & Richard J. Koletsky, Biomedical
Rationale for a Wellness Approach to Obesity: An Alternative to a Focus on Weight Loss, 55 J.
Soc. ISSUES 221, 229-30, 246-47 (1999).
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exercise on weight limited, especially in the presence of other genetic or
neuroendocrine abnormalities, but the effect of weight on overall fitness
and health may be greatly overestimated. Until doctors and researchers
have a better understanding of the precise mechanisms that control
weight, it will be difficult to say any more than this.
One final note on diet and exercise: Without question, there are hab-
its, which are at least partially a matter of choice, that do factor into what
an individual weighs. In other words, even though we all know some
people who can eat whatever they want and never seem to gain an ounce,
for many people, habits such as favoring high-fat, high-sugar, low-nutri-
tion foods, eating very large portions, eating for non-hunger-related rea-
sons, or spending all day in the car make them heavier than they would
be otherwise. However, what is crucial to realize is that many of these
are culture-wide phenomena, and this is precisely the reason weight has
increased so broadly in this country in the last seventy or eighty years.
For example, as one researcher explains, overweight people are far from
the only ones whose eating behavior is partially determined by environ-
mental factors-everyone is influenced by external cues in how, when,
and where they eat. 177 This is the whole purpose behind food advertis-
ing: to make the viewer want to eat or buy the food being advertised,
regardless of whether the viewer is actually hungry at the time. Like-
wise, the increased availability of snack foods, the large portions at
American restaurants, and the increasing number of jobs that are essen-
tially sedentary affect everyone, not just the laziest or most gluttonous
among us. Thus, while it is clearly untrue that we are powerless to
change our own weight or fitness level, it is important to recognize that,
of all the factors that go into determining what someone weighs, lack of
individual willpower is probably the lowest on the list in terms of im-
pact-particularly in light of the effects of cultural stigmatization, to
which I will now turn.
2. Weight Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination
One thing is absolutely clear: There are deeply entrenched cultural
stereotypes, prejudices, and biases surrounding weight and fat in this
country. Moreover, as will be evident from some of the dates on the
studies discussed below, this is not exactly news to social psychologists:
Extensive research in this area since the 1960s has revealed consistent
evidence of the stigmatization of the overweight at practically every
stage of life, in every area of functioning. Common stereotypes of over-
weight people depict them as "lazy, gluttonous, and both mentally and
177 Gloria R. Leon, Personality and Behavioral Correlates of Obesity, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASPECTS OF OBESITY: A HANDBOOK 15, 25 (Benjamin B. Wolman ed., 1982).
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physically slow."'1 78 Nor are these stereotypes hard to find: "Whereas
open derogation of other stigmatized groups is seen as morally objection-
able-or at least in bad taste-belittling jokes directed toward the over-
weight can be seen any night of the week on prime-time television." 179
Researchers have known for a long time that weight prejudice starts
early. One of the foundational studies in this area, published in 1961,
asked ten- and eleven-year-old children to rank-order six drawings of
children according to how much they liked them or would want to be
friends with them.' 80 The drawings showed a child with no physical
handicap, one with a leg brace and crutches, one in a wheelchair, a hand
amputee, a child with a facial disfigurement, and an obese child. The
experiment was repeated with different groups of children of different
sexes, races, socioeconomic classes, and urban versus rural settings, and
yet the results were strikingly consistent: The child with no physical
handicap was always ranked first, and the drawing of the obese child was
ranked last or next to last. 18 1 More recent work confirms these results, 182
and indicates that antifat prejudices actually form much earlier than this,
some in preschool children as young as three years old. 183 At five, chil-
dren would rather lose an arm than be fat.184 By the age of six to nine
years old, children have already acquired an "active dislike" of fat bod-
178 Diane M. Quinn & Jennifer Crocker, Vulnerability to the Affective Consequences of
the Stigma of Overweight, in PREJUDICE: TiH TARGET'S PERSPECTIVE 125, 125 (Janet K. Swim
& Charles Stangor eds., 1998).
179 Id. Professor Bradley Greenberg of Michigan State University is currently conducting
further research, under the aegis of the Rudd Foundation, in media depictions of overweight
and obese characters on popular TV shows. Cf. Dave Kehr, Seeing the Outsized Outsider in a
(Slightly) New Way, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, § 2, at 25 (discussing a string of recent
movies, including Shallow Hal, that depict large characters, and observing that, notwithstand-
ing some evolution in the treatment of such characters, "fat as a metaphor is unlikely to go
away anytime soon").
180 S.A. Richardson et al., Cultural Uniformity in Reaction to Physical Disabilities, 26
AM. Soc. REV. 241 (1961).
181 Id.
182 A recent study that repeated the experiments in the 1961 study indicated that the level
of stigma against the obese has intensified over the last 40 years-"females disliked the obese
person more than males and thinness was chosen as more likable than when the study was first
conducted back in 1961." Keith Mulvihill, U.S. Kids' Distaste for Obese Peers Has Grown,
YAHOO! NEWS (Nov. 9, 2001) available at http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20011109/hl/
peersl .html (discussing results of study by Janet Latner of Rutgers University, presented at a
conference sponsored by the American Obesity Association in Washington, DC on November
8, 2001).
t83 Rebecca Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell, Obesity and Discrimination 13 (2000) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing P. Cramer & T. Steinwert, Thin is Good,
Fat is Bad: How Early Does It Begin?, 19 J. App. DEVEL. PSYCHOL. 429 (1998)). See also
Rebecca Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell, Obesity Stigma (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
184 SOLOVAY, supra note 176, at 25 (citing Nicole Campbell, Weighed Down, DAILY CAL-
IFORNIAN, May 16, 1995, at 9 (reviewing a 20/20 television interview of several five-year-old
children, who unanimously decided they would rather lose an arm than be fat)).
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ies; in the case of girls, this extends not only to the bodies of other chil-
dren but to their own bodies as well.' 85 As one might expect, the
stigmatization becomes harsher as children reach adolescence; 8 6 ex-
treme cases have been documented in which peer teasing caused over-
weight teens to commit suicide.' 87 And, it should be noted, the
stigmatization that affects overweight children does not come only from
other children; the stigmatizing messages are often reinforced by teach-
ers, coaches, and/or poorly run physical education programs with "re-
quirements" that may be unrealistic for heavier children, such as passing
the Presidential Physical Fitness Test, or may just be deeply humiliating,
like mandatory weigh-ins.1 88
There is extensive documentation of weight prejudice among Amer-
ican adults. 189 One strong aspect of the general dislike of and hostility
toward fat people in this country appears to stem from the notion of
stigma controllability, as discussed above.' 90 Social-psychological ex-
periments on the subject of fat prejudice consistently implicate the per-
ception of weight as controllable in explaining the level and nature of
American hostility toward the overweight. 191 When an overweight or
obese person can offer an "excuse" for his or her weight, such as a thy-
roid condition, or when the person can show that s/he is in the process of
losing weight successfully, subjects assess him/her far less negatively
than they do an obese person with no "excuse" or who isn't "coping"
better.' 92 The question remains, however: Given what we know about
weight-that it is not completely within the individual's control-and
given that anyone who knows anyone with weight problems is probably
185 Id. at 34-35.
186 See, e.g., id. at 35-37; Puhl & Brownell, Obesity Stigma, supra note 183. There is an
absolutely vast literature, both academic and popular, on adolescents and body-image issues,
and it would be far beyond the scope of this article to attempt to detail even a significant part
of it.
187 See, e.g., SOLOVAY, supra note 176, at 58-59.
188 Id. at 52-56; see also Esther D. Rothblum et al., The Relationship Between Obesity,
Employment Discrimination, and Employment-Related Victimization, 37 J. VOCATIONAL BE-
HAVIOR 251, 262 (1990).
189 See, e.g., Betsy Covell Breseman et al., Obesity and Powerlessness, in APPEARANCE
AND POWER 173 (Kim K.P. Johnson & Sharron J. Lennon eds., 1999); Christian S. Crandall,
Prejudice Against Fat People: Ideology and Self-Interest, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 882 (1994); Christian S. Crandall & Rebecca Martinez, Culture, Ideology, and An-
tifat Attitudes, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1165 (1996); William DeJong, The
Stigma of Obesity: The Consequences of Naive Assumptions Concerning the Causes of Physi-
cal Deviance, 21 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAVIOR 75 (1980); Cheryl L. Maranto & Ann Fraedrich
Stenoien, Weight Discrimination: A Multidisciplinary Analysis, 12 EMPLOYEE RESPONSIBILI-
TIES & RIGHTS J. 9 (2000).
190 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
191 E.g., DeJong, supra note 189, at 85; Crandall, supra note 189, at 884-88; Crandall &
Martinez, supra note 189, at 1173; Weiner, supra note 53, at 964; Weiner et al., supra note 53,
at 745; WEINER, supra note 53, at 75-78.
192 DeJong, supra note 189, at 85.
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at least somewhat aware that this is the case, why would the belief that
weight was controllable persist? Whereas DeJong and Weiner, for exam-
ple, seem to feel that educating people as to the facts of stigma controlla-
bility should change their tendencies to stigmatize the obese,193 Crandall
maintains that the problem is more entrenched than that, and argues for a
parallel between symbolic racism 194 and "antifatism":
[T]he belief that fat people got that way primarily from
overeating and a lack of self-control does not properly
represent the scientific data. Instead, I propose the no-
tion that holding antifat attitudes serves a value-expres-
sive function, reinforcing a world view consistent with
the Protestant work ethic, self-determination, a belief in
a just world, and the notion that people get what they
deserve. If ideology leads a person to chronically attri-
bute controllable causality to others, he or she will tend
to blame fat people for their weight and stigmatize them
for it. A similar argument has been made for racism in
particular. Many Whites hold Blacks accountable for
their relatively poor economic status. The belief that in-
dividuals and disadvantaged groups are responsible for
any negative aspects of their situation is known as the
"ultimate attribution error." 195
Crandall's results were further supported in a subsequent compara-
tive study that looked at antifat attitudes in the United States and Mexico,
where Crandall and Martinez found substantial differences both in the
attitudes themselves and in the ideological networks that supported them.
Antifat attitudes in the United States were part of a social ideology
that holds individuals responsible for their life outcomes and may derive
from attributions of controllability over life events. Attributions of con-
trollability were significantly less important in Mexico for predicting an-
tifat attitudes, and antipathy toward fat people showed no evidence of
being part of an ideological network. Prejudice toward fat people in the
United States appears to have a significant ideological component. 196
Overweight and obese people are generally no less likely to hold
negative attitudes toward obesity than are average- or underweight peo-
ple. 197 Self-protective defense mechanisms often do not successfully in-
193 Id.; Weiner et al., supra note 53, at 745-46.
194 See supra text accompanying note 14.
195 Crandall, supra note 189, at 884.
196 Crandall & Martinez, supra note 189, at 1165.
197 Quinn & Crocker, supra note 178, at 127.
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sulate the overweight,19 8 who are part of the same culture and raised
within the same ideological networks as everyone else, from self-blame
and low self-esteem. Moreover, belief in that very ideology of blame
and stigma controllability induces many overweight people who do not
blame themselves for their condition to maintain negative attitudes to-
ward other overweight people, precisely because they view their own
membership in the stigmatized group as temporary. "There is no reason
for them to develop group consciousness or attempt to change the way
society views their weight because most members believe that they will
be able to leave the group through weight loss." 199
a. Employment Discrimination
These antifat stereotypes and prejudices have led to discrimination
against the overweight in a number of areas. Of these, perhaps the most
conspicuous is employment; there is extensive evidence of weight-based
discrimination in hiring, wages, promotion, and termination. A founda-
tional article published in 1979 was one of the first to demonstrate unam-
biguous discrimination in hiring against the overweight; it reported the
results of two studies based on simulated job interviews:
[F]or each of the 22 dependent variables on which there
were significant weight condition differences, the over-
weight were rated more negatively than the average
weight. This pattern of data provides strong support for
the existence of a negative overweight stereotype. Spe-
cifically, overweight persons are seen as significantly (p
< .05) less desirable employees who, compared with
others, are less competent, less productive, not industri-
ous, disorganized, indecisive, inactive, and less success-
ful . ..In addition, on skills measuring the degree to
which certain terms or phrases characterize the target,
the descriptive labels conscientious, takes the initiative,
aggressive, perseveres at work, and ambitious were seen
as less characteristic of the overweight than the average
weight, while mentally lazy and lacks self-discipline
were rated as more characteristic of the over-
weight. 200 .... The hypothesis that the applicant's weight
would influence the decision to hire for a job opening
198 Id. at 135 (noting that women in general, and white women in particular, are espe-
cially vulnerable in this regard).
199 Id. at 127.
200 Judith Candib Larkin & Harvey A. Pines, No Fat Persons Need Apply: Experimental
Studies of the Overweight Stereotype and Hiring Preference, 6 Soc. WORK & OCCUPATIONS
312, 315-16 (1979).
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was confirmed. The overweight applicants were signifi-
cantly less highly recommended ... for hiring than the
average weight ... applicants .... Furthermore, the re-
sults of this direct measure of discrimination were con-
firmed by the indirect, social comparison measure of
hiring bias. When asked to indicate their own chances of
being hired compared with the applicant's, subjects' re-
sponses showed a significantly greater expectation of be-
ing hired after observing the overweight . . . than after
observing the average weight . . . appli-
cant .... suggesting a lower evaluation of the overweight
applicant. 201
More recent studies in both laboratory and field settings have re-
peatedly confirmed these results, not only with regard to hiring, but in-
volving discrimination at all stages of the employment relationship. 20 2
Overweight employees were consistently viewed by potential and actual
employers as lazy or sloppy; having poor personal hygiene; lacking self-
discipline or self control; less competent, conscientious, healthy, or able
to get along with others; and more likely to have emotional and personal
problems or to be absent from work.203 Moreover, even where specific
information, such as high test scores or demonstrations of job-related
skill, was presented to dispel the stereotype as applied cognitively to a
particular employee or job candidate, the bias still persisted; this was
found to be consistent with the line of research suggesting that affective
factors play a very strong role in constituting biases that lead to discrimi-
nation.204 Interestingly, one study even found that it appeared to make
no difference whether physical appearance was relevant to the job
description (i.e., extensive public contact would be required) in terms of
the bias against hiring overweight applicants. 20 5 A number of studies
also demonstrate significant gender effects of obesity, such that over-
weight women suffer more employment-related discrimination and
201 Id. at 321.
202 See, e.g., Regina Pingitore et al., Bias Against Overweight Job Applicants in a Simu-
lated Employment Interview, 79 J. App. PSYCHOL. 909 (1994); Mark V. Roehling, Weight-
Based Discrimination in Employment: Psychological and Legal Aspects, 52 PERSONNEL
PSYCHOL. 969, 971-83 (1999) (summarizing studies); Rothblum et al., supra note 188 (using
survey data compiled from real overweight and obese people in naturalistic settings, rather
than in the lab); Puhl & Brownell, Obesity and Discrimination, supra note 183, at 4-6 (citing
approximately fifteen different studies).
203 Roehling, supra note 202, at 984.
204 Pingitore et al., supra note 202, at 915; see also supra text accompanying notes 61-62
(discussing evidence from studies).
205 Pingitore et al., supra note 202, at 915. But see Roehling, supra note 202, at 987.
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greater wage effects than do overweight men.20 6 One such study, based
on data taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market
Experience of Youth (NLSY), revealed that:
For women, economically as well as socially, thinner is
always better, no matter how thin you already are
. . . .Our estimates indicate that the wages of mildly
obese white women are 5.8% lower than their standard
weight counterparts, and wages of morbidly obese white
women are 20.0 to 24.1% lower, depending on the defi-
nition of morbid obesity used . . . .These differences
yield substantial wage penalties for women. In con-
trast, . . . we estimate that men who are mildly obese
experience a wage premium (7.1% for white men and
16.0% for black men) compared to their standard weight
counterparts. Remarkably, men do not experience a
wage penalty until their weight exceeds standard weight
by more than 100 lb . . . .Men only experience wage
penalties at the very highest weight levels. The wages of
white men whose weight is 100% over standard for their
heights are 19.6% lower, and those of black men are
3.5% lower than their standard weight counterparts.
White women suffer greater wage penalties for mild
obesity (20% over standard weight) than black men do
for weight that is 100% over standard weight. 20 7
Another study suggests that at least part of this wage discrepancy
may be due to weight-related occupational sorting of males; in other
words, overweight men may not have to suffer wage penalties because of
lower barriers to occupational mobility, which allow them to sort them-
selves more easily into either relatively high-paying occupations or jobs
where they are relatively more productive. Because the stigma of obesity
is greater for women, however, the effect of labor market discrimination
is to foster occupational segregation in jobs where wage penalties re-
sult.20 8 Thus, while overweight and obese men unquestionably face dis-
crimination in the workplace, their experience is different than that of
overweight and obese women, who suffer more of it and take far greater
wage cuts as well. In fact, Rothblum concludes that the often-observed
correlation between poverty and obesity for women is misunderstood:
206 See, e.g., Maranto & Stenoien, supra note 189; Josd A. Pag.n & Alberto D~vila,
Obesity, Occupational Attainment, and Earnings, 78 Soc. Sci. Q. 756 (1997); Roehling, supra
note 202, at 985; Esther D. Rothblum, The Stigma of Women's Weight: Social and Economic
Realities, 2 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 61 (1992).
207 Maranto & Stenoien, supra note 189, at 19.
208 Pagan & DAvila, supra note 206, at 757.
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Whereas most people tend to assume that poverty causes obesity, her
research has indicated that obesity, because of these wage effects, effects
on occupational mobility, and discrimination in access to prestigious ed-
ucation, actually causes poverty.209
The range of discrimination demonstrated in the social science re-
search is also reflected in the cases that have reached the courts. How-
ever, because of the standards of proof required in court, these cases tend
to reflect situations where there is an explicit physical and/or weight-
related requirement in place; the presence of such a requirement makes it
incontrovertible that the employee's weight was a genuine consideration
in the employer's decision, and thus enhances the plaintiff's likelihood of
prevailing on a claim of weight-based discrimination. Employers who
require a pre-hire physical or have height and weight requirements for
their employees often use these requirements as screening mechanisms in
order to refuse to hire2 10 potential employees, or to refuse to promote,211
or discipline21 2 or terminate, 213 present employees, who do not comply
with weight standards. Therefore, although police departments and air-
lines show up with particular frequency as defendants in these cases, this
does not warrant a conclusion that these are the only, or even the pri-
mary, areas in which weight-based employment discrimination occurs-
it may just be that the explicit weight standards make these cases more
feasible to bring and to prove in court. No type of workplace seems to be
categorically exempt: Other weight-discrimination cases have been
brought against hospitals and nursing homes,214 delivery and transporta-
209 Rothblum, supra note 206, at 66-68. But see Emsberger & Koletsky, supra note 176,
at 244 (noting that "[o]besity can be either a cause or a consequence of poverty").
2 10 E.g., Cook v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17
(1st Cir. 1993); Jones v. City of Mount Vernon, 114 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Furst v.
N.Y. Unified Court Sys., No. 97-CV-1502 (ARR), 1999 WL 1021817 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18,
1999); EEOC v. Tex. Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Wolf v. Frank, Civil
Action 92-76270, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10356 (E.D. Mich.); Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc.,
856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993); State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 478 N.Y.S.2d 982
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 413
N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
211 E.g., Greene v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 548 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
-212 E.g., Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997); Andrews v. Ohio, 104
F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997); Fredregill v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1082
(S.D. Iowa 1997); Morrow v. City of Jacksonville, 941 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Ark. 1996); Civil
Serv. Comm'n v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 591 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991).
213 E.g., Donoghue v. County of Orange, 848 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. City of
Tarpon Springs, 758 F. Supp. 1473 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Hazeldine v. Beverage Media, Ltd., 954
F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Polesnak v. R.H. Mgmt. Sys., No. 95-1705, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22106 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 1997); Nedder v. Rivier Coll., 944 F. Supp. III (D.N.H.
1996); Smaw v. Va. Dep't of State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469 (E.D. Va. 1994); Gimello v.
Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., 594 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Krein v. Marian
Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987).
214 Cook, 10 F.3d 17; Krein, 415 N.W.2d 793.
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tion services, 215 restaurants,2 16 grocery stores, 217 and colleges, 218 to
name only a few.
It should be noted that the threshold for discrimination in these
cases is far below morbid obesity; while many of the plaintiffs are obese,
and some are morbidly obese, others are barely even overweight. This is
one area in which the airline cases, which almost exclusively involve
flight attendants terminated or disciplined for exceeding weight require-
ments, are somewhat unusual-in these cases, individuals who are over-
weight (or over the maximum weight imposed by the airline) by as little
as ten pounds are subject to adverse employment actions. 219 Moreover,
it should be stressed that-as the airlines themselves admit, and the
courts recognize-the weight and other appearance restrictions for flight
attendants are in no way based on health or safety concerns, or on the
ability of the individual to "greet passengers, push carts, move luggage,
and, perhaps most important, provide physical assistance in emergen-
cies. '220 Rather, the airlines explain that these standards are in place
purely to promote their chosen corporate images, from "lean [and]
lithe"22 to "a quality image of the flight attendants as clean, healthy,
attractive individuals who take pride in themselves and their job"222 or
even "the love airline. '223 (Although I will address the law on weight
discrimination in detail below, in order to spare the reader the inevitable
suspense I will note now that the courts have held-as they must, under
215 Tex. Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965; Gimello, 594 A.2d 264.
216 Polesnak, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22106.
217 Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993).
218 Nedder, 944 F. Supp. Ill.
219 E.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000); Air Line Pilots
Ass'n, Int'l v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 73 C 1082, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11790 (E.D.N.Y.
1979). In one case, an individual was terminated who was over the weight limit but who was
not even slightly overweight or obese-he was a male bodybuilder. Tudyman v. United Air-
lines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
However, weight discrimination against non-obese employees is not confined to the air-
line industry. See, e.g., Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997) (firefighter);
Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997) (state highway patrol officers).
220 Frank, 216 F.3d at 855. In fact, in at least one case the weight requirements were
found to positively undermine the ability of flight attendants to perform these tasks. Gerdom v.
Continental Airlines, Inc. 692 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1982). But see In re Nat'l Airlines, Inc.,
434 F. Supp. 269, 274 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (The judge observes that a defense witness "points out
an obvious conclusion: that 'tubbies' on airlines are less agile and agility is an important factor
in flight attendants discharging the primary duty of providing safety for passengers." The same
judge later takes judicial notice, based on his personal experience, "[t]o the extent permitted by
Federal Evidence Rule 201 ... that in southern Florida National's flight attendants enjoy a
reputation for competence as well as good looks." Id. at 275-76 n.9).
221 In re Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. at 275 n.9.
222 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11790, at *15-16.
223 Wilson v. S.W. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 294 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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current law-that these standards are legal unless they impose different
burdens by sex or some other protected criterion.224)
There have also been a few weight-based harassment suits, the facts
of which can sound strikingly parallel to many sexual harassment
cases. 225 For example, when Brian Butterfield began work as a correc-
tions officer with the New York State Department of Corrections in
1989, he was 5 feet, 7 inches tall and weighed in excess of 400 pounds;
in 1993 he underwent gastric bypass surgery and his weight dropped to
255 pounds. 226 Butterfield alleged that he had been "subjected to differ-
ential terms and conditions of employment on the basis of his size," in-
cluding name-calling (e.g., "Butterball"), 227 since he was first hired, but
the intense harassment began after he returned to work after his surgery,
in the fall of 1993. Butterfield began to keep records of the harassment
in May of 1994.228 On July 5, 1994, he registered a complaint with the
Office of the Inspector General; the incidents of harassment subsequently
multiplied. The examples of harassment cited by Butterfield were nu-
merous: In July through August of 1994 alone, Butterfield's coworkers
put an unknown substance in his soda when his back was turned, which
caused nausea and burning in his stomach; Butterfield began to receive
harassing phone calls (which were traced to the correctional facility
where he worked) both at work and at home; other officers refused to
line up next to him as they were supposed to; and Butterfield's locker at
work was sprayed with cheese.229 Beginning in February of 1995, ob-
scene and harassing remarks began to appear scrawled on Butterfield's
time cards, and in April he found a dead rat in an envelope addressed to
him in his work mailbox. 230 As the court observed,
[T]aking his allegations as true, what he has presented in
this case is graphic evidence of what appears to be an
overwhelming and persistent pattern of severe harass-
ment by department personnel, a good portion of it fo-
cused quite explicitly upon Butterfield's obesity, and-
224 That is to say, as a matter of federal law, unless they violate Title VII or the ADA.
Thus, as one judge explained, "Even assuming that [the airline] may impose different weight
standards on female and male flight attendants, [it] may not impose different and more burden-
some weight standards without justifying those standards as BFOQs." Frank, 216 F.3d at 855.
225 Butterfield v. New York, 96 Civ. 5144 (BDP) (LMS), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18676
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also Sharlene A. McEvoy, Tipping the Scales of Justice: Employment
Discrimination Against the Overweight, 21 HUM. RTS. 24 (1994) (discussing harassment case
where plaintiffs coworker "poked, pinched, and ridiculed her in the presence of customers,
saying that fat people lie and stink").
226 Butterfield, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18676, at *9-12.
227 Id. at *21.
228 Id. at *13-14.
229 Id. at *14-17.
230 Id. at *18.
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most importantly-a striking failure on the part of man-
agement to effectively investigate or stop the harass-
ment, or even to punish any particular individuals who
participated in it, or any officers who observed it and
failed to stop it.231
The Butterfield case and the others discussed above have very im-
portant legal and precedential value, and I will turn to the legal aspects of
these cases in Section C below. For our immediate purposes, though, the
cases provide strong evidence of weight-based employment discrimina-
tion that occurs in the real world, reflecting and confirming the results
obtained in the social science studies.
b. Discrimination in Provision of Goods and Services
The overweight and obese are also discriminated against on the con-
sumer end of the marketplace. For example, in the clothing industry, as
Breseman et al. note,
It is puzzling that there are not more stores catering to
obese women because popular sources of fashion and
apparel information such as trade and fashion publica-
tions report that approximately 31 per cent of all Ameri-
can women nationwide are size 16 or larger and spend
over $10 billion on clothing annually. Furthermore, at
least 45% of such women are 24 to 35 years old, making
them the "most powerful clothes-purchasing segment of
the U.S. population. ' '232
Despite the obvious potential for moneymaking in this market, the
attitudes of many top apparel companies that regard plus-sized clothing
as "fashion poison" have served to restrict greatly plus-sized women's
choices in the clothing market; such clothing is more likely to be availa-
ble in places like New York City than elsewhere. 233 Moreover, studies
have indicated that overweight and obese customers are subject to dispa-
rate treatment by sales staff in retail stores, who are slower and more
reluctant to wait on them.234
Although not much research has been done in this area, there is
substantial anecdotal evidence (some of it from legal cases) that over-
weight and obese people also experience discrimination in public accom-
231 Id. at *42.
232 Breseman et al., supra note 189, at 180-81.
233 Id. at 181.
234 Id.
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modations such as restaurants, 235 movie theaters, 236 and transportation
services, 237 where seats are often too small for them. Businesses are
often reluctant to make substantial changes that would accommodate the
obese, often due to the financial costs involved. 238 However, there is
something more going on here than a simple cost-benefit analysis: Even
where accommodation can be made without costly structural changes,
and where it is in fact made for non-obese people, some businesses still
refuse to do so for the obese. Thus, for example, "if a woman is nine
months pregnant, an airline will not force her to purchase two seats be-
cause she does not fit in one seat. The airlines make accommodations for
travelers using wheelchairs, and do not question a pregnant woman's
right to occupy [more than] one seat, while they [insist that] obese people
[ ] buy two seats." 239 And the public humiliation and deliberate mockery
that accompanies some of these incidents owes nothing to financial
considerations. 240
One small study also found evidence of landlords' discrimination
against obese college students seeking to rent apartments. When normal-
weight and obese testers were sent out to eleven different properties ad-
vertised for rent in a small college town, it was found that five out of the
eleven landlords would not rent to the obese tester, whereas all eleven
offered their apartments to the non-obese tester; of the five who refused,
three increased the rent, and two claimed that the apartment was "practi-
cally rented to another college student."' 24t Moreover, the landlord's
weight did not have any apparent effect on whether or not s/he rejected
the tester.242
235 E.g., Sellick v. Denny's Inc., 884 F. Supp. 388 (D. Or. 1995).
236 E.g., Birdwell v. Carmike Cinemas, No. 2940014 (M.D. Tenn. 1994), cited in Milena
D. O'Hara, Note and Comment, "Please Weight to be Seated": Recognizing Obesity as a
Disability to Prevent Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 17 WI-lrrER L. REv. 895,
903-04 (1996).
237 E.g., Hollowich v. S.W. Airlines Co., No. BC035389 (Cal. 1991), cited in O'Hara,
supra note 236, at 904-05; Green v. Greyhound, No. 92VS55226H (N.D. Ga. 1992), cited in
O'Hara, supra note 236, at 905.
238 O'Hara, supra note 236, at 906.
239 Id. at 907. The same problem appears to persist in Canada. The Canadian Transport
Agency recently held that obesity, "as a general case," is not a disability requiring accommo-
dation under the Canada Transport Act. Canadian Tribunal Rules Obesity Isn't a Disability,
REUTERs HEALTH (Dec. 13, 2001) available at http://hvlib.integris-health.com/HealthNews/
reuters/NewsStoryl2l3200132.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2002).
240 See, e.g., Sellick v. Denny's Inc., 884 F. Supp. 388, 391-92 (D. Or. 1995) (open mock-
ery of morbidly obese customer by staff); Hollowich v. S.W. Airlines Co., No. BC035389
(Cal. 1991), cited in O'Hara, supra note 236, at 905 (morbidly obese passenger "pulled out of
line by Southwest employees in the presence of a large group of people and told that she was
obliged to buy another seat. If she refused, they warned her that they would take her off the
plane with armed guards.").
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Health insurance remains another area in which the obese often en-
counter problems. Puhl and Brownell point out that it is common for
health insurance plans explicitly to exclude obesity treatment from cov-
erage, and for physicians to encounter difficulty in receiving reimburse-
ment for their services. 243 Until December of 2000, the IRS had
excluded weight loss programs "not for the purpose of curing any spe-
cific ailment or disease, but for the purpose of improving the individual's
appearance, health, and sense of well being" as a medical deduction,
even when prescribed by a doctor.244 In December 2000, the IRS
changed its policy so that weight-loss programs "undertaken at a physi-
cian's direction to treat an existing disease (such as heart disease)" are
now deductible, but "if the purpose of the weight control is to maintain
your general good health," the cost of the program is still not deducti-
ble. 245 Also, in October of 1999 the Social Security Administration
eliminated obesity as a separate listing from its list of impairments used
to determine eligibility for disability payments; it is now to be listed as a
"medically determinable impairment" to be considered as an aggravating
factor along with other causes of disability (e.g., musculoskeletal, respir-
atory, or cardiovascular). 246 The SSA made this change "on the grounds
that the listing was too difficult to administer in the old form and led to
decisions that were undeservedly favorable. '247
As to why coverage for obesity treatment persists in being inade-
quate, Puhl and Brownell suggest that the notion of obesity as a problem
of willful behavior may once again be to blame 248; also, obesity treat-
ments are relatively expensive, and their success rate is generally low. 249
243 Puhl & Brownell, Obesity and Discrimination, supra note 183, at 10.
244 Rev. Rul. 79-151, 1979-1 C.B. 116 (1979).
245 American Obesity Ass'n, A Taxpayer's Guide on IRS Policy to Deduct Weight Con-
trol Treatment (Dec. 2000), at http://www.obesity.org/taxguide.htm (last visited Mar. 27,
2001). The AOA Guide notes that the IRS made this change in response to a petition filed by
the AOA and nine other organizations, among them the American Association of Bariatric
Physicians, Jenny Craig, Inc., Knoll Pharmaceutical Co., Obesity Law and Advocacy Center,
and Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc.
246 Clara W. Dworsky, A Weighty Problem: Obesity and Social Security Changes, 10
EXPERIENCE 37, 37 (Winter 2000).
247 Id. Note, however, that the case law seems more inconsistent than undeservedly
favorable. See, e.g., Stone v. Harris, 657 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that no underlying
physical cause was required to establish obesity as a disability, and that "[t]he notion that all
fat people are self-indulgent souls who eat more than anyone ought appears to be no more than
the baseless prejudice of the intolerant svelte"); Valdez v. Heckler, 616 F. Supp. 933 (N.D.
Cal. 1985) (holding that "[i]mpairments that can be reasonably remedied by treatment cannot
function as the basis for a finding of disability[, and] a claimant who willfully fails to follow
prescribed treatment [i.e., to lose weight] which could be expected to restore her ability to
work, is not under a disability").
248 Puhl & Brownell, Obesity and Discrimination, supra note 183, at 11 (citing A. Frank,
Conflicts in the Care of Overweight Patients: Inconsistent Rules and Insufficient Money, 5
OBESrrY RESEARCH 268 (1997)).
249 Id.; see also infra note 268.
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The result is that obese patients are often denied access to beneficial
treatment to an extent disproportionate to the standards of health insur-
ance otherwise available in the United States.250
c. Discrimination in the Medical Field
Another major trouble area lies in the very profession that purports
to be most concerned with Americans' weight: medicine. Despite the
fact that health care professionals, if anyone, should be familiar with the
scientific and medical facts about overweight and obesity, as Solovay
explains,
There are three fundamental beliefs about fat held by the
medical establishment all of which have profound impli-
cations not only for the health and well-being of fat peo-
ple, but also for the law. These rarely challenged
assumptions are: that weight is mutable, that weight loss
is a benign procedure, and that fat is unhealthy.
Medicine's failure to examine these basic assumptions
critically has resulted in the development of a field rid-
dled by bias. 25 1
Scholars and critics of medicine's approach to obesity have focused
on two main areas: health care professionals' prejudices regarding obese
or overweight patients, and the medical profession's hostile, "epidemio-
logical" approach to the general problem of obesity in America. As to
the former, several studies have documented significant anti-fat attitudes,
prejudice, and bias among doctors, nurses, and other health care profes-
sionals. For example, in one study of over 400 physicians, over one third
of the respondents listed obesity as a condition that aroused feelings of
discomfort, reluctance or dislike, and associated it with poor hygiene,
non-compliance, hostility, and dishonesty. 252 In another study of 318
family physicians, two-thirds of those surveyed reported that "their obese
patients lacked self control and 39% stated that their obese patients were
lazy."'253 And a study that focused on nutritional specialists found that
87% characterized obese persons as indulgent, 74% as having family
problems, and 32% as lacking willpower; moreover, 88% characterized
obesity as a form of compensation for lack of love or attention, and 70%
250 Puhl & Brownell, Obesity and Discrimination, supra note 183, at 11 (citing Frank,
supra note 249, at 270).
251 SOLOVAY, supra note 176, at 189.
252 Puhl & Brownell, Obesity and Discrimination, supra note 183, at 7 (citing D. Klein et
al., Patient Characteristics that Elicit Negative Responses from Family Physicians, 14 J. FAM.
PRAC. 881, 883 (1982)).
253 Id. (citing J.H. Price et al., Family Practice Physicians' Beliefs, Attitudes, and Prac-
tices Regarding Obesity, 3 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 339, 342 (1987)).
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attributed it to emotional problems.254 Studies of nurses obtained similar
results, finding that nurses were far more likely to blame patients than
the ineffectiveness of current weight loss programs for unsuccessful
weight loss, 2 55 and that nurses viewed obese persons as deficient in self
control, less successful, overindulgent, lazy, and experiencing unresolved
anger. 256 Forty-eight percent of nurses indicated that they felt uncom-
fortable caring for obese patients, and 31% would prefer not to care for
them at all.257
Other studies have indicated that these prejudices and negative atti-
tudes on the part of health care providers have the unfortunate result of
causing overweight and obese patients to avoid seeking health care.258
And still other evidence suggests that, once overweight people do seek
medical treatment, their health problems are more likely to be misdiag-
nosed because doctors are quick to attribute symptoms like amenorrhea,
fatigue, pain, or headaches to the patient's weight rather than to another
medical condition, such as pregnancy, mononucleosis, cancer, or eye
problems. 259
These tendencies to misdiagnose fat patients are consistent with the
medical profession's current general outlook on obesity, which can only
be described as hysterical. Although those of us outside the medical pro-
fession tend to think of medical research as a purely scientific endeavor
whose goal is to elucidate the "truth" about how human biology and bio-
chemistry works, there are many conflicting interests within medicine
that, unfortunately, have serious effects on how medical data and medical
advice are presented to the general public. 260 There is a large subset of
254 Id. (citing L.A. Maiman et al., Attitudes Toward Obesity and the Obese Among Profes-
sionals, 74 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS'N 331, 332 (1979)).
255 Id. (citing R. Hoppe & J. Ogden, Practice Nurses' Beliefs About Obesity and Weight
Related Interventions in Primary Care, 21 INT'L J. OBESITY 141, 143 (1997)).
256 Id. (citing D. Maroney & S. Golub, Nurses' Attitudes Toward Obese Persons and
Certain Ethnic Groups, 75 PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS 387, 389 (1992)); see also
SOLOVAY, supra note 176, at 219.
257 Puhl & Brownell, Obesity and Discrimination, supra note 183, at 7-8.
258 Id. at 9-10.
259 SOLOVAY, supra note 176, at 220-22.
260 Conflicts of interest in medicine and public health are by no means limited to obesity
research. Another well-known example is the controversy surrounding the USDA's most re-
cent set of dietary guidelines, including the "Food Guide Pyramid," which is supposed to
indicate graphically how many daily servings of various types of foods are recommended for
healthy eating. The last version of the Pyramid was published in 1996, U.S. DEP'T OF AORIC.,
THE FOOD GUIDE PYRAMID (1996), and was reviewed in 2000 amidst a firestorm of criticism
and allegations of conflict of interest. One organization, the Physicians Committee for Respon-
sible Medicine, filed a lawsuit against the USDA and HHS, charging that six of the eleven
panel members who were to review the guidelines had "inappropriate financial ties" to the
dairy, meat, and egg industries. Sam Fulwood III, Diet Guidelines Prompt Food Fight, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2000, at A22. The physicians' organization was particularly concerned with the
guidelines' stress on milk and dairy foods as important sources of calcium, given that many
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the current medical literature that stresses the characterization of obesity
itself as a disease, and focuses on its "epidemiology" and causal relation-
ship to other "comorbidities" such as heart disease and decreased longev-
ity. 261 This literature also tends to focus on the health costs of obesity to
the nation at large, presenting enormous statistics about how much obes-
ity costs the economy in medical services, lost productivity, and so
forth. 262 While this trend might at first seem to reflect a diminution of
antifat prejudice, in that physical "diseases" are generally viewed as less
controllable by the individual afflicted with them (and therefore less stig-
matizing), the result has been the waging of an all-out "war" on obesity
within the medical profession, where obesity is viewed, plague-like, as
something to be stamped out at any cost.
If the evidence for the causal relationship between weight and
"comorbidities" is as unclear and controversial as it seems to be, 26 3 then
why are so many medical researchers so quick to interpret ambiguous
medical findings as clear evidence of the health harms and economic
costs of obesity? The reasons may partially relate to the antifat prejudices
and stereotypes discussed above, but several authors have suggested an-
other reason: conflicts of interest "manifested by [ ] physicians' personal,
professional, emotional, and financial stakes in the determination that
obesity is an evil."'264 For example, Ernsberger and Koletsky point out
that
The National Institutes of Health frequently convene
panels of experts to discuss important and controversial
dark, leafy green vegetables are viable alternative calcium sources, and that non-Caucasian
populations are far more likely than Caucasians to be lactose-intolerant. Id. In the course of the
same review, controversy also arose over the USDA's dietary guideline on sugar: While the
original wording had urged Americans to "limit" their intake of sugar, vigorous lobbying from
the sugar industry and a letter signed by 30 senators, mostly from sugar-farming states, re-
sulted in a change in language. Raja Mishra, Food Guidelines Go Softer on Sweets Industry,
Senators Influenced Wording, BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 2000, at Al. Now, the guideline urges
Americans to "choose beverages and foods to moderate your intake of sugar." Id. (emphasis
added).
261 E.g., Ali H. Mokdad et al., The Continuing Epidemic of Obesity in the United States,
284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1650 (Oct. 4, 2000); Aviva Must et al., The Disease Burden Associ-
ated with Overweight and Obesity, 282 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1523 (Oct. 27, 1999). But see A.
Tremblay & E. Doucet, Obesity: A Disease or a Biological Adaptation?, 1 OBESrrY REViEws
27, 33 (2000).
Ernsberger and Koletsky also note the problem of selective citations of these kinds of
studies. Their citation analyses indicate that studies emphasizing a strong upward trend of
mortality with increasing body weight are cited far more frequently than studies with contrary
results, even with all other factors (e.g., prestige of the journal or of the researcher) being
equal. Ernsberger & Koletsky, supra note 176, at 248.
262 E.g., The Cost of Obesity in the U.S., 2 AM. OBEsITY Ass'N REP. 1 (Oct. 19, 1999), at
http://www.obesity.org/obesity-costs.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2001).
263 See Section B.1 supra.
264 SOLOVAY, supra note 176, at 211.
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issues in medicine and to arrive at compromise or con-
sensus statements that are almost universally agreed
upon. This process has worked well for many topics, as
experts representing a spectrum of opinion are brought
together and reach agreement on the current state of
knowledge in their field. A major problem with consen-
sus panels, however, is that many of the experts re-
present special interest groups . . . . This is clearly a
problem with NIH panels on obesity, on which the mul-
tibillion-dollar interests of the weight loss industry have
been well represented.265
Thus, a number of mainstream medical precepts agreed upon by
consensus panels serve to favor the growth and profitability of the
weight-loss industry: Exaggeration of the ill effects of obesity sends
more people running to doctors and weight-loss programs and facilitates
third-party payments for such services; setting body weight standards as
low as possible expands the client base for such services, as more people
become "too fat" by definition; and de-emphasizing the negative health
consequences of weight cycling encourages repeat utilization of weight-
loss services. 266 This phenomenon is even less surprising given that
many of the "experts" on these panels are either funded by pharmaceuti-
cal companies or are active participants in the weight-loss industry them-
selves, running diet clinics, publishing diet books, or working for weight-
loss companies such as Weight Watchers International. 267 The unfortu-
nate result is that, for all people of above-average weight, and especially
for the obese, the medical establishment is quick to refer them to diet
pills and programs that fail in the vast majority of cases 268- and thereby
to imply that any subsequent failure is entirely the patient's fault.
d. The Legal System: Juries and Prisons
There is also evidence from legal cases that demonstrates the opera-
tion of weight discrimination within the legal system itself-particularly
juries and prisons. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in
265 Ernsberger & Koletsky, supra note 176, at 249.
266 Id.
267 See, e.g., id. at 252 (table summarizing conflicts of interest among members of the
National Task Force on the Prevention and Treatment of Obesity); SOLOVAY, supra note 176,
at 211-12; FRASER, supra note 88, at 214-17.
268 See, e.g., C. Ayyad & T. Andersen, Long-Term Efficacy of Dietary Treatment of Obes-
ity: A Systematic Review of Studies Published Between 1931 and 1999, 1 OBESITY REVIEWS
113 (2000) (finding a 15% success rate for dietary treatments, with very broad definition of
"success"); FRASER, supra note 88, at 182 (quoting Yale obesity researcher Kelly Brownell's
observation that "most people stand a better chance of recovering from most forms of cancer
than losing weight and keeping it off").
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United States v. Santiago-Martinez, Batson v. Kentucky's prohibition on
race-based peremptory challenges does not apply to weight-based chal-
lenges, since "no court has yet held that discrimination on the basis of
obesity is subject to 'heightened scrutiny' under the Equal Protection
Clause."269 However, the result of obesity's exemption from heightened
scrutiny has been to give antifat prejudice and discrimination free play.
In a California murder case, People v. Galbert,270 one of the defen-
dant's grounds for appeal was that the prosecutor had used his peremp-
tory challenges to strike black women from the jury in violation of
People v. Wheeler (the California state law equivalent of Batson). The
prosecutor's response with regard to two of the three jurors was that he
had not struck them because of their race, but because of their weight;
the language is worth reproducing at some length:
[After explaining that he dismissed the first juror be-
cause she wore a nose ring and had long, braided hair,]
[t]he prosecutor's objections to the second juror, Ms. L.,
were similar: "Ms. L. also is a person, a younger per-
son .... She's grossly overweight .... She's got on a
little tiny skirt that doesn't fit her and she's got on a
sweat shirt .... She looked like someone who gave very
little attention to how she came into this courtroom and
how she looked .... The problem with that is a person
who comes into a courtroom looking like that, with a
skirt that's hiked halfway up her thighs when she sits,
when she stands, and then when she sits you can see
everything God gave the woman, I'm very uncomforta-
ble taking a case of this seriousness to someone whose
attire is so sloppy and inappropriate for the kind of pro-
ceedings that we're involved in." The prosecutor ex-
cused the third juror, Ms. A., for related reasons:
"Braids, obesity, size, manner of dress. Ms. A. had very
large, very thick braids. She had a dark blue pant suit on
with very large gold-plated buttons and very long dan-
gling earrings, which are just to me signs of, I won't say
ostentatious dress because in other circumstances they
may be important, but to me the way a person comes
into a courtroom tells me a lot about what I may have to
deal with down a line. And a person who is that young,
who is that big, who dresses in such a manner to draw
that kind of attention to herself, I'm just very uncomfort-
269 United States v. Santiago-Martinez, 58 F.3d 422, 423 (9th Cir. 1995).
270 People v. Galbert, No. A064486, 1995 WL 108696, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30,
1995).
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able in bringing a case to her whether she is white or...
black or whatever."'27'
A federal case, Torcasio v. Murray,272 involved a morbidly obese
inmate who alleged that the Virginia correctional facility where he was
incarcerated did not do enough to accommodate his size and disabilities.
All of his claims were dismissed on the grounds of qualified immunity
for the prison officials, which effectively means that, if the rule articu-
lated in this case were to be followed across the nation, prisons could
more or less completely refuse to accommodate obese inmates at all, as
long as this could be construed not to conflict with other federal laws
(which the judge in Torcasio believed to be the case).273
e. Family Law and Child Custody
Finally, some family law cases, particularly those involving custody
of overweight children, can implicate issues of weight-based discrimina-
tion. In particular, childhood obesity is sometimes viewed as per se evi-
dence of poor or neglectful parenting, and it has been used to remove
children from their parents' custody or to subject some aspect of their
lives to ongoing control by a court or agency. Thus, for example, in
Fillingim v. Fillingim,274 the Alabama court essentially elected to man-
age the child's weight itself, requiring that the child be placed on a
weight reduction program and that his weight be reported monthly to the
court. When the mother "diminished the size of her son's meals and [ ]
eliminated some objectionable foods therefrom, but [did not place] him
on a diet," 275 the trial court placed her in contempt of court, and the
appeals court upheld the trial court judgment. In another case, an Iowa
appeals court upheld the trial court's adjudication of a girl as a "child in
need of assistance," because, despite the mother's obtaining medical and
psychological help for her daughter, the child continued to gain weight
and the mother was reluctant to place her in a residential program.276
In one highly-publicized California case, when Christina Corrigan
died at the age of 13, weighing 680 pounds, her mother was prosecuted
criminally. Christina had been extremely, disproportionately heavy since
infancy, and despite constant medical attention and participation in medi-
cally supervised diet programs, she continued to gain weight rapidly
throughout her life.277 She stopped attending public school in middle
271 Id. at *2.
272 Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J.).
273 Id. at 1353.
274 388 So.2d 1010 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980).
275 Id. at 1012.
276 In re the Interest of L.T., 494 N.W.2d 450 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).
277 SOLOVAY, supra note 176, at 14-16.
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school, in part because the school was not able to accommodate her
physical limitations, and in part because of the relentless harassment she
received from other children and adults.278 Finally, one day, when
Christina's mother, Marlene, went out briefly to buy some iced tea, she
came home to find her daughter dead. The cause of Christina's death
was never determined, because, despite Marlene's request, a full autopsy
was never done, 279 but eight months later Marlene was charged with fel-
ony child abuse/endangerment. While the precise nature of the criminal
charges was never quite clear, "[ilt was widely reported that overfeeding
and 'allowing' Christina's weight gain were factors. '280 Marlene opted
for a bench trial, and the judge found her guilty of a misdemeanor, sen-
tencing her to community service, counseling, and probation-all for
having a child whose weight she could not control.
3. The Size-Acceptance Movement
Despite the intense stigma and shame associated with overweight
and obesity in this country, the last 30+ years have seen the beginnings
of a size-acceptance movement aimed at combating weight-based dis-
crimination and securing full civil rights for overweight and obese peo-
ple. NAAFA, the National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance, was
founded as a nonprofit human rights organization in 1969; currently with
approximately 5000 members worldwide, 281 its mission is "to eliminate
discrimination based on body size and provide fat people with the tools
for self-empowerment through public education, advocacy, and member
support. ' 282 Its political and legal activities include participating in ral-
lies and demonstrations, serving as a national legal clearinghouse for at-
torneys challenging size discrimination, fighting offensive advertising
and negative media representation through letter-writing campaigns, rep-
resenting the interests of the fat population at conferences of the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) and obesity research conferences, and repre-
senting consumers in legislative hearings to regulate the commercial
weight loss industry.283 NAAFA also works to educate the public on
size- and weight-related issues through discussion groups, conventions,
and working with the media, and provides support for fat people.
278 Id. at 16-18.
279 Id. at 20-21.
280 Id. at 19.
281 E-mail from Ann Rollinson, Administrative Office Assistant, NAAFA National Head-
quarters, to author (Apr. 2, 2001) (on file with author).
282 NAAFA, National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance Home Page, at http://
www.naafa.org (last visited Mar. 27, 2001).
283 NAAFA, NAAFA Information, at http://www.naafa.org/documents/brochures/naafa-
info.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2001).
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At the same time, as the information presented in this article so far
reflects, the size-acceptance movement is still very much in its infancy.
Its views are far outside the American mainstream, and, as I explain be-
low, we are far away from a legal regime that successfully protects peo-
ple from weight-based discrimination. Although advocates have often
been left, for lack of a better option, to pursue claims of weight discrimi-
nation under disability statutes, I argue that the kinds of severe stigmas
that attach to body weight bear a much closer resemblance to race- and
gender-based discrimination than to disability or age.284 In most situa-
tions, as we have seen, the concern on the part of the discriminator is not
that obese people are impaired beyond competence because of their obes-
ity; rather, it is that obese people are lazy, stupid, lack willpower and
self-control, and are "disgusting." If I had to choose a single analogous
form of discrimination, however, the best parallel would probably be to
sexual orientation. In the case of sexual orientation, as with weight, the
"etiology" problem is not yet fully understood or solved; yet, as the gay
and lesbian civil rights movement has illustrated, the less a stigmatized
condition is culturally constructed as a "choice," the further the stigma-
tized group can advance into protection and subsequently into the main-
stream. At this point, the size-acceptance movement is a decade or two
behind gay and lesbian rights, and the notion of weight as self-controlled
is still strong.
One might like to think that, with increased education and research,
changing our cultural understanding of weight will further the cause of
size-acceptance; however, under the current statutory scheme, size-ac-
ceptance has an additional hurdle to jump. In a very real sense, sexual
orientation discrimination has been able to benefit somewhat from being
"sexual"; it has been able, albeit very slowly and incrementally, to piggy-
back itself onto the jurisprudence and statutory law of sex discrimination
because of its nexus with gender, already a protected category. 285 Indi-
vidual instances of weight and weight discrimination, however, are usu-
ally not gendered (or raced) enough to be able to capitalize in this way.
Thus, as will be illustrated below, despite all the evidence, all the studies,
and all the money being spent on weight research loss in America, this is
a form of discrimination that the current logic of antidiscrimination law
has left more or less out in the cold. Like the stigmatized individuals
who hang their hopes on losing weight and thus removing themselves
from the stigmatized group, the legal and medical professions have
284 Cf. Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimi-
nation on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2035 (1987) (arguing
that "appearance, like race and gender, is almost always an illegitimate employment criterion,
and that it is frequently used to make decisions based on personal dislike or prejudicial as-
sumptions rather than actual merit.").
285 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (harassment).
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largely chosen to hang their hopes on "curing" obesity rather than doing
anything about the quality of the lives of overweight and obese people
now. And, given the current legal regime, there is not that much that can
be done about it.
C. SOURCES OF PROTECTION IN THE LAW: STATUTORY AND CASE
LAW
Plaintiffs claiming weight-based discrimination can bring suit at the
federal, state, and/or local levels; many pursue multiple options, alleging
federal and state claims in the same lawsuit. Their likelihood of success,
as we will see, depends on several factors; overall, however, it is fairly
low. At the federal level, there is no specific protection against weight-
based discrimination, so the plaintiff must attempt to fit his or her claims
into a more general statute: either Title VII, the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990, or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. (In theory, the fed-
eral plaintiff could also try to bring a constitutional suit as well, but, as
will soon become clear, this is rarely attempted because the probability
of prevailing is extremely low.) At the state level, the situation is often
similar, since only one state-Michigan-and the District of Columbia
have antidiscrimination statutes that explicitly cover weight-based
claims; in all other states,286 weight-discrimination plaintiffs must bring
suit under the state constitution or state human rights or public accom-
modations laws. Finally, there are currently two local ordinances-in
Santa Cruz and San Francisco-that prohibit weight-based discrimina-
tion, but these are of very recent vintage and do not yet appear to have
engendered much litigation.
1. Federal Law
Under current federal law, the weight-discrimination plaintiff has an
uphill battle to fight. The relatively few cases287 that have raised consti-
tutional claims (and where such claims have lasted long enough to be
mentioned in a judicial opinion) have done so based on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and, as anyone familiar with the juris-
prudence of the Fourteenth Amendment might expect, these plaintiffs
have all failed. First of all, the state action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment means that such suits could only be brought against either
286 In 1994, the New York state legislature considered a bill that would have prohibited
discrimination on the basis of height and weight in employment, housing, and public accom-
modations; that bill failed to pass, as did subsequent bills in 1999. However, there are cur-
rently new bills pending in both houses of the New York state legislature that would prohibit
height- and weight-based discrimination. S.B. 1323, 224th Ann. Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2001);
A.B. 4106, 224th Ann. Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2001).
287 E.g., United States v. Santiago-Martinez, 58 F.3d 422 (9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. City
of Tarpon Springs, 758 F. Supp. 1473 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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governmental 288 or quasi-governmental 289 entities; they cannot reach
purely private conduct under any circumstances. However, even when
the defendant is a state actor, under the Fourteenth Amendment, discrim-
inatory policies that do not deprive someone of a fundamental right, cre-
ate a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, or operate to disadvantage a
suspect or quasi-suspect class only receive the mildest standard of re-
view: rational basis review. The list of suspect classes is now strongly
enshrined in our constitutional law, shows no signs of changing, and, as
the court in United States v. Santiago-Martinez290 noted, does not in-
clude obesity: It is limited to classes based on race and national origin,
while the sole quasi-suspect classes are those based on gender and illegit-
imacy. 291 Because weight or appearance is not a suspect or quasi-sus-
pect classification, under the current state of the doctrine the
discriminatory policy would merely have to be conceivably rationally re-
lated to a legitimate governmental interest in order to pass constitutional
muster-a test that, in practice, almost always amounts to little more
than a rubber stamp. Finally, even if a plaintiff were suing a state actor,
and even if the claim could somehow be construed to implicate dis-
advantaging a suspect class, cases like Washington v. Davis292 and Per-
sonnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney293 have made it clear that
discrimination claims under the Fourteenth Amendment must be inten-
tional; "disparate impact" claims of the type recognized by Title VII are
not cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause. With the bar set this
high, it is unsurprising that weight-discrimination plaintiffs have not had
much success with constitutional claims.
a. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., prohibits discrimination "against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin." 294  Thus, like the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII operates categorically; discrimination
based on anything other than the five enumerated categories is not pro-
288 Either the federal government, see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), or state
governments, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (amended 1996).
289 That is to say, those private entities that nonetheless satisfy the state action require-
ment. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (nexus test); Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (public function doctrine).
290 Santiago-Martinez, 58 F.3d at 423.
291 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
292 426 U.S. 229, 238-46 (1976).
293 422 U.S. 256, 271-74 (1979).
294 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1995).
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hibited. Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, though, Title VII recog-
nizes both purposeful "disparate treatment" and, as of 1991,295 facially
neutral (I will not go so far as to say unintentional 296) "disparate impact"
claims. In the case of Title VII claims involving weight, those that suc-
ceed tend be brought as disparate treatment, rather than disparate impact,
claims. While a disparate impact claim involving weight certainly would
not be beyond the realm of logic, 2 97 such claims can end up extremely
difficult to prove-especially in cases involving relatively small employ-
ers, such as local police departments, where evidence of "class-wide"
disparate impact simply may not be available.298
Since weight is not one of the statutory categories, the usual theory
of a Title VII disparate-treatment weight discrimination case is that the
employer's weight requirements are significantly different, either facially
or as applied, for men and women. Height-weight charts that follow the
Met Life tables in allowing a man and a woman of the same height to
weigh different amounts, standing alone, never constitute a violation of
Title VII; as long as the requirements are equivalent, rather than equal,
for men and women, and enforced at the same rate, the courts will not
find a Title VII violation. 299 Violations, then, tend to be found in two
295 Disparate impact claims enjoyed a highly variable fate in the case law prior to Con-
gress's passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which added an allowance for disparate im-
pact claims to the statute itself: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1995).
296 As Professor Willbom points out, it is not entirely clear how "divorced" from intent
disparate impact really is. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), maintains that
disparate impact theory is not intent-based, but the Court in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), found that severe disparate impact can in fact
justify a finding of motive. Another view, reflected in Justice O'Connor's plurality decision in
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), is that disparate impact is in fact the
functional equivalent of pretext analysis-it may not quite be intent, but it functions more or
less as if it were. This latter formulation is actually probably closer to how the bulk of discrim-
ination functions, but O'Connor emphasizes the difference from "intentional" discrimination.
Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34
Am. U. L. REV. 799 (1985), quoted and discussed in ROBERT BELTON & DIANNE AVERY,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 174-75 (6th ed. 1999).
297 For example, Roehling cites an EEOC decision in which an African-American woman
was denied a hostess-trainee position because her hip measurements exceeded the maximum
allowed by the employer. The applicant claimed disparate-impact discrimination because the
employer's facially neutral measurement chart had a disproportionate effect on African-Ameri-
can women; however, the EEOC held that she had failed to establish the existence of a dispa-
rate impact, and thus found no violation of Title VII. Roehling, supra note 202, at 990.
298 E.g., Donoghue v. County of Orange, 848 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding plaintiff
was not able to adduce enough evidence to show a significant disparate impact on a protected
class, as opposed to herself); see also Wolf v. Frank, Civil Action 92-76270, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10356 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 1994) (determining evidence that one obese male was
hired where plaintiff, an obese female, was not, insufficient to make prima facie claim of sex
discrimination); Maranto & Stenoien, supra note 189, at 20 (observing that challenges to em-
ployer weight limits based on disparate impact theory have generally failed).
299 E.g., Jarrell v. E. Airlines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884, 891 (E.D. Va. 1977) ("There is
virtual unanimity among the Circuit Courts of Appeals that an employer may impose reasona-
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sets of circumstances: when the requirements are not equivalent, or when
the formal requirements are equivalent, but they are not enforced at the
same rate.
Disparate weight requirements have been involved in many of the
flight-attendant sex-discrimination cases that have been brought since the
1970s: Like the rest of the culture, airlines have tended to be far more
concerned with the slimness of their female flight attendants than with
that of men. From the mid-1970s onward, there usually was a height-
weight chart for male flight attendants, but the charts were often sub-
stantially more generous for men, either allowing them more latitude for
weight gain before disciplining or terminating them, or using different
standards entirely (for example, a common practice was basing the re-
quirements for men on the men's "large-frame" Met Life tables, but
those for women on the women's "medium-" or "small-frame" tables). 300
Disparate enforcement claims were also raised in many of the flight-at-
tendant cases, as in some of the more recent cases involving female ap-
plicants for law-enforcement positions; in these cases, men are not
disciplined at all, or are given a slap on the wrist, for exceeding the
maximum allowable weight, while women are rejected as job applicants,
disciplined, or terminated for equivalent infractions. 30'
Once the Title VII plaintiff makes a prima facie case of disparate
treatment, if the employer cannot produce evidence of a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the different and more burdensome weight
standards, the employer then has to prove that the discriminatory stan-
dards can be justified as bona fide occupational qualifications "reasona-
bly necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
ble personal appearance requirements upon its employees and such standards need not be iden-
tical for males and females. Such practices are said to be non-sexually discriminating."). See
also Dennis M. Lynch, The Heavy Issue: Weight-Based Discrimination in the Airline Industry,
62 J. AIR L. & COMMERCE 203, 212-15 (1996).
300 E.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 2000) (chart for men
based on "large-boned" tables; chart for women based on medium-frame tables); Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 73 C 1082, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11790
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (tables based on different frame sizes, plus different standards for excep-
tions); Laffey v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 773 (D.D.C. 1973) (no real require-
ments for male cabin attendants at all). But see Jarrell, 430 F. Supp. 884 (holding that use of
different body-frame charts by sex does not constitute a violation of Title VII).
301 E.g., Donoghue, 848 F.2d at 932-33 (holding that summary judgment on disparate
treatment claim was improper because "[t]he facts tend to suggest that Donoghue was ...
penalized with memoranda, push-ups and laps more frequently, that her weight was the basis
for negative evaluations when overweight males were not so evaluated, that she was not
warned of a need to improve, and that she was not given the opportunity to repeat the train-
ing."); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11790, at *29 (male flight attendants not
disciplined for exceeding weight maxima). But see Jones v. City of Mount Vernon, 114 F.
Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding no violation despite fact that female, non-obese plain-
tiff rejected for exceeding weight maximum demonstrated that overweight and even obese men
were not rejected).
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enterprise" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). This is a fairly onerous bur-
den for an employer to meet: Under Diaz v. Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc., the customer-preference rationale that employers often use to
justify having appearance standards at all will not justify a sex-discrimi-
natory standard unless "the essence of the business operation would be
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively. ' 30 2 Thus, a
Title VII plaintiff who can establish irrebuttable disparate requirements
or enforcement based on sex (or any of the other protected categories 30 3)
is in a fairly strong position. Without such proof, however, Title VII
affords the weight-discrimination plaintiff little. As discussed above,304
the courts have been consistent in holding that weight- and appearance-
based requirements and restrictions, even if the rationale is purely cos-
metic and inherently gendered, do not violate Title VII so long as they
are implemented in a gender-equitable manner. Thus, while Title VII
claims are often "thrown into" weight-discrimination lawsuits among
other claims, they seldom succeed, and advocates in these cases have
largely turned to other statutes, especially the ADA and the Rehabilita-
tion Act.
b. The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [hereinafter RA] and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 were both enacted in response to concerns
regarding discrimination against individuals with physical and mental
disabilities. The RA prohibits discrimination against the disabled by all
departments and agencies of the federal government, by entities under
contract with federal departments and agencies to provide goods and ser-
vices valued at more than $2500, and by any program or activity receiv-
ing federal financial assistance.30 5 The ADA extends and amplifies the
protections of the RA to the private sector: In broad outline, Title I pro-
hibits employment discrimination by private employers, employment
agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor-management committees,
and requires employers to make reasonable accommodations to other-
wise qualified disabled individuals 3°6; until the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Garrett,30 7 it also covered state governments. Title II prohib-
302 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
303 In the case of other categories, it only gets harder. For race, there is no BFOQ or
business necessity defense, period.
304 See supra notes 220-224 and accompanying text.
305 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (2001).
306 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (1995); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (2001) ("When an
individual's disability creates a barrier to employment opportunities, the ADA requires em-
ployers to consider whether reasonable accommodation could remove the barrier.").
307 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Congress failed validly to abrogate state sovereign
immunity with regard to Title I in light of the lack of sufficient evidence of underlying dis-
crimination by the states).
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its discriminatory exclusion of qualified disabled individuals from "ser-
vices, programs, or activities of public entities," including public
transportation.30 8 Title III prohibits discrimination by privately owned
public accommodations. 30 9 Title IV amended the Communications Act
of 1934 to require telecommunications providers to provide relay ser-
vices for those with hearing or speech impairments. 31 0 Finally, Title V,
entitled "Miscellaneous Provisions," 3 11 includes, inter alia, construction
provisions to the effect that "nothing in this Act shall be construed to
apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... or the regulations issued by Federal agen-
cies pursuant to such title,"3 12 and that "[n]othing in this Act shall be
construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of
any Federal law or law of any State or political subdivision of any State
or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for the rights of
individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this Act."3 13 Both stat-
utes, as well as their implementing regulations, indicate that the legal
standards for finding unlawful discrimination on the basis of disability
are essentially the same under the ADA and the RA. 31 4 Thus, for the
purposes of the following discussion, the ADA and RA will mostly be
treated together, unless explicitly indicated otherwise; I will also be fo-
cusing on the definitional and employment-discrimination provisions of
both statutes, as these have by far spawned the most administrative inter-
pretation, case law, and commentary. 31 5
Title I of the ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discrimi-
nate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disa-
bility of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensa-
tion, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
308 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65 (1996). Interestingly, the Garrett Court observed explicitly in
dicta that the evidentiary record was much stronger with regard to discrimination by the states
under Titles II and III of the ADA. 531 U.S. at 371-72 & n.7. The logical inference to be
drawn is that the holding in Garrett does not compel the same conclusion with regard to these
other statutory provisions; it remains to be seen whether the current Court will sustain this
logic.
309 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89 (1996).
310 47 U.S.C. § 401 (1996).
311 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-13 (1996).
312 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1996).
313 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (1996).
314 E.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 793(d), 794(d) (2001) (providing that the ADA standards
are to apply to the RA); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(g) (2001) (noting that Congress intended all
RA caselaw on what constituted a disability to apply to the ADA); see also BELTON & AVERY,
supra note 296, at 663-64.
315 For a discussion of the problem of obesity discrimination in public accommodations
and Title III of the ADA, see generally O'Hara, supra note 236.
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ment." 316 Unlike Title VII, which nowhere defines discrimination, the
ADA contains an exhaustive definition of discrimination that covers a
wide range of employment practices, including both disparate-treatment
and disparate-impact theories.317 Thus, in suits brought under the ADA,
it is often quite clear what kinds of activities on the employer's part con-
stitute discrimination; the contention, particularly with regard to weight-
based discrimination claims, tends to surround the "qualified individual
with a disability" provision. Here, too, the ADA itself is not silent, and
the EEOC has also provided extensive guidance and insight in the ADA
implementing regulations as to how these statutory terms are to be con-
strued. Thus, before moving into looking at what the courts have done
with weight-based discrimination claims brought under the ADA and
RA, it will be useful to look at what Congress and the EEOC have had to
say on the matter.
The ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires. ' 318 The statute and the regulations then
break this definition down into its component parts, and provide further
clarification on each. "Disability," for example, has a three-pronged def-
inition under the ADA: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment. '319 The administrative regulations then de-
fine the "physical or mental impairment" component as:
(1)Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more
of the following body systems: neurological, musculo-
skeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive,
genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endo-
crine; or (2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such
as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional
or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.320
The EEOC Interpretive Guidance also notes,
It is important to distinguish between conditions that are
impairments and physical, psychological, environmental,
316 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1995).
317 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (1995).
318 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1995).
319 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1995).
320 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2001).
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cultural and economic characteristics that are not impair-
ments. The definition of the term "impairment" does not
include physical characteristics such as eye color, hair
color, left- handedness, or height, weight or muscle tone
that are within "normal" range and are not the result of a
physiological disorder. The definition, likewise, does
not include characteristic predisposition to illness or
disease.321
"Major life activities" are considered to be "those basic activities
that the average person in the general population can perform with little
or no difficulty[. . . .including] caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing."' 322 However, this list is not exhaustive; the EEOC also notes that
"other major life activities include, but are not limited to, sitting, stand-
ing, lifting, reaching. ' 323 As to "substantially limits," the regulations
stress that it is not enough to simply have a physical or mental impair-
ment; there is a threshold degree of limitation:
(1) The term substantially limits means: (i) Unable to
perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly
restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or dura-
tion under which the average person in the general popu-
lation can perform that same major life activity.
(2) The following factors should be considered in deter-
mining whether an individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity: (i) The nature and severity of the im-
pairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term im-
pact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of
or resulting from the impairment. 324
Thus, with regard to the life activity of working, "[t]he term sub-
stantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as com-
pared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abili-
ties. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a
321 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h).
322 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(i), app. 1630.2(i).
323 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i).
324 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(l)-(2).
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substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." 325 Ulti-
mately, the regulations counsel that determination of whether an impair-
ment in a particular individual rises to the level of a substantial limitation
should be made on a case-by-case basis;326 however, the EEOC does
expressly note in the Interpretive Guidance that "except in rare circum-
stances, obesity is not considered a disabling impairment. '327
Part C of the statutory definition of disability, being "regarded as"
having a disabling impairment, is an extremely significant provision in
weight-based discrimination cases; in cases where the plaintiff is not
overweight enough to be considered disabled, or where the court rejects
entirely the notion of obesity as a disability, this is the sole potential
avenue for relief under the ADA. As the regulations explain, "regarded
as" having a disabling impairment can mean any of three things:
(1) The individual may have an impairment which is not
substantially limiting but is perceived by the employer or
other covered entity as constituting a substantially limit-
ing impairment; (2) The individual may have an impair-
ment which is only substantially limiting because of the
attitudes of others toward the impairment; or (3) The in-
dividual may have no impairment at all but is regarded
by the employer or other covered entity as having a sub-
stantially limiting impairment.328
In the regulations, examples are given to illustrate each of these
possibilities. 329 The example for (1) is an employee who has controlled
high blood pressure that is not substantially limiting, but whose employer
reassigns him or her to less strenuous work because of fears that s/he will
have a heart attack. That for (2) is an employee with a prominent facial
disfigurement or nervous tic, where the employer discriminates against
that employee because of customers' negative reactions to him or her.
And (3) is illustrated by an employer who fires an employee on the basis
of an untrue rumor that the employee has AIDS.
As to why the ADA would provide coverage for someone who is
not actually disabled under the terms of the statute, the EEOC explains in
the Interpretive Guidance that the rationale is drawn from that in School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline,330 where the Court described the rea-
soning behind Congress's amending the RA to include such coverage:
325 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
326 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j).
327 Id.
328 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(I), app. 1630.2(1).
329 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(1).
330 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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The amended definition reflected Congress' concern
with protecting the handicapped against discrimination
stemming not only from simple prejudice, but also from
"archaic attitudes and laws" and from "the fact that the
American people are simply unfamiliar with and insensi-
tive to the difficulties confront[ing] individuals with
handicaps." S. Rep. No. 93-1297, p. 50 (1974). To
combat the effects of erroneous but nevertheless preva-
lent perceptions about the handicapped, Congress ex-
panded the definition of "handicapped individual" so as
to preclude discrimination against "[a] person who has a
record of, or is regarded as having, an impairment [but
who] may at present have no actual incapacity at all."
... Such an impairment might not diminish a person's
physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless
substantially limit a person's ability to work as a result
of the negative reactions of others to the impairment. 33'
Echoing Arline, the Interpretive Guidance lists some common attitu-
dinal barriers that frequently result in exclusion by employers of individ-
uals with disabilities: concerns regarding productivity, safety, insurance,
liability, attendance, cost of accommodation and accessibility, workers'
compensation costs, and acceptance by coworkers and customers. 332
Thus, the EEOC, like Congress and the Supreme Court, recognizes that
these "myths, fears, and stereotypes" about the disabled can function as
major barriers to equal opportunity even where no actual disabling im-
pairment is present. 333
For disparate-treatment types of charges, the implementing regula-
tions note the availability of the "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"
defense, as under Title VII. 334 With regard to disparate-impact claims,
the main defense available to employers under the ADA is set forth in 42
U.S.C. §12113(a): An employer's qualification standards, tests, or selec-
tion criteria that screen out or tend to screen out individuals with disabili-
ties may be permissible if such standards, tests or criteria are job-related
and consistent with business necessity. The regulations note that such
criteria must be related to an essential function of the job that the em-
ployee cannot perform, even with a reasonable accommodation. 335
What have the courts made of weight-discrimination claims under
the RA and Title I of the ADA? The results have been fairly inconsistent,
331 480 U.S. at 278-79, 283 (citation omitted).
332 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(1).
333 Id.
334 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(a).
335 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(1).
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even with regard to the most basic questions. Thus, for example, there
has been no consistent answer to whether obesity alone falls within the
statutory definition of "disability," or whether some other physiological
condition that causes the obesity is also required. In Cook v. Rhode Is-
land,3 3 6 one of the first major weight-discrimination cases to reach the
federal courts, the First Circuit took the former position. Plaintiff-appel-
lee Bonnie Cook had worked as an institutional attendant at a state resi-
dential facility for the mentally retarded from 1978 to 1980, and again
from 1981 to 1986, both times departing voluntarily and "leaving behind
a spotless work record." 337 When she reapplied for the same position in
1988, she was 5'2" tall and weighed 320 pounds. The nurse who con-
ducted her pre-hire physical found no limitations that would have af-
fected Cook's ability to do her job, but the state agency balked at hiring
her, claiming that her weight "compromised her ability to evacuate pa-
tients in case of an emergency and put her at greater risk of developing
serious ailments ... [that] would promote absenteeism and increase the
likelihood of workers' compensation claims. '338 Cook sued the state in
federal court under RA section 504, and a jury ultimately found in her
favor and awarded her $100,000 in compensatory damages.
On appeal, Rhode Island contended, inter alia, that because morbid
obesity was both "mutable" and voluntary-i.e., within the patient's con-
trol-it could not qualify as a disability under the RA; that Cook's rejec-
tion from this one job was not sufficient to constitute widespread
perception of a substantial limitation; and that the limitations of her
physical condition actually disqualified her for the position she sought.
The First Circuit rejected all of these claims. It had no problem with the
trial court's willingness to accept the characterization of morbid obesity
itself as a disabling impairment, remarking that the plaintiff "presented
expert testimony that morbid obesity is a physiological disorder involv-
ing a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the neurological ap-
petite-suppressing signal system, capable of causing adverse effects
within the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. '339
The Cook court also held that being unable, or regarded as unable, to
work at a particular class of job within a given field constituted a sub-
stantial limitation for the purposes of the statute:
[A]n applicant need not subject herself to a lengthy se-
ries of rejections at the hands of an insensitive employer
to establish that the employer views her limitations as
336 10 F.3d 17 (lst Cir. 1993).
337 Id. at 20.
338 Id. at 21.
339 Id. at 23; see also Polesnak v. R.H. Mgmt. Sys., Inc., No. 95-1705, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22106, at *12 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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substantial. If the rationale proffered by an employer in
the context of a single refusal to hire adequately evinces
that the employer treats a particular condition as a dis-
qualifier for a wide range of employment opportunities,
proof of a far-flung pattern of rejections may not be nec-
essary. Put in slightly more concrete terms, denying an
applicant even a single job that requires no unique physi-
cal skills, due solely to the perception that the applicant
suffers from a physical limitation[ I] that would keep her
from qualifying for a broad spectrum of jobs, can consti-
tute treating an applicant as if her condition substantially
limited a major life activity, viz., working.340
Other courts, however, have subsequently adopted positions incon-
sistent with Cook (while usually avoiding outright disagreement). For
example, the court in Smaw v. Virginia Department of State Police took a
much broader view of the plaintiff's "field" in determining whether her
weight constituted a substantial limitation on her ability to work, holding
that, because she could still work in "the field of law enforcement as a
whole," she was not disabled under the statute.34' In Morrow v. City of
Jacksonville, the district court cited the Fourth Circuit's decision in Tor-
casio for the proposition that "neither the statutes, nor the caselaw, nor
the applicable regulations clearly establish that the ADA or the Rehabili-
tation Act apply to the obese. '342 And the Second and Sixth Circuits
have both held that obesity, standing alone, cannot constitute a disabling
impairment without some further underlying physiological disorder. 34
3
The courts in these subsequent cases have usually distinguished
Cook by explaining its holding as limited to morbid obesity,344 to obesity
with an underlying physiological disorder, or to situations where the
obesity is so great that it constitutes more of an "impairment" than in the
case at bar. However, while the plaintiff in Cook did perhaps weigh
more than some of the plaintiffs in these other cases, there was nothing
else substantively different about her obesity or her job-related limita-
tions; it was not as if she suffered from a disorder like Prader-Willi syn-
340 Cook, 10 F.3d at 26.
341 862 F. Supp. 1469, 1475 (E.D. Va. 1994).
342 941 F. Supp. 816, 827 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (citing Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th
Cir. 1995), notwithstanding the fact that Torcasio was not an employment discrimination case,
but a prison conditions case involving Title II, not Title I, of the ADA).
343 Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997); Andrews v. Ohio, 104
F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997).
344 This despite the fact that, "[a]ccording to settled mainstream medical thought, [non-
morbid] obesity is a physiological condition or disorder that involves and affects the musculo-
skeletal, respiratory, cardiovascular, digestive, skin, or endocrine systems-the definition of
impairment under the ADA." SOLOVAY, supra note 176, at 149.
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drome or hypothyroid, and she was far from unable to perform the duties
of her job (in fact, the issue of "accommodation" does not even seem to
have arisen). Rather, the real distinction turned on the First Circuit's
opinion that "[tihis pathbreaking 'perceived disability' case presents a
textbook illustration of the need for, and the operation of, the prohibition
against handicap discrimination contained in section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 . . . . 345while the other circuits did not share the
same view.
As may have already become evident, many of the ADA/RA
weight-discrimination cases founder on the "substantial limitation in a
major life activity" requirement. The ways in which the courts have con-
strued this requirement often result in plaintiffs finding themselves be-
tween the proverbial "rock and a hard place" of the "qualified
individual" and the "disability." On the one hand, if they are not capable
of performing the essential functions of the job, they are not "qualified"
and thus don't qualify for protection under the statute; on the other, if
they are not so disabled that they can't perform not only their job but any
other job within their field (however broadly or narrowly the court con-
strues "field"), then they are not "disabled" enough to qualify for protec-
tion under the statute. 346  For many employment-discrimination
plaintiffs, not just those bringing weight-based claims, their ability to do
their jobs as well as anyone else is understandably a point of pride (and
the basis for their lawsuit in the first place), and in depositions or in-court
testimony, overweight and obese plaintiffs often insist truthfully that they
345 Cook, 10 F.3d at 20.
346 This catch-22 was further exacerbated for many ADA plaintiffs by a trio of Supreme
Court decisions handed down in June of 1999: Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516
(1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999); and Albertson's v. Kirkingburg, 527
U.S. 555 (1999). In Murphy and Sutton, the Court held that the determination of whether an
individual is disabled under the ADA must be made with reference to, and taking into account,
all corrective and mitigating measures used by the individual. In Kirkingburg, the Court em-
phasized that the existence of disabilities must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and thus
a given physical condition is not per se enough to establish disability. Taken together, as one
commentator notes, these decisions significantly narrow the scope of protection under the
ADA, and increase the likelihood of "the bizarre situation that a person is disabled enough to
be refused a job, but not disabled enough to seek protection under the ADA." SOLOVAY, supra
note 176, at 136 (discussing Sutton).
However, Solovay continues, these decisions may not actually have much of a direct
negative impact on fat-as-disability cases; in fact, she suggests that they may even be some-
what beneficial, in two respects. First, she suggests, under Sutton, people who are on diets or
other weight-loss programs and experiencing physical side-effects "may suddenly have an ar-
gument for coverage under disability law." Id. at 137. Second, Sutton may help in those cases
where an overweight litigant is questioned about his/her efforts to lose weight, due to its hold-
ing that "[t]he use or nonuse of a corrective device does not determine whether an individual is
disabled; that determination depends on whether the limitations an individual with an impair-
ment actually faces are in fact substantially limiting." Id. at 137 (quoting Sutton, 527 U.S. at
488) (first emphasis added).
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can perform the full range of tasks associated with their jobs. 347 How-
ever, by being honest about their competence, these plaintiffs usually
succeed in convincing the courts that they do not fall within the statutory
definition of "disability," and thus seldom prevail. Or, some courts have
held that job-related tasks (such as lifting a certain amount of weight),
despite being job-related, are not "major life activities," and thus the im-
pairment is insufficient to qualify for protection. 348 This was, in fact, the
position just adopted by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufac-
turing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, where the Court held unanimously
that "[wihen addressing the major life activity of performing manual
tasks, the central inquiry must be whether the claimant is unable to per-
form the variety of tasks central to most people's daily lives, not whether
the claimant is unable to perform the tasks associated with her specific
job."349
One might think that the availability of the "perceived disability"
theory under § 12102(2) would help obese and overweight employment-
discrimination plaintiffs to get around some of these problems. After all,
the core of a "regarded as" claim is not that the individual actually is
disabled, or is substantially limited with regard to a major life activity,
but that the individual is so perceived. However, as construed by the
courts, the shift from an actual to a perceived disability theory has not
proved to be all that helpful for plaintiffs, because the thorny definitional
problems of actual disability are simply transferred to someone else's
perspective. Thus, instead of having to prove that one suffers from a
substantially limiting physical or mental impairment, the "perceived"
plaintiff has to prove that his/her employer perceives him/her as suffering
from such an impairment. The question of what is an impairment, and
what is substantially limiting, still remains.
In particular, substantial confusion persists as to whether the per-
ceived disability is required to be one that, if it existed, would qualify as
an "actual" disability. Thus, to take the example of controlled high blood
pressure from the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 350 the condition itself
would not qualify as an actual disabling impairment, but because the
employer perceives it as disabling, according to the EEOC it constitutes
347 E.g., Furst v. N.Y. Unified Court Sys., No. 97-CV-1502 (ARR) 1999 WL 1021817, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Nedder v. Rivier Coll., 944 F. Supp. 111, 117-18 (D.N.H. 1996); Wolf v.
Frank, Civil Action 92-76270, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10356, at *9 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
348 E.g., Hazeldine v. Beverage Media, Ltd., 954 F. Supp. 697, 703-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
Wolf, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10356, at *14.
349 Toyota Motor Manuf., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, _ U.S. - , 122 S. Ct. 681, 693
(2002). Thus, the Court went on to explain, the Sixth Circuit should have focused on the fact
that the respondent was able to "tend to her personal hygiene [and] carry out personal or
household chores," and taken this into account in assessing whether she was substantially
limited in performing manual tasks at work. Id.
350 See supra text following note 329.
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sufficient grounds for a perceived disability claim. The question of obes-
ity's relationship to this example has plagued the courts: Is obesity like
controlled high blood pressure, or is it more like hair or eye color, char-
acteristics that do not constitute bases for disability claims regardless of
the employer's perception of them? Many courts have essentially opted
for the latter analogy,35' with the result that a perceived-disability plain-
tiff is practically required to be actually disabled in order to prevail under
the ADA; at least one circuit court has indicated its categorical skepti-
cism of perceived-disability claims based on obesity.352
This is not to say that no weight-discrimination plaintiffs ever pre-
vail under the ADA/RA: Some do. However, those who do tend to be
the "easier" cases that circumvent the difficulties inherent in defining
"disability" under the statute-morbidly obese plaintiffs with substantial
enough "impairments" to seem obvious to a lay person (i.e., a judge or
juror), who also have strong evidence of their employer's perception of
them as undesirable because of their disabilities. Thus, for example, the
plaintiff in interest in EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines was a morbidly obese
woman who applied for a driver position with the defendant, had a very
strong interview and passed the driver's test, but failed the pre-hire phys-
ical because the doctor felt that she "would not be able to move swiftly in
the event of an accident. '353 Both the doctor's report and his testimony
revealed that inability to move swiftly was not on the Department of
Transportation's list of disqualifying conditions for drivers, and thus that
"Texas Bus Lines made the decision not to hire Manuel because of a
perception of disability based on 'myth, fear or stereotype.' . . . Texas
Bus Lines regarded Manuel as disabled and, therefore, unable to work as
a driver based on her alleged impaired mobility without the benefit of
objective medical testing or findings. '354
Thus, if one is morbidly obese, and if one's particular physical im-
pairments are neither too great nor too minor, and sufficiently relevant to
one's job without being so narrow as to be irrelevant to a "major life
activity," and one has strong, direct evidence of bias on the part of one's
employer, the ADA and RA may afford relief for weight-based discrimi-
nation. In other words, the vast majority of weight-based discrimination
in employment remains out of the reach of these statutes. However, this
may not be an entirely nonsensical result, particularly in light of the cen-
351 E.g., Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997); Andrews v. Ohio, 104
F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997); Fredregill v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1082
(S.D. Iowa 1997); Morrow v. City of Jacksonville, 941 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
352 Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of S.E. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 665 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting
that "[w]e have not recognized a cause of action against an employer who discriminates
against an employee because it perceives the employee as disabled by obesity.").
353 923 F. Supp. 965, 967 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
354 Id. at 979.
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tral purpose of the ADA and RA: to ensure "equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency" for in-
dividuals with disabilities. 355 As noted previously,356 one of the provi-
sions of the ADA that Title VII lacks is the requirement of "reasonable
accommodation," which reflects the understanding that some disabled in-
dividuals are truly "differently abled" than the nondisabled, and must be
allowed to perform to the full extent of their abilities where possible.
The concept of accommodation would make little sense in the Title VII
context, where the logic underlying the statute is precisely that race and
gender almost never create material differences in how an employee per-
forms his or her job.
In looking at the problem of weight-based discrimination in em-
ployment, then, the question becomes: Is an overweight (or obese, or
morbidly obese) individual more like the intended beneficiary of the
ADA, or like that of Title VII? This is admittedly a difficult question to
answer, particularly in light of the fact that even individuals covered
under the ADA do not necessarily require accommodation (e.g., the per-
son with a prominent facial scar or controlled high blood pressure).
However, on the whole, the intuition of the EEOC and of many of the
judges considering these cases seems to be that most instances of weight
discrimination are not quite the same as discrimination against the dis-
abled. Where an individual is overweight or "simply," rather than mor-
bidly, obese, the nature of the discrimination they suffer often seems to
have more to do with appearance, and the stereotypes and prejudices
associated with that appearance, than with a judgment that the person is
less capable because of a disability.357 Although this can certainly be
true of some discrimination against morbidly obese individuals as well,
the courts and the EEOC also acknowledge that there is a much stronger
perception of extremely obese 358 individuals as "impaired" within the
meaning of the ADA.
Moreover, while there is no question in my mind that all victims of
weight discrimination deserve protection, I do question whether we
355 42 U.S.C. § 12101(8) (2001).
356 See supra text accompanying note 306.
357 See Chai R. Feldblum, The Americans with Disabilities Act Definition of Disability, 7
LAB. LAW. 11, 19 (1991) ("Coverage of a person based on weight depends on whether the
person's weight is simply a physical characteristic or a physiological disorder .... [S]ome
individuals may be so obese that their obesity is a recognizable physiological disorder. Be-
cause the obesity of such individuals usually interferes with walking or breathing, these indi-
viduals would be covered under the first prong of the [ADA] definition.").
358 See, e.g., Jane Byeff Kom, Fat, 77 B.U. L. REV. 25, 42-43 (1997). It is not clear,
however, that the actual threshold for this degree of disabling obesity necessarily corresponds
to "morbid" obesity. As Kom points out, drawing the line at morbid obesity is both arbitrary
and itself "grounded on group-based assumptions rather than on the kind of individual consid-
eration mandated by the ADA."
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would like the results if all such victims were included within the scope
of the ADA. A judgment that all individuals who are above, or even
20% above, the ideal weight for their height are "disabled" plays
squarely into the stereotypes and prejudices against the overweight that
perpetuate weight-based discrimination in the first place. There is a rea-
son, beyond history, why a phenomenon like race-based discrimination
should not have been covered under a disability statute even though em-
ployers and others "perceived" nonwhites as less intelligent and having
poorer impulse control: because nonwhites are in no way "differently
abled" than whites-just like the vast majority of overweight and obese
people. Requiring all weight-discrimination plaintiffs to come into court
and present a litany of physical complaints in order to prevail just rein-
forces the message-to judges, to juries, and to the broader culture-that
the ramifications of extra body weight run far deeper than they actually
do. For anyone who truly aspires to put an end to weight-based discrimi-
nation, this cannot be the best solution.
Thus, the ADA should be available for any plaintiff who is obese
enough to require accommodation or who is actually sufficiently im-
paired to fall within the statutory definition of disability. 359 However,
for those who suffer weight-based discrimination at lower levels of obes-
ity or impairment, the ADA does not, cannot, and probably should not
provide a sufficient remedy.
2. State Law
Only Michigan and the District of Columbia currently have laws
specifically prohibiting discrimination on the basis of weight. Michi-
gan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act declares that "Itihe opportunity to
obtain employment, housing and other real estate, and the full and equal
utilization of public accommodations, public service, and educational fa-
cilities without discrimination because of religion, race, color, national
origin, age, sex, height, weight, familial status, or marital status as pro-
hibited by this act, is recognized and declared to be a civil right." 360
D.C.'s human rights law provides:
It is the intent of the Council of the District of Columbia,
in enacting this chapter, to secure an end in the District
of Columbia to discrimination for any reason other than
that of individual merit, including, but not limited to,
discrimination by reason of race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sex-
359 But see id. at 44 (arguing that "protecting only those who are morbidly obese has an
intrinsic gender bias [because] [s]tudies indicate that fat women, unlike obese men, suffer
discrimination at weights below the level of morbid obesity").
360 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.548(102) (Michie 2000).
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ual orientation, familial status, family responsibilities,
matriculation, political affiliation, disability, source of
income, and place of residence or business.36'
The D.C. statutory definition of "personal appearance" is:
the outward appearance of any person, irrespective of
sex, with regard to bodily condition or characteristics,
manner or style of dress, and manner or style of personal
grooming, including, but not limited to, hair style and
beards. It shall not relate, however, to the requirement
of cleanliness, uniforms, or prescribed standards, when
uniformly applied for admittance to a public accommo-
dation, or when uniformly applied to a class of employ-
ees for a reasonable business purpose; or when such
bodily conditions or characteristics, style or manner of
dress or personal grooming presents a danger to the
health, welfare or safety of any individual. 362
Neither statute has spawned much in the way of weight-related liti-
gation. Art Stine, Ombudsman of the Michigan Department of Civil
Rights, has explained that this may have to do with the tolerant attitudes
in his state that allowed for easy passage of the legislation in the first
place:
Michigan added height and weight to the Civil Rights
Act in 1975, and its passage was very easy. Given that
certain height and weight characteristics tend to be
linked to certain ethnic groups or to women, state legis-
lators decided it was all the more appropriate to include
body size as part of a comprehensive antidiscrimination
policy. There wasn't even much debate about it. Since
then, I'd estimate that eight or ten weight-related cases
have come before our commission for a decision. Over-
all, . . . people simply haven't had a big problem with
it.363
In other states, victims of weight-based discrimination have sought
relief under more general antidiscrimination laws, usually human rights
or civil rights statutes. Here, as might be expected, the results have been
extremely mixed. Where suits have been brought under state disability
statutes (each, it should be noted, with its own definition of disability), a
361 D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.01 (2001).
362 D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.02 (2001).
363 SOLOVAY, supra note 176, at 245.
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few state courts have found that obesity qualifies as a disability; 364 more
have held that even morbid obesity, without an "underlying physiological
cause," does not.365 As early as 1967, one state court recognized that the
denial of a teaching license on grounds of obesity was arbitrary and ca-
pricious, 366 other cases, however, reflecting exactly the kinds of stereo-
typed judgments discussed by the EEOC in the Interpretive Guidance to
the ADA, have added to the state caselaw on obesity discrimination.
Thus, the court in Greene v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. found that "the de-
fendant could reasonably believe ... that [a morbidly obese] applicant
would be less apt to be an efficient, safe, illness-free, and claims-free
employee than one not having those conditions. I find that a person with
plaintiffs weight and blood pressure would be significantly more apt to
suffer a heart attack or a stroke than one not having those conditions. '367
Likewise, in Metropolitan Dade County v. Wolf, the court held that a
weight requirement for a communications operator in the fire alarm divi-
sion of the county fire department was grounded in business necessity
under Griggs, since "there is reasonable basis to conclude that one who
is obese or overweight, as for other health conditions, is thereby more
likely to become disabled during employment, to the detriment of the
county financially and otherwise. '368
Plaintiffs in state cases also often run afoul of the same "disabled
but not too disabled" problem that arises in federal court: The more they
maintain that they are as capable of doing their job as anyone else, the
less likely they are to be found disabled. This was the case in Cassista v.
Community Foods, Inc., where the court observed, in finding the plaintiff
insufficiently impaired, "Indeed, plaintiff alleged in her complaint and
maintained at trial that despite her weight she is a healthy, fit individ-
ual."'369 And the decision in Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Commonwealth
relates that:
The physician who examined Ms. English ... testified
that [she] had no gastrointestinal problems, no cardio-
364 E.g., Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., 594 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991); State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 478 N.Y.S.2d 982 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
365 E.g., Greene v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 548 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (obesity not a
handicap under Washington law because condition not "immutable"); Cassista v. Cmty. Foods,
Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793
(N.D. 1987); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Commonwealth, 591 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991); Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 448 A.2d 701 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
366 Parolisi v. Bd. of Examiners of New York, 285 N.Y.S.2d 936, 940 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1967) ("[O]besity, standing alone, is not reasonably and rationally related to the ability to
teach or maintain discipline. It may be noted that there is no record of a teacher being denied
appointment because of underweight; or of a male teacher, because of overweight.").
367 548 F. Supp. at 5.
368 Metro. Dade County v. Wolf, 274 So.2d 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
369 856 P.2d at 1154.
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vascular disease or history, no hypertension, no pulmo-
nary disease and no peripheral edema. The physician
concluded by saying that there was nothing physically
wrong with Ms. English that would prevent her from
performing any of the duties of the job she was seeking.
As we have already noted, Ms. English said in her
deposition that she was perfectly able to do a regular
day's work at all times and that work had never bothered
her. PECO has admitted that Ms. English could perform
the duties of Customer Service Representative.
On the basis of this summary of the evidence we
must conclude that .. .Joyce English had no non-job
related disability or handicap whatsoever. 370
Meanwhile, as Solovay points out, a plaintiff's choice to depict him-
or herself as a helpless victim can really pay off: Thus, in the Rossi case,
the plaintiff, fired from his job for weighing over 400 pounds, sued for
wrongful dismissal, claiming that he was disabled by a physiological dis-
order and was seeking weight-reduction treatment-and the jury
awarded him $1 million. 371 Even this approach, however, is far from
failsafe: In Sellick v. Denny's Inc.,372 a public accommodations case, a
severely obese man (weighing more than 400 lbs.) sued after (a) the res-
taurant was not able to accommodate him with an appropriate chair or
bench and (b) a waitress then rudely pointed and shouted at him in front
of a restaurant more than half full of patrons. The court found for
Denny's on all claims, holding that the waitress's conduct did not
amount to intentional infliction of emotional distress because it "did not
constitute extraordinary transgression of the bound of socially tolerable
conduct, '3 73 and noting that the Oregon disability-discrimination statute
did not even mandate a "reasonable accommodation" requirement. 374
Thus, despite the fact that the states generally have greater legisla-
tive latitude, particularly in the area of civil rights, than the federal
courts, it appears that most of them are not using that latitude to provide
broader protection against weight-based discrimination, either under a
disability paradigm or otherwise. The landscape of state weight-discrim-
ination law is mostly just as confused and as underprotective as in federal
law, and in several cases the courts and/or legislatures have explicitly
370 448 A.2d at 707.
371 SOLOVAY, supra note 176, at 154.
372 884 F. Supp. 388 (D. Or. 1995).
373 Id. at 391.
374 Id. at 393.
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looked to the federal disability paradigm of the ADA and RA as a
model. 375
3. Local Ordinances
Only two cities-San Francisco and Santa Cruz, California-have
ordinances prohibiting discrimination based on physical appearance. 376
The amendment to San Francisco's preexisting Police Code that incorpo-
rated height and weight as characteristics protected against discrimina-
tion in employment, housing, and public accommodations was passed in
May 2000. Santa Cruz passed its ordinance prohibiting arbitrary dis-
crimination on the basis of "age, race, color, creed, religion, national
origin, ancestry, disability, marital status, sex, gender, sexual orientation,
height, weight, or physical characteristic" in 1992. ("Physical character-
istic" was defined as "a bodily condition or bodily characteristic of any
person which is from birth, accident, or disease, or from any natural
physical development, or any other event outside the control of that per-
son including individual physical mannerisms. '377)
What has been most striking about both of these ordinances has not
been their legal impact-in fact, as Santa Cruz City Attorney John G.
Barisone explained, as of 1999, "[t]o my knowledge, there have been no
private enforcement actions taken pursuant to the ordinance and the City
has not been required to take any formal enforcement actions as a result
of ordinance violations. '378 Rather, the most substantial ripples created
by the passage of these statutes appear to have been in the popular media.
As Marc Slavin, a deputy city attorney in San Francisco, put it, "Much of
the coverage of this ordinance has been of the 'another crazy idea from a
crazy city' variety." 379 His observation is completely consistent with the
media reaction not only to the San Francisco ordinance, but to the Santa
Cruz ordinance eight years earlier. Despite the fact that, as Professor
Post has observed, from its earliest draft the Santa Cruz law had "specifi-
cally permitted employment decisions to be based on appearance if 'rele-
vant to job performance,'1, 38 0 the immediate reaction was hysteria on the
part of outraged employers and nightmare scenarios about being required
to hire cross-dressing journalists. 38 1 One journalist, in responding to the
375 E.g., Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1149 (Cal. 1993); Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. Commonwealth, 591 A.2d 281, 282-83 (Pa. 1991).
376 SAN FRANCISCO, CA., POLICE CODE art. 33 (2000); SANTA CRUZ, CA., MUNICIPAL
CODE ch. 9.83 (1992).
377 SANTA CRUZ, CA., MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.83.02(13) (1992).
378 SOLOVAY, supra note 176, at 244.
379 Mark Lisheron, The BIG Issue; Cars Cramp, Seats Squeeze, Ads Taunt. Life is Hard
if You're Fat. Should We Have Laws to Make it Easier?, AusrIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, May
27, 2000, at Dl.
380 Post, supra note 80, at 4.
381 Id. at 3.
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passage of the San Francisco ordinance, fretted that "doctors now can be
hauled into court if they suggest while removing a corn that an obese
patient should lose some weight. '382
Eight years into the life of the Santa Cruz statute, and a year after
the passage of San Francisco's, none of the doomsday scenarios have
come to pass. However, other cities and towns do not seem to have
followed suit, nor do they seem likely to do so anytime soon. 383 Perhaps
the journalist who observed that these ordinances "scare the pants off of
the rest of America" was right. If he was, though, this is exactly why
these laws, and others at the federal and state levels, are so desperately
needed in the first place.
D. WEIGHT DISCRIMINATION AND THE REMEDY PROBLEM
At the end of this Part, two basic points should be very clear. First,
weight-based discrimination in this country is not a joke: It is a very real
phenomenon and has far-reaching negative effects similar to those of dis-
crimination based on protected categories like race and gender. Second,
we do not have adequate remedies for this form of discrimination in
place at any level: federal, state, or local. The very few states and cities
that have subject-specific weight-based antidiscrimination provisions are,
perforce, those where the general communities are probably the most
receptive to these kinds of measures, and the local ordinances in particu-
lar have evoked responses that indicate just how strong anti-fat stereotyp-
ing and prejudice continue to be elsewhere.
At the present time, a majority of commentators and advocates to
address the subject push for expansion or construction of existing disabil-
ity-discrimination laws to cover weight-based discrimination. 384 While it
382 Rowland Nethaway, San Francisco Cracks Down on Menace to Civil Rights: The Fat
Joke, Cox NEWS SERVICE, May 10, 2000. This same author, in his short (628-word) commen-
tary full of terms like, "San Francisco's hefties," "oversized residents," "beefy Bay-area re-
sidents," and "stamp[ing] their ponderous feet," also noted one supporter's opinion of the
ordinance: "'It's important that this law passed because it can have far-reaching implications
outside of San Francisco,"' and observed that "[t]hat scares the pants off the rest of America."
383 See Christopher J. Martin, Protecting Overweight Workers Against Discrimination: Is
Disability or Appearance the Real Issue?, 20 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J. 133 (1994).
384 E.g., Kom, supra note 358; Karen M. Kramer & Arlene B. Mayerson, Obesity Dis-
crimination in the Workplace: Protection Through a Perceived Disability Claim Under the
Rehabilitation Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 41 (1994);
O'Hara, supra note 234; Christine L. Kuss, Comment, Absolving a Deadly Sin: A Medical and
Legal Argument for Including Obesity as a Disability Under the Americans With Disabilities
Act, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 563 (1996); Jeffrey Garcia, Note, Weight-Based
Discrimination and the Americans With Disabilities Act: Is There An End in Sight?, 13 HOF-
STRA LAB. L.J. 209 (1995); Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 282. But see Elizabeth M.
Adamitis, Comment, Appearance Matters: A Proposal to Prohibit Appearance Discrimination
in Employment, 75 WASH. L. REV. 195 (2000); Karol V. Mason, Note, Employment Discrimi-
nation Against the Overweight, 15 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 337 (1982).
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is certainly true that, under existing laws, weight-discrimination plaintiffs
probably fare better under disability statutes than anywhere else, ulti-
mately this avenue is inadequate as a solution to the problem. First, at-
tempts to characterize varying degrees of overweight and obesity as a
disability have mostly fallen flat, not only with the courts and legisla-
tures, but with overweight individuals and the general public themselves.
The definitional problems occur not only at the level of convoluted statu-
tory language and contradictory medical evidence, but with the common-
sense notions of disability that will govern, for many jurors, the out-
comes of cases that attempt to characterize an overweight or obese per-
son as disabled. With so many Americans overweight or obese, it is a
safe bet that just about everyone knows someone who falls into either
category; and my intuition is that if one were to ask anyone whether they,
or their Uncle Bob who has about fifty pounds to lose, were disabled, the
answer would usually be a quick "no." (If Uncle Bob had a hundred and
fifty pounds to lose, or had trouble standing or walking because of his
weight, the answer would probably be different.)
The common-sense intuition with regard to weight and disability
here is important not because of any inherent primacy to common-sense
intuitions (many of which are mistaken), but because in this case it hap-
pens to reflect what we know of medical and functional reality: Different
people respond differently to the same degree of overweight and obesity,
but overall, some levels of obesity are disabling and others are not.
Where an individual's weight does rise to the level of a genuine func-
tional impairment, and/or where accommodation is required, it should be
covered under statutes designed to protect disabled individuals from dis-
crimination. But attempts to label every overweight person in this coun-
try as disabled, well-meaning though they may be in terms of securing
protection against discrimination, are destined to founder, or, worse, to
create a backlash on the part of juries and employers-and they probably
should.
The majority of weight-based discrimination operates in ways very
similar to discrimination based on characteristics like race. By this, I do
not mean that obesity discrimination is "like" racial discrimination in
general, or that the magnitudes are comparable. What I do mean, how-
ever, is that antifat stereotypes and prejudices are usually based in the
kind of animus and disapproval that have surrounded race-based discrim-
ination throughout its history. Few people "hate" the disabled or con-
demn them morally, because most disabling conditions are widely
recognized to be outside the individual's control; the stereotypes sur-
rounding disability generally have more to do with discomfort, unfamili-
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arity, and underestimating the capabilities of disabled individuals. 385
While it is true that the stereotypes and prejudices surrounding race in
this country have also involved unfamiliarity and underestimation, they
have also been laced with a strong dose of moral condemnation and ani-
mus that was used to rationalize slavery and other subordinating phe-
nomena. In this sense, antifat prejudice is more like race than like
disability, and while it may not have anything near the same degree of
institutional history, it does show up extensively in modem social sci-
ence research and in the popular culture.
As the current jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment and Ti-
tle VII makes clear, however, there are no better options than the disabil-
ity paradigm present in current American law. This is precisely because
antidiscrimination law in America is shackled by a needlessly formalis-
tic, categorical and intent-based approach to protection from discrimina-
tion. Certainly, a subject-specific remedy for weight-based
discrimination would help, but lopping off this Hydra's head would only
result in others growing into its place. Rather, as I shall argue in the next
Part, we need to reconceive antidiscrimination law to reflect more
closely and accurately how prejudice and discrimination function.
III. TOWARD A MEANINGFUL REMEDY: BROADENING THE
REACH OF FEDERAL ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
For good or evil, private employers are generally free to be arbitrary
and even capricious in determining whom to hire, unless the employer
somehow discriminates on the basis of race, national origin, alienage,
age, sex, or handicap status, considerations which Congress has deter-
mined to be prohibited. 386
The formalistic concept of antidiscrimination law enshrined in our
constitutional jurisprudence has deep roots in American law, and contin-
ues to permeate it to the present day. Its influence is so strong that, even
in a statute like the ADA-passed by Congress in 1990 on the basis of
extensive, long-term findings of discrimination against the disabled-the
drafters still felt compelled to argue explicitly as justification for the stat-
ute that the disabled meet the Carolene Products definition of a suspect
class:
385 As one scholar notes, this distinction was also observed by the United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights: "In 1983 the United States Commission on Civil Rights observed that,
while most disability rights laws were explicitly modeled on prior civil rights statutes and are
part of 'the general corpus of discrimination law,' '[h]andicap discrimination and, as a result,
its remedies differ in important ways from other types of discrimination and their remedies."'
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RaV. 413, 429-30 (1991).
386 Tudyman v. United Airlines, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 739, 746-47 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
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[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular
minority who have been faced with restrictions and limi-
tations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political.
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics
that are beyond the control of such individuals and re-
sulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative
of the individual ability of such individuals to participate
in, and contribute to, society.387
The inclusion of this language in the ADA illustrates just how
profound its impact remains-all the more so because, to be blunt, much
of it is either absolutely or relatively incorrect as applied to the disabled.
The thorny definitional problems and the hundreds of pages of ink
spilled on defining "disability" seem to belie any characterization of the
disabled as "discrete and insular." While the disabled have certainly
faced unjustified restrictions and limitations, their "history of purposeful
unequal treatment" arguably pales in comparison to that of racial minori-
ties and women.388 How the disabled have been "relegated to a position
of political powerlessness" is unclear, since voting rights were never
contingent on being free of disability, as they were on race or gender; to
the extent that their lack of power might stem from economic factors,
this is no less true of some non-disabled populations, and moreover has
never been held to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The rest
of the language about characteristics beyond the individuals' control and
stereotypic assumptions is certainly accurate with respect to the disabled
(as well as a lot of other groups), but not present in the Carolene Prod-
ucts formulation.
Let's be honest: The reason we have laws like the ADA is not be-
cause we have suddenly "discovered" a new group whose experience is
"just like" that of women and racial minorities. The reason is that, in
spite of the entrenched, formalistic logic of American antidiscrimination
law, on some level Congress knew better. Faced with extensive evidence
of a stigmatized group's routine deprivation of equal opportunity and
human rights, Congress decided to transcend constitutional formalism
387 42 U.S.C. § 12101(7) (2001).
388 At least, as far as facial, statutory subordination on the federal level is concerned. But
see Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 377-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing exten-
sive congressional findings of unjustified discrimination against the disabled by state govern-
ments and officials); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding constitutionality of a
Virginia statute authorizing involuntary sterilization of institutionalized "feebleminded" indi-
viduals); James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the New Federalism May
Affect the AntiDiscrimination Mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L.
REv. 91, 133 (2000) (observing that documentation exists with regard to historical practices
such as forced sterilization and inappropriate institutionalization).
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(even as it paid it lip service) and create a remedy in the present for a
problem in the present. To be sure, the disabled had been suffering from
unequal opportunity in this country for some time, but anyone who seeks
to argue that past, facial, intentional governmental action is the sole ac-
ceptable rationale for antidiscrimination law in this country must be con-
strained to argue that laws like the ADA are a mistake.
For those of us (including Congress) who feel that laws like the
ADA are not a mistake, the next step is to recognize that the logic under-
lying them is not mistaken, either. While the Carolene Products concep-
tion embodies one example of a stigmatized group in need of civil rights
protection, it is not the only legitimate model. Another equally legiti-
mate model is that embodied in the ADA: a group not necessarily dis-
crete, insular, or politically disempowered by the state, but one that
experiences constant widespread, harmful, irrational discrimination that
can be extensively documented on a systemic level. This model, which
includes the disabled, must also include the victims of other equivalent
forms of discrimination-such as discrimination on the basis of weight.
The case study of weight-based discrimination in Part II of this arti-
cle thus serves a couple of purposes. First, it provides a detailed illustra-
tion of another form of discrimination that should be amenable to
remediation by American antidiscrimination law-if not on the Carolene
Products model, then certainly on that of the ADA. Second, it demon-
strates the profound negative consequences of trying to wedge a blatant,
harmful form of discrimination under preexisting statutes that do not fit
and that reflect a different model of discrimination. The result is not
only that the victims of such discrimination are left without a remedy,
but that the statutes, enacted to remedy other problems, come to be seen
as abused and exploited, and their credibility ultimately becomes
undermined.
There are broader points to take away from the discussion on
weight-based discrimination, however. Most importantly, the discussion
in Part I of how prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination function
serves to illustrate that, just as different kinds of cancers are all cancer,
weight discrimination is fundamentally no different from any other form
of discrimination-race, gender, national origin, or disability; the sole
difference is in where it manifests itself. Weight-based discrimination is
not "special" in any etiological sense, although it may be with regard to
its extensive social harms. Thus, the remedy I have described here
should be available not just for weight discrimination, but for any form
of irrational discrimination that can meet the ADA/weight standard of
documentation and proof. Moreover, because "intent" is not special or
distinct either, as other commentators have urged before me, disparate-
"FREE TO BE ARBITRARY AND ... CAPRICIOUS"
impact theories of discrimination should be widely available on the same
terms as they are under the ADA.
Perhaps the most common and immediate objection to an argument
of this sort is the "line-drawing problem": why won't this mean a flood
of legal claims for "whiny-voice" discrimination, or "grouch discrimina-
tion"? 389 Effective though the dreaded "slippery slope" may sometimes
be as a rhetorical device, here the traction is easily sufficient to forestall
the descent. As the statutes in Michigan and D.C., and the ordinances in
San Francisco and Santa Cruz, illustrate perfectly, recognizing a broader
range of discrimination than the federal status quo does not automatically
imply recognizing every conceivable type of irrational decision as
grounds for legal action. In addition to defenses like business necessity
and the BFOQ requirement, which would screen out genuinely job-re-
lated claims once such a provision was in place, statutory coverage of
"new" types of discrimination would also require extensive factual find-
ings and demonstration that the form of discrimination in question exists
and is widespread. And, in the end, if a form of discrimination can be
proven to be intensely problematic, then the fact that it seems funny or
trivial to some is hardly a substantive argument for excluding it from
coverage.
A note on form is warranted here: Although it may be useful analyt-
ically to think of this approach as the "expansion" of Title VII to cover
additional categories of discrimination, in practical terms the actual
amendment of Title VII is both descriptively unlikely and, normatively,
probably undesirable. As one commentator, who was intimately in-
volved in the drafting of the ADA, explains:
Attempts to amend the 1964 Civil Rights Act to include
people with disabilities continued periodically through
the mid-1980s. Such efforts were opposed, privately at
least, by traditional civil rights groups who feared that
opening up the 1964 statute to any substantive amend-
ments might also risk reopening the bill to weakening
changes by opponents of civil rights, and thereby endan-
ger previous hard-fought legislative victories. 390
If we were starting from scratch, and/or with a different legislative
process, overhauling and expanding Title VII would be the most logical
place to start, but as Burgdorf and others have acknowledged, in the real
world of American politics it is probably most important to preserve
what protections we have. Thus, working within the categorical frame-
work of current American antidiscrimination law, the best hope for
389 Post, supra note 80, at 8.
390 Burgdorf, supra note 385, at 429.
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broadening its coverage is probably the same approach as that taken with
the ADA: new statutes that could be presented in Congress as "[simple
completion of] the path taken in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which pro-
hibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin, and
later, gender." 391 As the presence of the Carolene Products language in
the ADA illustrates, this firm grounding of statutory change in preexist-
ing civil rights statutes, no matter how strained the details may actually
be, often proves to be crucial to the passage of a new law, both in practi-
cal terms and in terms of creating the moral imperative to overcome the
inertia of the status quo. 39 2
While my argument certainly applies to the states as well as to the
federal government, it is particularly important that the federal legislature
be able to set the standard of acknowledging previously underprotected
forms of discrimination. Experience with the ADA and other civil rights
statutes has shown that federal law can have a profound top-down influ-
ence on state law.393 In particular, it often functions not only as a direct
model for various aspects of state laws, but as a "floor" lower than which
the states cannot go. The states would still be free to experiment with
differing degrees of protection, but where a problem is nation- and cul-
ture-wide, it is important that the solution be so too.
IV. CONCLUSION: A FINAL NOTE ON BLAME
Pace Justice Powell, 394 societal discrimination, where it is severe
and clearly documented, is already enough to justify remediation, and,
where new forms of it can be proven, it should continue to be enough.
This is not because people who stereotype and discriminate are "bad"
and deserving of punishment, but because those who are unfortunate
enough to possess traits that are the targets of irrational stigmas do not
deserve to shoulder the whole burden of being stigmatized.
In our culture, we are generally much happier when we can isolate a
cause-effect relationship, point a finger at the cause, blame it, and act
391 Arlene B. Mayerson & Silvia Yee, The ADA and Models of Equality, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
535, 536 (2001). This line of presentation becomes even more important in the context of
statutory amendment. See Arlene Mayerson, The Americans with Disabilities Act-An Historic
Overview, 7 LAB. LAW. 1, 3 (1991) (discussing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, a
successful amendment of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to prohibit discrimination
on the basis of disability).
392 See Mayerson & Yee, supra note 391, at 535-36 ("There can be no doubt that [the
American] civil rights tradition was used as a strong moral imperative in advocating for a
comprehensive civil rights statute for people with disabilities.").
393 See supra text accompanying note 375.
394 And Judge Friedman, the Michigan district court judge who authored the recent opin-
ion in Grutter v. Bollinger, declaring unconstitutional the University of Michigan Law
School's race-conscious admissions policy. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 869
(E.D. Mich. 2001).
"FREE TO BE ARBITRARY AND .. . CAPRICIOUS"
accordingly. 395 We are a lot less comfortable with situations we do not
understand, where there is a problem and we do not have anyone (not
even ourselves) to blame. Who or what is to blame for prejudice? In
terms of what causes it, psychology has multiple answers, and while
overt, "hot" bigots are certainly part of the problem, they are not respon-
sible for creating the predilection or for sustaining it. Stereotyping,
prejudice, and discrimination are a part of how we all function: a fact of
life that we all have to deal with. Who or what is to blame for obesity in
America? The problem is extremely complex-if we really knew the an-
swer, we would be further along on a solution-but the evidence indi-
cates that individual lack of willpower or moral failings are probably the
least to blame.
American antidiscrimination law needs to develop a better way of
handling situations where there may be no discrete person, group, or pe-
riod of history to blame, but where we still desperately need a solution.
The current battle raging over race-based affirmative action provides a
stark example of the conflict between the blame-based model of antidis-
crimination law, which resists "introducing" biases into a status quo pre-
sumed to be neutral, and one that understands the status quo as inherently
biased and seeks to redistribute the consequences of that bias more equi-
tably. As this article has argued, the controversy over weight-based dis-
crimination provides another such example. While there is no question
whatsoever that the subordinating practices of the past may have been
extremely severe, and perhaps even "blameworthy," Professor Siegel is
correct in warning that we should not allow them to serve as an excuse
for perpetuating the subordinating practices of today. Regardless of
whether we are all aware that we are participants in "societal" discrimi-
nation, no meaningful remedy will be possible until we can acknowledge
that we all need to participate in the solution.
395 See Crandall & Martinez, supra note 189, at 1173 (observing that American culture is
a "culture of blame," in which "Americans strongly believe in the metatheoretical assump-
tions ... that make causality, controllability, and responsibility so important for blame and its
attendant consequences.").
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